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INTRODUCTION
 As the nation races into the 2016  
presidential elections season, it is worthwhile to 
stop the headlong rush and take a look back and 
see what we may have learned from our recent 
history, specifically what that history can teach 
us about our presidential elections and their 
long-term impact on the political system, how 
public policy is made and the prospects for any 
party to be able to govern in modern America 
when the nation is so deeply divided by parti-
sanship, ideology, geography, class and race.
 One of the most important lessons is that 
the nominations process goes a long way toward 
determining the outcome of the election and 
helps to define and clarify the images and issue 
positions of both parties and the choices they are 
offering for the American people. Our  
presidential nominations are driven by the  
primaries and to a lesser extent the caucuses.  
Both are devices designed to allow the  
American public the maximum opportunity to 
participate in the selection of the presidential 
candidates.  Primaries are an American  
invention and they are uniquely important in the 
selection of a wide range of candidates for local, 
state and national office and most importantly, 
the presidential candidates.  
 No other nation uses primaries nearly 
as extensively as we do especially in the selec-
tion of the chief executive.  Primaries open up 
the process and make it much more transparent 
and more widely participatory than the party 
insider selection processes used in other major 
democracies.  Our primaries and caucuses make 
it possible for an extraordinarily wide range of 
candidates to run for president.  This means that 
even people with little or no party identification 
or party record can compete for the  
nomination (e.g. Bernie Sanders for the  
Democrats and Donald Trump for the  
Republicans).  Our nomination system  
encourages ordinary voters to become widely 
and deeply engaged in the selection of the  
nominees. The candidates who run and espe-
cially those who are chosen and the stances they 
take during the nominations process then help 
define the image of the parties, solidify their 
ideological and issue positions and channel their 
actions over the next four years.  
 Out of all the millions of adult  
Americans who are theoretically and legally  
eligible to become president, only two will  
become the official nominee of the Democratic 
and the Republican Parties.  One of these two 
then is almost certainly going to take the oath of 
office and become our next president on  
January 20, 2017.  Given the impact of this 
intense political season, this paper will examine 
some of the following important questions 
about the presidential selection process through 
the lens of recent electoral history.  
 *How will the nominations process  
involving the boiling down of all the potential 
candidates into two contenders most likely play 
out in 2016 and what will be the impact of the 
nominations conflict on the potential outcome 
of the presidential election?
 *How will the parties try to manage 
that nominations process in a manner which 
will enhance their chances for victory in the 
general election and ensure their futures as 
they contend for control of presidential power 
and control of the national government?  
 * How will the president ultimately 
chosen run a campaign which sets out his or 
her agenda and manage the campaign in such 
a way as to have any chance at all of getting 
that presidential agenda translated into public 
policy?  
 These nominations campaigns are full 
of drama and conflict and high intensity media 
scrutiny and intrusion.  They are led by outsized 
personalities who have the audacity to believe 
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deeply in their hearts that they can and should 
be president. 
 The successful candidates already 
possess, or must build quickly, a deep and 
experienced political organization capable of 
functioning at peak capacity for at least two 
years and spanning the continent.  The whole 
gigantic enterprise is undergirded by tens of 
millions of dollars for even the most remotely 
possible candidates and hundreds of millions 
for the front-runners.  This produces a buzzing, 
blooming confusion that is hard for the average 
voter to sort out.  It is particularly confusing in 
an open seat election year when no incumbent 
is running and which ordinarily attracts multiple 
candidates from both parties as is the case for 
2016.  The confusion multiplies in such an open 
seat year and the prologue to 2016 has seemed 
particularly complicated and confusing.
 However, there are distinct patterns and 
there are discernable regularities to these  
nominations and general election campaigns.  
They follow a set pattern of events and rules 
which are dictated by the political culture, the 
external political environment, the parties and 
interest groups involved, and especially by the 
official state and federal rules and requirements 
for running for president.
 It is possible to discern those regularities 
and to make some educated assessment of those 
candidates most likely to succeed in each  
election year and to handicap with some accu-
racy those who are likely to be the front-runners 
or in the first tier of contestants and those who 
are more likely to fill out the second tier and 
then the “dark horse” roles.  One of the  
objectives of this paper is to look at the historic 
record and see what we can learn from each of 
the quadrennial case studies as we analyze how 
the overall complex system functions to produce 
a nominee for the Democratic and Republican 
Parties each presidential election year. 
 I agree with the authors of the most 
popular and long-lived textbook in the field 
who argue that their basic theoretical position is 
based on the following perspective: 
“Put simply, the pages that follow argue that 
the institutional rules of the presidential nomi-
nations and election processes, in combination 
with the behavior of the mass electorate, struc-
ture the strategic choices faced by politicians in 
powerful and foreseeable ways” (Polsby, Wil-
davsky, Schier and Hopkins, 2016, xiii).
 The age of reform covered in this paper 
has clearly established that the rules have an 
important impact on how the game is played. 
Those rules include the national party rules 
which have become the most important  
component of the rules environment since the 
reform era. Both the Democrats and 
Republicans have a complex set of  
presidential selection procedures which in turn 
have a significant role in establishing the  
strategic environment and setting the parameters 
for each presidential aspirant.  These national 
party rules then sit on top of state laws and state 
party regulations which can sometimes even 
vary by party within the state.  Thus there are 
102 different sets of primary and caucus rules 
which must be understood and mined accurately 
for what they mean to that particular candidate.  
Proper strategic planning is a must for the  
competitive presidential campaign and that 
planning begins with a cold and rational look at 
the rules of engagement. 
John Jackson
December 2015
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CHAPTER 1
 The case studies from 1976 through 
2012 support the following basic generalizations 
that are usually applicable through multiple 
elections and are thus probability statements 
about how the nominations process will play 
out. These probability statements can be  
attached to the potential fate of each of the of-
ficial candidates. The basic “rules of the game” 
are as follows:
 *The successful candidate must run 
in and win a series of state based primaries 
and caucuses in order to be nominated. The 
last nominee who did not rely on winning the 
primaries was Hubert Humphrey in 1968.  Since 
the McGovern-Fraser rules were promulgated in 
1970 every successful candidate in both par-
ties has been required to prove his or her mass 
appeal by running in and winning a majority of 
the delegates coming out of the primaries and 
caucuses. This also means that the idea of a 
candidate emerging from a “brokered conven-
tion” which means that the choice is made in the 
convention itself, as was very possible before 
the reform era, is no longer a viable alternative.  
 *One of the early front-runners usual-
ly wins the nomination.  This is almost always 
true for the Republicans and usually true for the 
Democrats.  These front-runners are identified 
long before the first vote is taken in a primary or 
caucus.  
 *The Republicans traditionally nomi-
nate candidates who have run for president 
at least once previously.  They nominate 
experienced politicians with a political record 
and deep support in the power structure of the 
party. “Outsider” candidates are usually not 
welcomed in the Republican Party’s search for a 
nominee. The Democrats will occasionally, but 
rarely nominate an outsider or longshot candi-
date. (See Carter in 1976 and Obama in 2008).  
But generally the Democrats will also nominate 
a candidate with widespread early support in the 
party organization, and very few outsiders and 
unexpected candidates or candidates who are 
little known nationally at the start of the cam-
paign will last long in this high stakes game.  
 *The party activists in both parties 
have become the major influences in deciding 
who the nominees will be.  In the case of the 
Republicans this means that the candidate must 
first be supported by and acceptable to the right 
or the most conservative activists in the party.  
This is also generally true among the Democrats 
where the party activists are predominantly from 
the most liberal wing of the party. Both wings 
dominate in most of the primaries and caucuses 
but both parties usually have enough moder-
ates or pragmatists to temper the influence of 
the party wings somewhat, but there is always 
a struggle. How that intraparty struggle plays 
out has a very large impact on the nominee’s 
prospects in the general election since primaries 
expose and exacerbate those intraparty conflicts 
so publically. 
 This change from a more pragmatic and 
more diverse party base occurred during the 
era under study here.  That is, the Republicans 
became the clearly and avowedly conservative 
alternative and the Democrats have likewise 
become the liberal alternative since 1972.  As 
previous research by the author has demonstrat-
ed this shift and realignment of the party base is 
reflected in and largely led by the party activ-
ists, and most notably by the presidential party 
elites who are extremely active in helping their 
favored candidates at the primary and caucus 
stage of the process and many of whom become 
delegates to the national conventions (Kirkpat-
rick, 1976; Jackson, 2015).  This polarization 
also means that the centrist and more moderate 
activists have declined in numbers and influence 
in favor of the more ideologically motivated 
party cadres.
THE RULES OF THE GAME
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 *The candidate who raises the most 
money will usually win. Thus successful  
candidates must spend enormous amounts of 
time and energy on raising money.   It also helps 
to have significant personal resources to provide 
early seed money for the campaign or to be  
supported by interest groups and individual 
donors who can provide very substantial early 
financial support which is essential to staying 
alive in the nominations process. Raising early 
money is the most essential and crucial chal-
lenge any candidate will face.  
 The current campaign finance system 
was put into place as a series of reforms which 
passed the Congress in 1971 and 1974 to  
address some of the abuses magnified by the 
Watergate scandal.  This system depended  
centrally on public finance of campaigns 
through a voluntary check off chosen by income 
tax filers. Thus the mass public was playing a 
major role in financing the campaigns through 
the tax system although private and interest 
group donations were also important. The  
sources were also transparent because they had 
to be publically identified in filings with the 
Federal Election Commission.  
 This new reform system broke down 
initially in 2000 and then most notably in 2008 
when first George W. Bush refused public 
money for his primary campaign in 2000 and 
then Barack Obama refused public money for 
both the primary and the general election in 
2008 and again in 2012.  Their actions, plus U. 
S. Supreme Court decisions, most notably the 
Citizens United (2010) and McCutcheon v. FEC 
(2014) cases, led to the formation of “Super 
PAC’s” which allowed for the unregulated 
collection of very large sums of money, from 
individuals, corporations and unions, which 
could be spent in the campaigns and elections 
as long as these efforts were not directly coor-
dinated with the candidates’ campaigns, or were 
so-called “independent expenditures.”  In some 
cases, depending on how the PAC is registered 
with the FEC, these funds can now be do-
nated anonymously and thus the public cannot 
know where the funds originated (i.e. a 501 c 4 
PAC).   
 These developments marked the  
profound transition from a mixed source  
presidential campaign finance system that was 
at least partially funded by the public to one  
almost entirely dependent on private fund-
ing and one where public funding counts for 
less and less.  This also meant that a few very 
wealthy donors could adopt a single candidate 
and keep that candidate in the nominations race 
longer than had been the case in the former  
public finance system where the candidate who 
fell below a threshold of 10% of the votes in 
two consecutive primaries was no longer  
eligible for federal matching funds.  With almost 
total private financing, this is no longer a legal 
problem although it certainly can be a  
political problem if the candidate fails to win 
early contests.  
 *Sequencing is critical to the  
development of a successful candidate  
strategy.  The sequencing of the nomination 
contests is dictated by the state level laws and 
party rules covering when each contest will be 
held and who can vote in them.  Understanding 
that state level sequencing, and making the most 
rational choices possible within the parameters 
provided by the calendar is essential to a candi-
date’s probabilities for success.  This requires 
a state by state strategy as well as a national 
strategy which is very similar to the Electoral  
College based strategy required to win the  
general election.  
 *Campaign infrastructure and  
human resources are critical.  The candidate 
who attracts the most experienced high level 
 political operatives to the major staff positions 
at the national level and the most grassroots 
activists at the state and local levels will most 
likely win. These new political elites and  
insiders have become the most crucial 
component in putting together a viable presiden-
tial campaign.  At the same time the mass voters 
also play a critical role as the campaign must 
appeal to them successfully by winning prima-
ries.  The primaries used to be secondary and 
now they are primary influences in winning the 
presidential nominations. 
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CHAPTER 1 - THE RULES OF THE GAME
 *The preprimary presidential debates 
are a new obstacle and opportunity and have 
become an increasingly important part of the 
winnowing process.  The Republicans  
scheduled nine debates for the 2015-16  
nominations season and the Democrats sched-
uled six.  The debates are the first chance many 
Americans have to see the potential candidates 
and thus are the first chance some of the  
candidates have to make a first impression.   
The debates also draw enormous audiences in 
comparison to most other political events.  
In 2015 the first Republican debate drew a 
reported audience of 25 million viewers and 
the first Democratic debate drew approximately 
15.3 million (CNN News, October 14, 2015).  
The debates often reinforce the position of the 
dominant front-runner (e.g. Clinton in 2015) but 
can also elevate a relatively unknown candidate 
from the lower tier to the top tier (e.g. Fio-
rina and Carson in 2015).  A bad or lack-luster 
performance in one or two early debates can 
become the death-knell for one of the lower 
ranked candidates (e.g. Perry, Walker, Chafee, 
and Webb in 2016).  So, in summary, they are 
just one more hurdle, and an increasingly  
important one to be negotiated in the long  
marathon to the finish line.  
 *Winning early contests and winning 
often is essential to establishing momentum 
and staying alive in the race. The gaining of 
voter endowed credibility quickly is essential 
to an ultimate victory in the nominations con-
test.   If one does not win the early contests, 
he or she must at the very least do “better than 
expected” in some of the initial contests.  The 
candidate who does not win early can only be 
competitive in the long race if there is a solid 
core of dedicated ideological and issue oriented 
followers who will maintain their commitments 
to an intensely issue based candidate in spite of 
adversity.  However, these issue intensity  
candidates must also win some early tests to 
prove their mass appeal and to maintain them-
selves and their followers in the race.  Otherwise 
they become the also-rans, or the fringe candi-
dates fairly quickly. (See for example Ron Paul 
in 2012 or Pat Buchannan in 1992).  One must 
win often enough to gain the momentum neces-
sary to continue the race from week to week 
and to gain and maintain the image of being a 
potential nomination winner.  Such momentum 
is also necessary to weather temporary losses 
and maintain credibility with supporters, donors 
and the media alike.  
 *The candidate who relies heavily or 
almost exclusively on an initial one state vic-
tory strategy will almost certainly lose.  (See 
for example Paul Simon and Iowa in 1988 or 
Rudy Giuliani and Florida in 2008). The basic 
strategy simply must have a longer and larger 
time horizon and the campaign staff, ground 
level organization, and most importantly, fund-
ing, must be deeper than the typical shoe string 
foundation of the one state strategy.  This means 
that the once popular “favorite son” candidate 
strategy is no long viable.  
 A candidate can skip one or two of the 
very early primary or caucus states for plausible 
personal or political reasons; however, a  
candidate must enter and win or do better than  
expected in one or more early high profile 
contests to remain viable and the more early 
victories the better.  Those who cannot pass the 
early victory hurdle cannot last long because 
their financial support ordinarily will dry up and 
the mass media will cease to take them seriously 
and their news coverage will dry up. (Note: 
public funding used to cease if the candidate did 
not exceed the 10% minimum vote threshold in 
two consecutive primaries but, the political real-
ity has changed since the advent of very wealthy 
patrons who can fund a favorite candidate in 
spite of their failure to win early. However, even 
the most ardent admirers of a single candidate 
still lose faith and patience if their champion 
consistently fails to win some primaries). 
 *The party which holds the most har-
monious national convention will go on to vic-
tory in November.  A party which holds a na-
tional convention marked by highly publicized 
conflict and dissent will find it almost impossible 
to heal the internal wounds and achieve victory 
in the general election.  
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 National conventions have ceased to  
be the major arenas for making the key  
decisions on who will be the presidential 
nominee.  However, they are still important to 
the party activists and party organizations for 
adopting a platform and taking care of essential 
party functions, and they must ratify the earlier 
decisions of the primary/caucus season. They 
are even more important as the public face of 
the party and for kicking off the fall campaign.  
They are held both for the benefit of those in the 
convention hall and to make the best presenta-
tion to the national audience participating  
vicariously through the media (Shafer, 1988). 
They are still critical for creating and/or  
unifying the party coalition which will win the 
general election. 
 *Winning the party base, that is a 
large majority in the range of ninety percent 
or above of all party identifiers level, is  
necessary for a victory in the fall.  In the 
general election candidates must first secure the 
party base at this very high level before  
moving on to trying to attract the Independents.  
In a polarized era, almost no candidate is likely 
to gain more than about ten percent of potential 
cross-over voters from the other party.  The base 
is usually secured in the primaries season and at 
the latest by the time the national  
convention ends. Ideologically pure and even 
extreme appeals are often used to secure the  
party base first.  This feeds polarization which 
has become the major characteristic of the 
American political system. (See Appendix A 
for a synoptic account of these rules).  
9
CHAPTER 2
 As is usually the case when there no 
incumbent president running, the open seat at-
tracted a lot of early attention and speculation 
about the candidates for both parties in the run 
up to the 2016 presidential nominations contest.  
This would not be a normal open seat contest 
for 2016 though.  For one thing, the nominations 
contest started earlier than ever before.   
 Traditionally the “invisible primary” 
opens on the first day after the results of the 
mid-term elections are announced.  Those re-
sults become the grist for media and elite specu-
lation about what they mean for the fortunes of 
both parties and a variety of specific candidates 
as the nominations race gets under way for 
the next presidential election.  By the time of 
the mid-term elections in November of 2014, 
however, there had already been much media 
attention and early speculation about who would 
run on both sides and there had already been 
several published horserace polls.  An already 
long presidential nominations season became 
even longer in the run up to 2016. Undoubtedly 
the American people would tell the pollsters that 
they were sick and tired of the contest well 
before the first vote was cast, but the  
preliminaries start earlier and the campaigns get 
longer and more expensive with every cycle.  
The Republican Candidates
 The other difference for 2016 was that 
the out party, in this case the Republicans, ini-
tially fielded seventeen major candidates.  The 
ordinary size of the field for the out party in an 
open seat contest is no more than eight.  Thus, 
the seventeen official Republican candidates 
was more than double what is normally expect-
ed.  At the outset there were plenty of Repub-
lican candidates but a shortage of a clear and 
dominant front-runner.  The absence of a natural 
front-runner meant that a variety of uncon-
ventional and unexpected candidates emerged 
early with a strong interest in the presidential 
campaign and the chutzpah to believe that they 
could attain the Republican nomination and be 
elected president.
 Perhaps emboldened by Barack Obama’s 
audacity from 2008, an unprecedented bevy 
of young upstart first term-term U. S. Sena-
tors made all the early moves characteristic 
of presidential aspirants.  This group included 
Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, Senator Rand Paul 
of Kentucky and Senator Marco Rubio from 
Florida.  Each of these new comers aggressively 
courted the spot light in the senate, an institution 
where freshmen were traditionally expected to 
be seen but not heard. They were eagerly sought 
out by the national media soliciting their views 
on every controversial subject whether they had 
shown any particular legislative expertise in that 
area or not.  From the Senate, they were joined 
by Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina 
who was the only veteran U. S. Senator to make 
the race. Former Senator Rick Santorum who 
had run in 2012, and effectively came in second 
to Mitt Romney, also announced, but he had 
been out of public office for several years and 
had trouble attracting attention and support.
 The list of state governors, or former 
governors, was lengthy.  It included several who 
had deep experience in governing large states 
or who had run previously or toyed with earlier 
races.  This group included former Governor 
Jeb Bush of Florida, Governor John Kasich of 
Ohio, former Governor Rick Perry of Texas, 
former Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas, 
Governor Scott Walker of Wisconsin, former 
Governor George Pataki of New York, Governor 
Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, former Governor 
James Gilmore of Virginia and Governor Chris 
Christie of New Jersey.  
 The perennial narrative of The Ameri-
can people being “fed up” with Washington and 
longing for an “outsider” not from Washington,
THE CANDIDATES AND LESSONS FOR 2016
10
was advanced early and often by all of these 
candidates who touted their executive experi-
ence in the governor’s chair since it fit their 
own campaign rationale so well.  The narrative 
of the alleged deep longing for an outsider was 
also picked up by the media, and it is a theme 
that gains great credence every four years. 
Despite its familiarity, the narrative was treated 
as though it was a new and novel story and this 
year it had an extraordinary impact on the Re-
publican race for the nomination.
 No one could have anticipated just how 
virulent this quest for an outsider would become 
until the three Republicans who had never held 
public office made their appearance and started 
to dominate the conversation.  Donald J. Trump 
was at the head of this class of “non-politicians” 
who made a major impact on the Republican 
race for 2016.  Trump was a real estate entrepre-
neur who had inherited a small fortune from his 
father. 
 He parlayed that inheritance into a much 
larger real estate empire making his signature 
“Trump” name a landmark on many high profile 
trophy properties in New York City, Atlantic 
City, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los 
Angeles.  He often boasted about how rich he 
was as proof of his business acumen.  He  
variously reported his net worth to between 
eight and ten billion dollars although there were 
questions raised in the media about just how he 
had calculated those figures and how accurate 
they were. There was no log cabin to the  
penthouse mythology in Trump’s appeal.  
 Trump also developed the image and 
persona of being somewhat of a character with 
his flamboyant orange hair permanently fixed in 
a painfully obvious comb over that became the 
butt of endless late night comic jokes.  His stints 
as a reality television impresario, especially 
with his show “The Apprentice” made him a 
familiar figure on American television which is 
one of the most important assets all  
candidates seek.  When it comes to a name 
brand and a well-developed image, hurdles 
which are very hard to clear for many candi-
dates, Donald Trump already had those  
obstacles covered when he officially entered the 
race on June 16, 2015.  
 The other two non-traditional candidates 
were Carly Fiorina and Dr. Ben Carson.  Fiorina 
had been CEO of Hewlett-Packard and other 
big companies although she had been fired by 
the Hewlett-Packard Board.  She also had run 
for the U. S. Senate in California against in-
cumbent, Barbara Boxer, in 2010, a race which 
she lost by a ten percent margin in a year which 
was generally very good for Republican con-
gressional candidates.  Although she had never 
held public office, Fiorina often advanced the 
tried and true conservative mantra that business 
experience was exactly what the presidency 
demanded.  She was also the only female in the 
Republican race.  
 Dr. Ben Carson was a retired  
neurosurgeon who had a compelling Horatio 
Alger story of rising from rags to the top of his 
very demanding profession.  He had written a 
best seller book based on his personal life and 
accomplishments and very public professions 
of his Christian faith.  The fact that he was a 
conservative African-American also brought a 
modicum of diversity to a mostly white, male 
group and this appealed to some Republicans.  
So, the Republicans had three bona fide “out-
sider” candidates in the field of seventeen if one 
takes not having held public office as the defini-
tion of that term. 
 In August and September of 2015, with 
just over a year yet to go until the general  
election and just over four months until the Iowa 
Caucuses and the New Hampshire Primary, 
the Republicans had two outsiders, Trump and 
Carson, leading their ticket both nationally and 
in those early states and Fiorina was moving 
up noticeably in the polls after a well-reviewed 
performance in the first two Republican debates. 
Later, as more revelations about her record at 
Hewlett-Packard became more widely known, 
her poll numbers declined dramatically and she 
dropped out of the top tier of candidates.  By 
November, Trump and Carson continued to 
dominate and attracted close to a majority of all 
potential Republican primary voters.
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The Democratic Candidates
 The race for the Democratic nomination 
was not nearly as crowded.  It ultimately  
attracted only six official candidates.  This  
number is much more in line with the usual 
norms for an open seat.  This smaller number is 
probably influenced substantially by the pres-
ence of the early front-runner, Hillary Clinton, 
who many observers thought would be the dom-
inant and odds-on favorite.  By the measurement 
of objective credentials, the nation had not seen 
a candidate with the unique set of offices held 
and public image established quite like Hillary 
Clinton.   
 She had been First Lady when her 
husband, Bill Clinton, had occupied the White 
House from 1993 through 2000. From there 
Clinton went on to be elected U. S. Senator 
from New York in 2000 and was re-elected in 
2006.  She famously ran against Obama for the 
Democratic nomination in 2008 and their fight 
for the nomination took on historic proportions 
(Jackson, 2015 and 2009).  Then she became 
Secretary of State in Obama’s first term  
administration.  All of these prior offices al-
lowed her to claim a unique set of experiences 
and skills to be president and Clinton started the 
early campaign season as the clear front-runner 
for the Democrats.
 Another early favorite who appeared 
to be a potentially serious challenge to Hillary 
Clinton was Vice President Joe Biden. The early 
polls showed that he was a second strongest 
Democratic candidate behind Clinton although 
he later dropped to third in many polls.  
 He first ran for president in 1988 and in 
some respects had never stopped running. He 
was a declared candidate again in 2008 although 
he, along with other more traditional candidates, 
like fellow Senator Chris Dodd, were ineffectual 
in their challenge to Barack Obama and Hillary 
Clinton.  He did get to be Vice President, how-
ever, as a very nice consolation prize for that ef-
fort and in recognition of his three plus decades 
of service in the U. S. Senate and his legitimate 
credentials as Chair of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and before that Chair of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.  In addition, Biden 
was a creature of the Senate and knew all the 
major players on both sides of the aisle and was 
at home in the wheeling and dealing of the legis-
lative process.  
 This was an area where Barack Obama 
needed help and Biden became Obama’s most 
important ambassador to Capitol Hill during 
their eight years in office together. Biden how-
ever endured a family tragedy when his son, 
Beau Biden, who had been Attorney General of 
Delaware and was an Iraq war veteran, died of 
a brain tumor in May 2015.  This tragedy was 
compounded by the earlier loss of Biden’s first 
wife and daughter in a car accident when Beau 
was only five years old.  Biden’s family obliga-
tions and mourning for his son contributed to 
the sense that he might not have the emotional 
stamina to make what would be a demanding 
and brutalizing race if he chose to run.  His very 
public musing over that issue contributed to 
persistent doubts about whether he had the “fire 
in the belly” necessary to face up to the rigors 
and privations of the campaign trail for over a 
year.  He promised a final decision by the end of 
October and he opted not to run.  
 The other potential names in the early 
horse race polls included former Governor 
Martin O’Malley of Maryland, Senator Eliza-
beth Warren of Massachusetts, Governor Ma-
rio Cuomo of New York, Independent Senator 
Bernard Sanders of Vermont and former Senator 
Jim Webb of Virginia.  While each of these cur-
rently held office or had recently left office and 
was well-known in their own states, none had 
the high name recognition and national reputa-
tions that Clinton and Biden had long enjoyed 
(Balz and Clement, April 2, 2015). Warren and 
Cuomo ultimately did not make the race while 
Webb, O’Malley and Sanders did.  Later the 
others were joined by Lincoln Chafee, who was 
former governor of Rhode Island, and a former 
Republican Senator, who had defected to  
become a Democrat.
 After Warren very firmly rejected mak-
ing a run for the nomination,  the Democratic 
Party’s left wing turned to Sanders. He was 
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officially designated as an Independent in the  
U. S. Senate although he caucused with the 
Democrats. He variously called himself a  
Socialist or a Democratic Socialist which clearly 
indicated his position on the ideological spec-
trum.  The fact that he had never actually run 
before as a Democrat made it somewhat difficult 
to imagine that he could defeat Hillary Clinton 
although some on the left were certainly very 
loyal to him.  The early polls showed Warren 
was the most popular alternative for those who 
did not want Clinton.  
 Later the polls showed Sanders pick-
ing up most of the Warren support on the left 
after she declined to run.  He gained significant 
ground on Clinton in Iowa and New Hamp-
shire and came to tie or slightly exceed her in 
the polls for those two early states although he 
trailed her by a twenty percent margin in the na-
tion-wide polls (Real Clear Politics, September 
14, 2015). The media gave him enormous atten-
tion as they looked for an alternative to Clinton, 
and he emerged as the candidate most likely to 
succeed in taking on that mantle if Biden did not 
run.  The challenge for Sanders was to broaden 
his appeal while at the same time not losing 
those who were drawn to his ideological purity 
which is a challenge those who are most clearly 
ideologues always face.  
 As almost a footnote, the official list also 
included Lawrence Lessig, a Political Science 
Professor from Harvard, who filed his papers 
and was a single issue candidate running to 
attract media attention for his major cause of 
campaign finance reform.  Neither Chaffee nor 
Lessig got much media coverage or raised much 
money and neither figured in the mix of serious 
candidates for the nomination.  
 So who will the Democrats and the  
Republicans choose in 2016? It will cost hun-
dreds of millions, perhaps a billion dollars, for 
each of the parties and the nation to find the 
answer to that question.  However, it is certainly 
possible to discern some basic lessons from the 
past which can be helpful guideposts for the 
informed observer:
The Schedule and the Rules
 All of the candidates understand to a 
greater or lesser degree that the calendar and 
the rules of the game would play a critical role 
in how the game would be played.  Those who 
understand these external rules based pa-
rameters the most clearly and who develop a 
strategy designed for the long distance race 
are the most likely to win. The overall strategic 
plan must include a national component which 
weaves the disparate campaign components 
together and presents the major rationale for the 
candidate’s nomination and gives careful atten-
tion to the state-by-state coalition which must be 
knitted together to produce a winning combina-
tion of delegate votes for the first ballot roll call 
at the national convention.   The national and 
state party rules create a complex labyrinth of 
primaries and caucuses which has to be negoti-
ated very deliberately.  
 The Invisible Primary for this round 
started early, even before the mid-term elections 
in November of 2014,  and intensified the day 
after the congressional results which produced 
a massive Republican sweep were announced 
(Hadley, 1976).  The pre-nominations stage of 
the season had already grown intense by Janu-
ary of 2015 and only grew hotter during that 
year as candidates maneuvered and jockeyed 
to gain position, supporters and resources in 
the build-up to 2016. The official starting bells, 
the national conventions, were still over a year 
away.   
 The first-in-the nation Iowa Caucus 
would be held on February 1, 2016 followed 
quickly by the New Hampshire Primary on 
February 9.  Then the Nevada Caucuses for the 
Democrats would be held on February 20th 
and for the Republicans on February 23. The 
South Carolina Republican Primary was sched-
uled for February 20th and the South Carolina 
Democratic Primary for February 27th.  (See 
Appendix B for the full nominations sched-
ule).  These would be the only party sanctioned 
early events and anyone outside those windows 
would face penalties from the national parties.
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 According to the rules, all the other 
states were supposed to hold their contests 
between March 1 and the second Tuesday in 
June in order to be in compliance with  
national party rules.  March 1, 2016 became 
the opening of the official window when nation-
al party rules allowed all states to first schedule 
their primaries or caucuses without party ap-
proval.  It quickly became the focus of what was 
called the “SEC Primary” which designated it as 
a de facto southern primary for that year.  It was 
scheduled to include a total of thirteen states 
with eight being southern or border states on 
what has been dubbed “Super Tuesday.”   
 By pushing the opening rounds to later 
in the year, both parties were attempting to 
avoid the worst features of the “frontloading” of 
the primary calendar which previously had been 
moving more and more states toward early  
January of election year.  
 In addition, the Republicans adjusted 
their 2012 rules regarding the use of Propor-
tional Representation (P. R.) and Winner-Take-
All primaries.  In 2012 they required P. R. to be 
used in the states which held primaries before 
April 1. (The Democrats had emphasized P. R. 
since the McGovern-Fraser rules in 1970 and 
had officially mandated it in 1992).  The Repub-
licans changed the 2016 rules to require use of 
P. R. before March 15th.  Primaries held after 
that date could revert to the more traditional 
Winner-Take-All rules, which mean that those 
candidates who get the most votes in a primary 
will get all the delegates.  The Winner-Take-
All rules help the leading candidate to develop 
momentum and thus help the party to select its 
nominee earlier in the season (Jackson, 2015; 
Nagourney and Martin, September 19, 2015). 
Undoubtedly the RNC knew that and reduced 
the P.R. window in order to help encourage an 
early closure to their 2016 race.  
 The Republican National Committee in 
its meeting of January 15, 2015 also adopted 
a set of rules which attempted to significantly 
reduce the number of presidential nominee 
debates. The heavy use and focus on presiden-
tial nominations debates was a relatively new 
phenomenon which seemed to explode in 2012.  
The Republicans held more than twenty debates 
in 2012 and many observers contended the 
excessive number and rancor of those debates 
had harmed the party’s eventual nominee, Mitt 
Romney, in the general election since as the 
front-runner he was the target of most of the 
criticisms from his rivals. The RNC decreed 
there would be just nine sanctioned and official 
debates this time.  The DNC decreed they would 
hold only six presidential debates reflecting their 
much smaller field. Later, DNC Chair Debbie 
Wasserman Schultz faced intense pressure to ex-
pand the number although she resisted that pres-
sure knowing full well that more debates would 
only exacerbate the party’s internal divisions.   
 The RNC and DNC also specified the 
debates should start later than they had in 2012 
and be more tightly controlled as to sponsors 
and the threshold level criteria required for 
candidates to participate. With seventeen candi-
dates initially, this decision became especially 
relevant to the Republicans as they sought to 
winnow down their field as early as possible. 
 All of this procedural maneuvering was 
designed to tamp down the divisiveness of the 
nominations season and intra-party conflict 
which was so evident in 2012 as well as come to 
closure on the nominee much earlier than they 
were able to do in 2012 (Balz and Rucker,  
January 15, 2015). 
 Fox News held the first presidential 
primaries debate for the Republicans on August 
6, 2015, and the jockeying for position and 
to be included in the top ten was intense. Fox 
ultimately decided on the novel idea of having 
the top ten candidates in the polls included in 
the main event and those from number eleven 
to seventeen included in a warm up debate held 
earlier in the evening. The second debate was 
held on September 16, and competition for a po-
sition on the main stage was just as intense the 
second time around. The two tiered format con-
tinued although Carly Fiorina was added to the 
top group as a result of her rise in the polls.  In 
the interim, former Texas Governor, Rick Perry, 
dropped out on September 11th even before the 
14
second debate. The inexorable winnowing 
process had begun in earnest and had claimed 
its first victim.   
 Trump clearly got most of the media 
attention and credit for winning the first debate.  
He managed to dominate the stage and much 
of the discussion and his attacks on his oppo-
nents during and after the debate got most of 
the media’s attention.  For the rest of August, 
the media focused almost entirely on Trump 
and what he was saying.  The only way one of 
the other Republicans could garner much media 
attention was to attack Trump or be attacked by 
him.  Perhaps as a result of this outsized media 
attention Trump began a steady rise in the polls. 
  As August turned to September, Trump 
was leading polls of the Republican field at first 
with one fourth of the vote and then rising to 30 
percent.  Carson was steadily in second place 
and Bush, the former leader, struggled to stay 
in the top tier in most polls.  No one else was 
above single digits as the second debate opened 
on September 16th.  Trump bore the brunt of 
most attacks in the second debate and seemed to 
be much less dominant in that round.  Fiorina, 
and to a lesser extent Marco Rubio, got the me-
dia’s decision as to who “won” that debate.  Not 
surprisingly,  Fiorina and Rubio then moved up 
in the national polls while Trump’s lead shrunk 
a bit although he still retained the top spot (Rap-
peport, September 20, 2015). 
 Scott Walker dropped out on September 
21 amid poor polling results and having not 
done well in either debate. At that point two had 
already dropped out, but fifteen official candi-
dates remained.  
  The top three candidates for the Repub-
licans in September included Trump, Carson, 
and Fiorina, none of whom had ever held public 
office previously.  Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio 
rounded out the top five in both the Bloomberg 
and Quinnipiac polls (Real Clear Politics, Sep-
tember 24, 2015).  
 Media observers consistently empha-
sized that over fifty percent of potential Repub-
lican primary voters wanted an outsider nomi-
nee and took this as a sign of the much touted 
desire for a non-politician to lead the nation.  
However, this prevailing narrative did not take 
into account the staying power of the party’s 
establishment and both Trump and Fiorina had 
many detractors within the party itself and all 
three had numerous external critics.  Those 
critics apparently had a fairly quick impact on 
Fiorina as the critiques of her days as CEO 
spread after the second debate and her poll rat-
ings dropped from the top three into the second 
tier again. Over the long haul it seemed prob-
able that the experienced politicians would 
likely outlast the non-traditional candidates 
and one of them, most likely Bush or Rubio,  
would coalesce the party’s establishment and 
go on to become the party’s nominee.  It also 
seemed most likely that if Fiorina wound up 
on the ticket it would be as the GOP nominee 
for Vice President.  
 The first debate for the Democrats was 
held on October 13th in Las Vegas, Nevada.  
The next day polls and commentary by the 
media and political elites gave the victory to 
Hillary Clinton with Bernie Sanders also do-
ing fairly well.  They agreed that O’Malley had 
done perhaps an adequate job but had not done 
enough to break out of the second tier.  The oth-
er two, Chafee and Webb, were all but counted 
out of the race by the next day. On October 20, 
Webb officially dropped out of the race for the 
Democratic nomination.  He said he was no 
longer comfortable in the party and was actively 
considering a run as an Independent. Lincoln 
Chafee dropped out three days later on Octo-
ber 23rd.  He cited lack of widespread support 
and lack of money but promised to continue to 
advocate for a variety of causes he believe in.  
In effect the first debate had taken two casual-
ties.   The winnowing process had begun for the 
Democrats.  
 The commentators also claimed that the 
clear loser was Joe Biden since one of the major 
rationales for his candidacy was predicated on 
the possible collapse of Hillary Clinton’s cam-
paign and the predicted un-electability of Bernie 
Sanders. Neither prediction appeared to be very 
plausible after the first debate, and this made
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Biden’s path to a possible nomination seem 
much more obscure on October 14th than it had 
been the day before.  Biden dropped out on  
October 21st citing family considerations and 
his own lack of full and unequivocal commit-
ment to the challenge. So, in that one single 
week, three of the potential Democratic can-
didates dropped out of the race and only three 
real choices were left.  In the wake of Biden’s 
withdrawal, the polls showed Clinton to be 
in the strongest position nation-wide.  Her 
campaign organization, infrastructure and 
fundraising were imposing and she certainly 
appeared to be in a commanding position at 
that point; however, that presumptive front-
runner status would have to be confirmed by 
the votes of real people in the primaries and 
caucuses before her nomination was ensured.  
 On November 13th, terrorists attacked 
bars, restaurants and a concert hall in Paris.  130 
people were killed at the hands of radicals af-
filiated with or inspired by ISIS.  Naturally this 
tragedy then had an impact on the American 
presidential race.  On the Republican side the 
fallout helped Trump and Cruz both of whom 
were hard-liners on the questions of immigra-
tion and whether to allow any refugees from 
Syria to be relocated to the United States.  Ac-
cording to the polls Carson’s support took a 
significant nosedive as he struggled to articulate 
clear answers to major foreign policy questions.
 On the Democratic side the polls showed 
Hillary Clinton’s lead firming up and increasing 
to a two to one (60% to 30%) advantage over 
Bernie Sanders who also seemed to have dif-
ficulty with foreign policy and terrorism issues.  
Unexpected events, especially external threats 
to America’s security are always possible 
intervening influences and candidates are fre-
quently judged on how they respond to such 
challenges.
 After the debate season began the rules 
of the game were in place and started to dictate 
the pace and unfolding contours of the nomina-
tions contest. The debates and the daily cam-
paign grind would dominate the news through 
the remainder of the fall and into the winter. 
Traditionally this season is dominated by the 
mass media and the candidates and their cam-
paign organizations and a lot of political maneu-
vering and inside baseball.    
            The start of the new year is where the 
voters start to weigh in and make their power 
count. It would start with the Iowa caucuses on 
February 1st and the New Hampshire primary 
on February 9th, and would gain speed and in-
tensity every week after then.  (See Appendix B 
for the schedule).   Thus began the long internal 
party struggle to see which of these contenders 
would still be left standing when the Republi-
cans gathered in their national convention in 
Cleveland on July 18-21 and the Democrats in 
Philadelphia starting July 25.  
 Only two candidates ultimately will 
have the personal stamina, political acumen and 
formidable financial and organizational assets 
required to go the distance necessary to gain the 
grand prize, the presidential nomination of one 
of the major parties midway through the second 
decade of the Twenty-First Century.  
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            As a backdrop to 2016, this paper sets 
each earlier nomination contest and general 
election between 1976 and 2012 into a larger 
historic context. This discussion will provide 
some detail on the nomination and general elec-
tion contests for each year.  It will provide a 
roadmap to America’s presidential election his-
tory over four decades of turbulent and transfor-
mative political development.
           The 1976 election was chosen as a start-
ing point because it was the first nominations 
contest when the McGovern-Fraser Rules were 
fully implemented in the Democratic Party and 
this election, along with the Nixon –  
McGovern contest of 1972, actually started 
what is called the Reform Era which fundamen-
tally changed the way we make presidential 
nominations (Jackson, 2015; Kirkpatrick, 1976). 
Most notably it was the time when the presiden-
tial primaries became primary, that is, became 
the necessary route to victory in the nomination 
process.  The system shifted from one where 
the party elites or insiders could dominate the 
nominations -- which had been the case since 
the advent of the national conventions in 1832-- 
to one where the mass voters had to be included 
and winning their support was a necessary con-
dition for attaining the nomination.  
 The Reform Era also fundamentally 
changed the political parties, the presidency 
and the way public policy is made in the 
United States in the 21st Century.  This condi-
tion is often called “polarization” to refer to the 
party, ideological, geographic, racial and class 
divisions which have marked American politics 
recently and which have made it difficult, and 
often impossible to get anything of great  
significance made into public policy.  
 This is the era when the polarized party 
system we now find so familiar took shape and 
developed into the institutionalized form it has 
become over the past four decades.  This section 
of the paper outlines the leading candidates and 
issues of the day and provides the narrative for 
how the contest unfolded, what the calendar and 
sequence looked like and which rules helped 
make a difference.  Each national election oc-
curs in a particular political and chronological 
context, and it is important to understand that 
context. That election then has a significant im-
pact on the historic period which follows it, and 
particularly on the fate of the political parties. 
 One of the basic themes of this paper 
is that the elections, the candidates nominated, 
their campaigns, the campaign and party activ-
ists mobilized, and notably the ideological and 
issue positions taken by the candidates matter a 
great deal. They have a major impact on defin-
ing the political parties and creating and sustain-
ing their name brands and images for the Ameri-
can public. This is true in the general elections, 
and perhaps even more so in the primaries when 
the candidates usually have to tack to the more 
extreme ends of the ideological continuum in 
order to appeal to each party’s core supporters.
 Candidate identification and image, and 
both elite and mass polarization, especially pub-
licized and emphasized in the primary season, 
have become the major products of the recent 
epic era of party development this author has 
described elsewhere (Jackson, 2015).  
 This an era when party and ideological 
polarization has come to be the major defining 
feature of the political landscape and constant 
competition and raucous conflict between the 
two major parties has become endemic to the 
way the system works, or many times does not 
work. The analysis of the candidates nominated 
by the parties and their campaigns, their issue 
and ideological positions and the issue groups 
and party factions they represent and how they 
ultimately prevailed and who they defeated is 
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significant. It is essential to understanding the 
type of political parties, and in turn the mass 
appeal based presidential politics, which have 
emerged in the last three decades of the 20th 
Century and the first decade of the 21st Century. 
These conditions have only intensified since the 
2010 and 2014 mid-term elections which  
accelerated and exacerbated the polarized  
politics that will inhabit and enrage the 2016 
elections like a national fever.  
The Nominations and Campaigns
1976
The Democrats in 1976
          In the annals of presidential history and 
strategic decision making, the Jimmy Carter 
nomination campaign of 1976 will always hold 
a special place because he understood and used 
the new rules so effectively and won an unex-
pected victory as an outsider candidate.  Carter 
and his advisers observed the McGovern cam-
paign of 1972 and studied carefully the major 
product of the reform era, the new Democratic 
Party rules controlling presidential nominations.  
From that experience, Carter and especially his 
chief campaign strategist, Hamilton Jordan, 
devised an overall strategic plan for approach-
ing the caucus-primary season from a carefully 
thought out and rational overview of their basic 
objective and how to accomplish it.  In 1975 
Jordan wrote a now-famous memo to Carter 
outlining the strategy and giving the rationale 
for it, and Carter followed the basic outline of 
that memo all the way to the Democratic Party’s 
nomination (Witcover, 1977, chapter 4).   
          Key to their early plans was to win or 
at least make a “better than expected” show-
ing in the Iowa caucuses and then to use that 
momentum to win other early contests.  At that 
time Iowa was not especially well known for 
being the first in the nation contest, although it 
had helped McGovern get early notice in 1972 
(Winebrenner and Goldford, 2010).  Jordan and 
Carter recognized Iowa’s potential for establish-
ing a candidate as a serious contender very early 
in the season, and perhaps even capturing the 
front-runner mantle.  This was especially im-
portant for an “outsider” candidate like Carter, 
a former one-term governor of Georgia, who at 
that time had no real national reputation and low 
levels of name recognition.  
            Ultimately Carter’s carefully laid plan 
for Iowa and his long months of campaigning 
in that state paid off.  Contrary to popular lore, 
he did not actually win Iowa, i.e. he did not 
receive the most votes in the first round of the 
caucuses.  That place was claimed by “Uncom-
mitted” which previously had been a viable way 
for the party leaders who wanted more time to 
make up their minds and to preserve their room 
for maneuvering at the conventions, to remain 
out of the camp of any candidates while they 
sought the best deal for themselves and their 
states.  The day of the “uncommitted” delega-
tions controlled by the party leaders was rapidly 
coming to a close and had probably already 
passed in most states by 1976 as the new party 
rules effectively made that strategy obsolete. 
Carter’s finish as the top vote-getter among the 
candidates in Iowa garnered him the front page 
of the newspapers and the cover of news maga-
zines throughout the nation in the next week 
(Witcover, 1977, Ch. 8-13).         
 The Iowa caucus was the perfect launch-
ing pad for the New Hampshire primary which 
came next, but it was held on February 24, 
1976, late by more modern standards.  Carter 
achieved an unqualified victory in the New 
Hampshire primary finishing ahead of all the 
other candidates despite winning only 28 per-
cent of the popular vote. Subsequently there 
were many other state primaries and caucuses 
and some losses to Senator Henry Jackson of 
Washington and California Governor Jerry 
Brown.  Brown was to the left of Carter and 
Jackson was more conservative, leaving Carter 
in the enviable position of seeming to be at the 
middle of the Democratic Party which at that 
time was the most advantageous strategic place-
ment.  Carter won the most primaries and won 
the total popular vote by a wide margin, and 
he wrapped up the nomination well before the 
convention started. 
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 The Democrats managed to hold a har-
monious convention in 1976, quite unlike 1972, 
and they used it to unite the party and to launch 
their general election campaign. Carter, and his 
running-mate, Walter Mondale, came through 
the nominations season successfully and they 
went on to win the general election against an 
incumbent president a feat which had not been 
accomplished previously since Franklin Roos-
evelt turned out Herbert Hoover in 1932. 
The Republicans in 1976 
 Republican Gerald Ford, who was our 
only appointed president, faced a tough climate 
for the fall race.  His party was divided by a 
strong challenge from the former Governor of 
California, Ronald Reagan, who tried to wrestle 
the party’s nomination away from the incum-
bent by running to Ford’s right.  The Republican 
convention was deeply and closely divided, but 
Ford ultimately prevailed.  The party’s internal 
division between the conservative wing led by 
Reagan and the more moderate wing led by 
Ford was on vivid display during the primaries.  
Those internal wounds were exacerbated by 
the primary season’s bad blood and not entirely 
healed during the national convention.  
 In the fall Ford’s campaign faced the 
tough challenge of uniting the party base while 
also appealing to Independents and disgruntled 
Democrats.  He was not able to accomplish that 
strategic objective and he lost a close popu-
lar vote to Carter. Carter won the presidential 
election with 50.1 percent of the popular vote 
compared to 48.0 percent for Ford taking 297 
electoral votes compared to 240 for Ford (Stan-
ley and Niemi, 1998, 103).  Trends and patterns 
put into place in 1972 and 1976 are still very 
much with us today. The necessity of winning 
or doing better than expected in some of the 
early contests was especially set by the Carter 
example in Iowa and New Hampshire and those 
two contests are particularly important still.   
            The nearly successful challenge Reagan 
posed to Ford’s nomination in 1976 demon-
strated just how far the conservative movement 
had come within the Republican Party.  The fact 
that Ford lost to Carter in 1976 suggests that the 
internal factional battle that Ford had to face in 
the primary season continued to hurt his candi-
dacy in the fall campaign.  The somewhat tepid 
response of the conservatives to Ford’s  
candidacy helped to doom him in the general 
election although certainly the context of the 
Watergate scandal and Ford’s pardon of Nixon 
were important factors as well.  
 The 1976 GOP contest showed the 
Republican Party base had clearly shifted 
to the right and the balance of power within 
the party was shifting toward the South and 
West and away from the Northeast and the 
Midwest. The fact that Ford felt it necessary to 
dump his current Vice President, Nelson Rock-
efeller of New York off the ticket and replace 
him with the much more conservative Robert 
Dole from Kansas indicated this power shift.  
Republican power was shifting rapidly from an 
old party establishment based in the East and 
Northeast to a new and much more conservative 
elite based in the South and West.   
 That shift became more permanent when 
Reagan went on to win the Republican nomina-
tion and the presidency in both 1980 and 1984.  
Since then conservatives in the South and West 
have become the base of the Republican Party 
and a formidable force in the party while the 
more moderate Northeastern base of an earlier 
generation steadily lost influence during the last 
of the 20th Century and has almost disappeared 
in the 21st Century.   
1980
The Democrats in 1980
 In 1980 Jimmy Carter was the incum-
bent president seeking a second term.  Carter 
campaigned as a moderate in 1976 and generally 
tried to govern as a non-ideological pragmatist 
during his term in office.  He was frequently in 
trouble with the liberals in his own party and he 
came under withering fire from the conserva-
tives on the Republican side.  Carter was thought 
to be in some electoral trouble late in 1979 and 
early in 1980 because of the voters’ general un-
happiness with the economic conditions of that
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era.  The nation’s economic problems had been 
especially exacerbated by the “oil shocks” of the 
mid 1970s when the oil cartel known as OPEC, 
or the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, used a combination of production 
caps and price increases to rapidly drive up the 
price of crude oil on the world market, which 
led to dramatic increases in the price of gaso-
line.    
 Because of the energy price shocks the 
United States reached a state of both high infla-
tion and low economic growth which combined 
in what was termed “stagflation.”  This deadly 
combination led to additional criticism of Carter 
and his administration’s handling of the  
economy.  
 The critique of Carter was broadened 
when on November 4, 1979, militants in Iran, 
mostly young people, seized the American Em-
bassy in Tehran and took 52 Americans hostage.  
This happened almost exactly one year before 
the American presidential elections of Novem-
ber, 1980.  
 At the time no one dreamed that the  
crisis would continue throughout the election 
year.  The Carter Administration tried repeat-
edly to negotiate the release of the American 
hostages.  At first, the hostage crisis worked 
to Carter’s advantage as he enjoyed the “rally 
round the flag” effect which is typical of public 
opinion when American interests are challenged 
overseas and American nationals are placed in 
jeopardy (Mueller, 1973).  This advantage was 
particularly helpful to Carter in the spring of 
1980 when he faced an internal party challenge 
for the nomination from Massachusetts Senator 
Edward Kennedy.  
 The last surviving brother from one of 
the most respected families in the Democratic 
Party, Kennedy had been expected to run for 
the White House since at least 1972 after his 
brother, Robert, was assassinated the night of 
the California primary in June of 1968. Edward
Kennedy was an effective senator and had  
become an important Progressive voice in the 
senate. The Kennedy versus Carter conflict 
divided the Democratic Party along the ideo-
logical wings among other factors. Kennedy 
was clearly seen as representing the more liberal 
wing of the party while Carter appealed more 
to the moderates and to some liberals as well.  
Carter knew that the Kennedy challenge would 
be a formidable one and that many Democrats 
felt that Kennedy was entitled to his run.  Deft 
use of the external threat from Iran enabled 
Carter to weather the Kennedy challenge in the 
spring even though Kennedy started the race 
with many advantages of his own (Canellos, 
2009). 
 Carter got off to a quick start winning 
the first round of the Iowa caucuses by a 51 to 
31 percent margin. He then beat Kennedy by 10 
percent in the New Hampshire Primary on  
February 26.  Since New Hampshire is next 
door to Kennedy’s home state of Massachusetts, 
this loss did not help start Kennedy’s campaign 
off on a promising note. Although Kennedy did 
win his home state primary handily one week 
later, Carter took neighboring Vermont’s pri-
mary by a three to one margin and he won the 
Maine caucuses handily (Ragsdale, 1998, 53).  
 Then Carter swept three southern prima-
ries, Florida, Georgia and Alabama, on March 
11th by wide margins.  He followed that with a 
65 to 30 percent victory in the Illinois Primary 
on March 18th.  In Illinois Carter piled up the 
delegates where he took 155 of the 169 delegate 
slots available (Cannelos, 2009, 10).  It is  
notable that Iowa, New Hampshire and the 
southern primaries plus a quick victory in Il-
linois had formed the early basis for Carter’s 
victory in 1976, and he repeated that pattern in 
1980. Then the race shifted to more liberal ter-
ritory and Kennedy won New York by almost 
20 percent on March 25th and Connecticut by 
a closer margin the same day (Ragsdale, 1998, 
54).  
 These Kennedy victories breathed some 
fresh life into his campaign and showed that 
Carter did indeed have some problems in some 
of the more liberal Northeastern states.  Ken-
nedy’s comeback however was only temporary.  
He did not win any more primaries except for a 
very narrow victory in Pennsylvania on April 
20
22nd and a two to one victory in the D. C. 
primary on May 6th. Those scattered Kennedy 
wins were too little, too late. As the season wore 
on and Carter maintained the momentum and 
built his delegate lead, it became increasingly 
likely that Carter was going to prevail in the 
convention.  
 Carter won far more primaries and cau-
cuses and more popular votes than Kennedy did 
by a considerable margin.  Carter won 9.5 mil-
lion popular votes to 6.9 million for Kennedy 
(Cook, 2007, 23). In the end he won 23 prima-
ries compared to 9 for Kennedy (Cook, 2007, 
23).  Total aggregate primary votes won and 
number of states won became important indica-
tors of the candidate’s strength in the party and 
projected strength in the general election. By 
both metrics, Carter was well ahead and increas-
ingly likely to prevail on the first ballot; how-
ever, Kennedy refused to drop out and vowed 
to stay in the race all the way to the convention.  
Only a significant upset based on some external 
event or fundamental change in the rules would 
provide a path for a Kennedy upset in the na-
tional convention.  
 Carter went into the Democratic Nation-
al Convention held in New York City on August 
11-14 with significantly more pledged delegates 
than Kennedy had, and in the final analysis 
this became the key since almost all of those 
delegates stayed loyal to their pledge to vote 
for the president on the procedural challenges 
and on the first roll call. The Carter campaign 
firmly  controlled the mechanics of the national 
convention, if not the optics, and the week was 
spent in a series of tactical moves by Kennedy 
designed to shake up the equation and to deny 
Carter a first ballot victory. The Democrats were 
definitely a party divided by internal strife and 
this division was easily evident to the national 
television audience. On the night of Carter’s ac-
ceptance speech Kennedy refused to concede to 
Carter except in a most perfunctory manner. 
 The spectacle of internal party conflict 
and bad blood between Carter and Kennedy was 
graphically on display for a national television 
audience the last evening, and when it was over 
the Democratic National Convention had failed 
to perform one of its most basic functions which 
is to bring the party together and unite it behind 
a single candidate by week’s end.  The whole 
national convention was one negative portent 
for the tough campaign which Carter faced in 
the fall.  The fact that the Iranian hostage crisis 
was still continuing over a year later on the day 
of the national elections led to dire predictions 
near the campaign’s conclusion about Carter’s 
diminishing chances of beating Reagan.  The 
Iranian hostage crisis and the deadly economic 
problems of high inflation and low levels of 
economic growth ultimately doomed Carter to 
be a one term president.
             The Kennedy insurgency against the 
incumbent president in 1980 was partially based 
in ideology with the liberals primarily favoring 
Kennedy and the moderate and conservative 
party activists overwhelmingly in support of 
Carter.  This is the way it has often been in the 
Democratic primaries and conventions with the 
liberal activists trying to drive the agenda to 
the left and the moderates resisting, sometimes 
successfully, often not very effectively.  The 
struggle of these two factions has been the ma-
jor fault line of Democratic Party politics for a 
generation.  Successful presidential candidates, 
like Clinton and Obama, transcended it.  Unsuc-
cessful ones get caught between the ideological 
pincers and are ground up by them.
 Carter made a race of it in 1980 and he 
stayed very close in the polls until nearly the end 
of the campaign; however, the division within 
the party helped to doom his re-election bid 
in the fall as he faltered against Reagan during 
the last week to ten days of the campaign. Until 
then, and the single presidential debate held late 
in October, the race between Carter and Reagan 
was a statistical tie in the polls, and the election 
could have gone either way.  Reagan’s perfor-
mance in the debate, and the media’s reaction to 
Reagan’s avuncular presentation style, has been 
credited with sealing the deal with the American 
public.  
 News stories that followed in the final 
campaign week focused on the fact that it was
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the one year anniversary of the Iranian hostage 
crisis, with no solution in sight, and the Carter 
Administration’s handling of the crisis appeared 
to be ineffectual. On Sunday morning before 
the Tuesday election Americans awoke to front-
page newspaper pictures of Iranians burning the 
American flag in celebration of their anniversary 
of holding the hostages.   The die was cast. 
            The polls, which had been essentially 
tied during the whole race, turned in the last 
week against Carter and toward Reagan. Ulti-
mately Reagan won a bare majority with 50.7 
percent of the popular vote while Carter took 
41 percent and Congressman John Anderson 
running as an Independent captured 6.6 per-
cent.  Based on that margin, however, Reagan 
won a landslide of 489 Electoral College votes 
to Carter’s 49 (Archer, et. al, 2006, 49).  Carter 
won only his home state of Georgia plus his 
running-mate Walter Mondale’s home state, 
Minnesota, along with West Virginia, Maryland 
and the District of Columbia. 
 Carter’s political demise was due in part 
to the defections in 1980 of what came to be 
called the “Reagan Democrats”, i.e. blue collar 
and working class Democrats who decided to 
go with the candidate appeal of Reagan instead 
of voting for their own issue preferences and 
on basis of their historic party identification.  
There were also internal party structural divi-
sions which continued into the more modern era 
represented by  those who support the moderate 
Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) which 
was often at odds with the more liberal com-
ponents of the Democratic Party’s coalition.  
Sometimes these factional camps seemed more 
intent on prevailing against the rival faction than 
they are dedicated to defeating the other party.  
That was certainly the case for the Democrats 
and their internal divisions which were very 
publicly displayed in the 1980 race and which 
led to their loss in the general election.
The Republicans in 1980 
            It is usually forgotten now, but there was 
a spirited contest for the Republican nomination 
for president in 1980.  Ronald Reagan was prob-
ably the initial favorite, but not the prohibitive 
favorite for the nomination in the early prima-
ries. He had made a preliminary run for the 
presidential nomination in 1968 in a challenge 
against Nixon which was abandoned fairly early. 
He then made a determined bid against Ford in 
1976 in a conflict which probably helped seal 
Ford’s fate in the general election. Reagan never 
stopped running after he lost the nomination to 
Ford in 1976, and he immediately set his sights 
on 1980.  He was the champion of the conserva-
tive movement in the United States having by 
then assumed Goldwater’s mantle, and  con-
servatives were determined that their time had 
come under Reagan’s banner.  Thus, 1980 was 
Reagan’s third try for the Republican nomina-
tion, and it would probably have been his last if 
he had lost to one of the other candidates. 
      In the winter and spring of 1980 the battle 
for the Republican nomination settled down 
quickly into a contest between the two lead-
ing contenders, George H. W. Bush and Ronald 
Reagan. Bush was widely seen as representing 
the more moderate side of the Republican Party 
while Reagan had the allegiance of most of the 
conservatives.   Bush was widely reported to 
be pro-choice, and his wife, Barbara Bush, in 
public comments left no doubt that she favored 
the pro-choice side of the argument. 
 Bush got off to a quick start when he 
won the Iowa caucuses. He happily claimed 
the momentum in the race or “The Big Mo’” as 
he termed it in a memorable phrase which has 
stuck in the lingua franca of campaign jargon.   
However, on February 26th Bush lost the New 
Hampshire primary to Reagan (Ragsdale, 1998, 
53).  Bush probably lost the New Hampshire 
primary when in a dramatic, made for television 
moment at a Republican candidate debate which 
was billed to be limited to the top two candi-
dates, Reagan and Bush, by mutual consent, Rea-
gan invited the other candidates to participate. 
Reagan dramatically declared that he had paid 
for the microphone and that he could do what-
ever he wanted with it even though the rules 
both camps had agreed to beforehand stipulated 
that the top two candidates in the polls were
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the only ones participating in that debate.  Bush 
looked pained and uncomfortable during the in-
cident and said nothing, but all the commenta-
tors agreed that Reagan’s confident assertiveness 
during that incident had won the debate. Note 
that it was style, not substance, that had carried 
the day. 
 No one paid much attention to the sub-
stance and truth of the answers the contestants 
had given, but focused on the dramatic micro-
phone incident instead.  This focus on style 
became the pattern for the reporting on future 
debates and the media evaluations of who won.    
 The moment illustrated just how  
effectively Reagan used the mass media,  
especially television and his skills as an actor to 
his advantage (Schieffer and Gates, 1989).   For 
a brief period there was a real contest underway 
particularly when Bush won some early prima-
ries in his native New England.  Reagan then 
scored significant victories in the South and the 
West and his camp prevailed handily over the 
challenge being offered by Bush, and most of 
the other candidates quickly dropped out. Bush 
ultimately won only six primaries (Michigan, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, D. 
C. and Puerto Rico) although he refused to 
concede until very late (C. Q. 2001, 138; Rhodes 
Cook, 2007, 23). Reagan won the rest and was 
clearly on his way to a first ballot victory at the 
convention.  
              Some suggested Reagan ask Gerald Ford 
to be his vice president candidate on a sort of 
“unity ticket”; however, Reagan quickly settled 
on George H. W. Bush as his running mate.  
In this choice Reagan was reaching out to his 
most successful primary opponent.  He was also 
thought to be reaching out to a different part 
of the ideological spectrum in the Republican 
Party. Although the moderate faction won on a 
few platform issues, the conservatives associated 
with Reagan advocated a number of platform 
planks that were very conservative, and they 
successfully turned the party to the right by their 
actions and rhetoric. 
 An explicitly anti-abortion plank was 
adopted for the first time, and it called for a 
constitutional amendment to outlaw abortions 
and overturn Roe v. Wade. (C. Q., National Party 
Conventions, 139; Craig and O’Brien, 1993, 
314). Before that, the conflict over abortion had 
not cleanly divided the two parties into two dis-
tinct camps on this issue. Although moderates in 
the Republican Party objected to the plank and 
tried to have it removed, it stayed in the plat-
form and has been in each subsequent Republi-
can platform. The party moved decisively to the 
right in 1980 and precedents established then are 
still operative today.  This and other precedents 
for the Republican Party’s basic issue positions 
were set in 1980 and the party has maintained 
these conservative positions each election 
since then.   In addition, that year Republicans 
pledged that their president would only nomi-
nate federal judges who were clearly pro-life and 
this was the first example of the so-called “litmus 
test” being introduced into the equation for the 
appointment of federal judges. This has been an 
important issue for every Republican convention 
since 1980.  
             The fights between liberals and moder-
ates inside the Democratic Party and among 
conservatives inside the Republican Party have 
been ongoing since the 1980 conventions and 
national election. Many of the issue positions 
which are emblematic for each party now were 
adopted during this era as well. Republican 
Party platforms have been very conservative 
since then, and the 1980 take-over of the party 
by Reagan’s disciples was clearly the tipping 
point for the clarification of the differences the 
Republicans were offering compared to their 
Democratic counterparts (C. Q., 2001, 138-139).  
The fact that Reagan went on to win a resound-
ing  victory over Jimmy Carter in the general 
election served to assure conservatives that their 
stance was the correct one for the party’s future 
success and to demonstrate that conservative 
positions would be supported or at least toler-
ated by the larger voting public.  The conserva-
tive wing of the Republican Party since then has 
dominated the party from the 1980 convention 
all the way through the 2008 and 2012 conven-
tions.
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To the Left, to the Right or to the Center?
 After their 2006, 2008 and 2012 election 
loses Republican party leaders debated what 
should be the future of their party heading into 
the 2014 and 2016 elections. Whether to con-
tinue their hard turn to the right and vote for the 
most conservative candidate or take a somewhat 
more pragmatic view and vote for the candidate 
they think may be more viable in the fall cam-
paign, which may be a candidate with at least 
some moderate appeal is a crucial question each 
Republican delegate and party activist must face 
each nomination season.  
 The Democratic activists face the same 
dilemma on the left side of the spectrum.  That 
debate continues in both major parties as the 
conflict between the ideological wings of the 
parties and the more moderate middle is appli-
cable in both cases. Until recently it was more 
apparent among the Democrats than among the 
Republicans with the fight between the Demo-
cratic Leadership Council and other moderate 
Democrats, like the Blue Dog contingent, and 
the liberal factions usually attracting the most 
media notice.  
 In 2009, however, the Tea Party burst on 
the scene as a vehement opponent to the Obama 
Administration’s policies.  The Tea Party then 
took aim at several Republican Establishment 
candidates, especially for the U. S. Senate, 
and scored some major victories in Republi-
can primaries in 2010, 2012 and 2014.  It was 
clear from various analyses that the Tea Party 
enthusiasts were predominantly disenchanted 
Republicans and that they fell on the hard right 
of the political spectrum.  Suddenly the factional 
strife within the Republican Party was front and 
center in the mass media and the nation’s con-
sciousness.  
 Factional strife lives on as a conflict 
generator common to both major parties.  How 
they manage that factional strife is critical to the 
health and future of each of the two parties and 
the debates have continued since the conserva-
tive take over in 1980.        
1984  
The Republicans in 1984
         The 1984 election season presented a stark 
contrast in candidate fortunes.  Reagan as the 
incumbent took his party’s nomination with no 
effective challenger in the primaries. He coasted 
through the primary season and saved his en-
ergy and money for the general election. The 
negative examples of the Kennedy challenge to 
Carter in 1980 and Reagan’s challenge to Ford 
in 1976 illustrated graphically the pitfalls of the 
incumbent’s having to face a strong primary 
challenger, and the Reagan forces were deter-
mined not to repeat those two scenarios.  The 
Republican National Convention, held in Dallas, 
Texas, on August 20-23, became a re-coronation 
of Reagan and an opportunity for the Republi-
cans to celebrate what they saw as the successes 
of Reagan’s first term (C. Q. National Party 
Conventions, 2001, 24, 146-147).  The conser-
vatives were in complete control of the party in 
this early phase of the age of Reagan although 
beneath the surface there was still some dissent 
from the moderates. 
 By and large the national convention 
went very well and according to the script writ-
ten and directed by the Reagan campaign and 
designed to showcase their candidate and causes 
for the general election battle.   
 The Republicans spent their time and 
energy in Dallas getting ready for the upcom-
ing campaign and developing the themes they 
would use against the Democrats in the fall. 
There was some high profile dissent outside the 
convention hall and even one widely covered 
flag-burning which ultimately became a land-
mark U. S. Supreme Court case; however, the 
demonstrators were kept far from the hall and 
only provided unifying fodder for the speak-
ers inside the convention to rail against.  In 
the modern age of media driven politics the 
conventions are an important and integral part 
of a larger overall strategy and message, and 
planning and executing their scripts smoothly is 
what successful presidential campaigns use the 
conventions to accomplish. This is what the Re-
publicans did like a well-oiled machine in their
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national convention of 1984.
The Democrats in 1984
            By contrast, Walter Mondale, who was 
the former Vice-President, and the early front-
runner, faced a serious internal party challenge 
in 1984 from Gary Hart and from Jesse Jackson. 
Jackson was the prominent civil rights leader 
who had been a chief lieutenant to Dr. Martin 
Luther King and who had emerged in subse-
quent years as a high profile civil rights leader 
in his own right with a strong political base in 
Chicago where he was headquartered.  Jackson 
had a significant following in the African-Amer-
ican community, and even those who did not 
personally support him also did not want to see 
him disrespected by the Democrats.  Hart was 
an incumbent Senator from Colorado and had 
been George McGovern’s campaign manager 
in 1972.  He was given much credit for having 
shaped McGovern’s upset victory for the nomi-
nation that year.  Hart went on to fashion for 
himself a reputation as a thoughtful and inno-
vative U. S. Senator who was interested espe-
cially in national defense and strategic planning 
issues, but he was also viewed as something of a 
maverick in the Senate.  
           Mondale was clearly the favorite of the 
Democratic Party’s Establishment that year.  He 
had especially strong support from the labor 
union movement for whom he had worked and 
advocated for years.  Mondale was a traditional 
liberal in the mold of his friend and mentor, 
Hubert Humphrey, and he had been put onto 
Carter’s ticket in 1976 partially because of his 
liberal track record and his network of liberal 
interest group and union supporters.    
            Hart, by contrast, was hard to classify 
on the ideological spectrum, but he appealed 
to the more independent- minded voters and he 
advocated a mixture of traditional liberal and 
new high tech policy issues, and he was espe-
cially committed to building a modern defense 
and intelligence capability. Hart also appealed to 
young people, especially well-educated young 
professionals. 
 While Mondale beat Hart in Iowa, Hart’s 
second place showing gave him some momen-
tum going into New Hampshire two weeks 
later. When Hart pulled an upset and won New 
Hampshire, the momentum shifted to him, and 
Mondale’s campaign was in trouble. The polls 
showed that Hart was at 3% in the Gallup poll 
taken just before the New Hampshire Primary 
and Mondale was favored by 49 percent of 
likely Democratic voters. After New Hamp-
shire, Hart stood at 30 percent and Mondale at 
33 percent (Buell, in Mayer, 2000, 104-105).   
This may be an exceptional case but one which 
graphically illustrates the instant momentum 
which a victory in the New Hampshire Primary 
and its attendant good publicity can create. 
 Mondale prevailed in the first ever mega pri-
mary day when multiple states held primaries 
on March 13, 1984. It subsequently came to 
be known as “Super Tuesday”.  The first such 
multiple state event was originally touted as a 
Southern Regional Primary because four of the 
eight states that held primaries on the original 
Super Tuesday were in the South (Cook, 2007, 
24.)  On Super Tuesday Mondale was especially 
helped by victories in Georgia and Alabama 
where Hart’s style of new age populism did not 
have wide appeal. This victory helped to slow 
Hart’s momentum.   
 Mondale then followed with quick victo-
ries in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New York, the 
nation’s industrial heartland which was already 
threatened with turning into the “Rust Belt”. In 
these states Mondale was especially aided by 
organized labor which had been a traditional 
source of his strength. Hart and Mondale then 
traded victories in a series of primaries and 
caucuses with Hart doing especially well in the 
later primaries in the west. 
            It was a closely contested battle and it 
was not settled until very late.  The fight went 
on until the last primary day when Hart won the 
all-important California primary, a loss which 
ordinarily would prove to be fatal for a Demo-
cratic frontrunner; however, Mondale offset Cal-
ifornia with a victory in New Jersey. Mondale 
also had far more support among the party and 
elected officials who were accorded automatic 
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delegate status by the Democratic rules which 
were changed that year in an effort to advantage 
insiders.  Unlike the other delegates, the party 
and elected officials delegates were permitted 
by the rules to remain unpledged thus maximiz-
ing their potential leverage. There were 568 of 
those high level party and public officials (e. 
g. Governors, Senators, Representatives, State 
Party Chairs, etc.) out of a total of 3,933 or 
14.4 percent so they formed the largest identifi-
able block vote in the convention (Stanley and 
Niemi, 2010).        
    These officials are now called “super del-
egates” and their margin for Mondale was an 
important factor in his victory (Kamarck, 2009, 
132; Mayer, 2009, 91-94). After that initial 
influence, super delegates laid low politically in 
subsequent elections and waited until the most 
popular candidate emerged from the primaries 
and the caucuses before getting on board the 
bandwagon. They did not want to create contro-
versy by taking a stance counter to that of the 
party’s base as expressed in the popular votes.   
1984 would be the first and last time the super 
delegates played a key role in the nomination 
contest until 2008 when their late movement 
to Obama helped put him over the top against 
Clinton. 
 In 1984, the Democratic nominee needed 
a united party to face Reagan during the fall 
campaign, and that unity was going to be diffi-
cult to attain.    
          The Democratic National Convention 
was held July 16-19, 1984 in San Francisco.  
The internal fight went on until the convention, 
after both Hart and Jackson refused to concede 
to Mondale. Jackson held out for several issue 
positions which would move the party to the left 
and the Jackson campaign also advocated sev-
eral important rules changes. It became popular 
for the media to ask, “What does Jesse Jackson 
want?”, and answering that question success-
fully became a challenge for Mondale.  
          Mondale understood well that he needed 
Jackson, and especially African-American 
voters if he was going to have any chance in 
November.  By this time it was evident that 
any Democrat had to have strong support in the 
black community to counterbalance the hege-
mony that the Republicans had established in 
the white South.  Even though Mondale had a 
long history of civil rights support, he still had 
to defer to Jackson in order to ensure that solid 
African-American support in the fall contest. 
Mondale, for example, adopted Jackson’s posi-
tion on an affirmative action plank in the Demo-
cratic platform. Mondale also needed the enthu-
siastic support of the Hart people, and especially 
the younger and more independent elements of 
the electorate they seemed to epitomize. Often 
catering to the African American or union posi-
tions meant taking a stance that alienated the 
Hart camp.  Mondale had to keep one eye on the 
factions within the convention hall and another 
on the developing fight with Ronald Reagan 
shaping up for the fall. 
            On the roll call in the Democratic Na-
tional Convention Mondale prevailed rather 
handily on the delegate vote count.  Mondale 
received 2,191 first ballot votes, compared to 
1,200.5 for Hart and 465.5 for Jackson (Rags-
dale, 1998, 83). Delegate votes, and their strate-
gic spread across the nation, as well as a narrow 
victory in the total number of primary votes for 
Mondale trumped numbers of state primaries 
won by Hart and Jackson.  At that point Hart 
finally closed ranks with Mondale, and the party 
began to try to unite the base for the fall contest.  
Jackson did not win the nomination in 1984 and 
as these totals show, he did not even come very 
close; however, he proved that he had consider-
able appeal and that he could be an important 
factor in any Democratic race. His claim to 
speak for African-American voters had to be 
taken seriously and dealt with carefully by any 
viable Democratic presidential candidate.       
 This was the era when African-American 
voters became solidified as a crucial base vote 
for the Democrats.  However retaining that 
vote each election came with a price.  Jackson’s 
policy positions tended to constantly pull the 
party toward the left and to provide fodder for 
the Republicans especially among white south-
erners and white males. Appealing to these two 
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constituencies, white southerners and white 
males, became increasingly a challenge and a 
problem for the Democrats.  This point became 
more evident in 1988 when Jackson played a 
larger role. 
             Clearly the Republicans held the more 
harmonious and the more united convention 
in 1984, which launched Reagan’s successful 
re-election campaign. There were many reasons 
for the Reagan landslide over Mondale when 
Reagan took 59 percent of the popular vote 
compared to 41 percent for Mondale.  Mondale 
carried only his native state of Minnesota plus 
the District of Columbia and Reagan carried all 
the rest in an historic Electoral College victory 
of 525 to 13 (Ragsdale 1999, 103).  
            If you look at a map of the whole nation 
with the states coded in the now-familiar red 
for Republican victory and blue for Democratic 
victory categories, the map appears as a sea of 
red surrounding only the islands of Minnesota 
and D. C. (Archer, et. al., 2006, 50).  After the 
1984 election the Democratic Party struggled 
to define itself while the Republicans reveled in 
the Age of Reagan.  It became the thing to do 
among Republicans to wave the flag of Rea-
gan and to use his name and image as a mantra 
and  a shorthand to illustrate the party’s strong 
stances especially against taxes and in favor of a 
strong and assertive national defense.  What the 
Reagan legacy would mean for the long term 
survival and prosperity of the two parties be-
came somewhat more problematic when Reagan 
left the scene in 1988.  The Republican Party 
is still fighting over what the legacy of Reagan 
should be and well over two decades later all 
factions try to claim his mantle.  
                                   1988 
The Democrats in 1988  
 In 1988 the Democrats were the chal-
lenger party and they could be expected to field 
multiple candidates which they did.  There 
were ultimately eight serious candidates on the 
Democratic side.   These included the initial 
frontrunner, Governor Michael Dukakis of 
Massachusetts who had the most extensive orga-
nization and the most money.   Dukakis started 
his campaign early and was highly successful 
in raising early money which is one mark of 
a serious candidate.  Dukakis was something 
of a technocrat and had a good record as the 
manager of the government in the nation’s most 
liberal state.  Dukakis himself was not particu-
larly ideological and promised to run the nation 
with effectiveness and competence, apart from 
ideology and partisanship, as he claimed to 
have done in Massachusetts.  He was also fairly 
unexciting as a personality.  
          Dukakis was most notably challenged 
again by Jesse Jackson making his second run 
for the presidency, Al Gore, who was then a 
Senator from Tennessee, Joe Biden, a Senator 
from Delaware, who became Vice President in 
2008, Representative Richard Gephardt from 
St. Louis, Missouri, one of the leaders in the 
U. S. House, Bruce Babbitt, former Governor 
of Arizona and Paul Simon, a respected Sena-
tor from Illinois. Jesse Jackson coming off his 
strong showing in 1984 also decided to make 
another run at the prize in 1988.   Waiting in 
the wings, although not initially included in the 
early maneuvering, was Gary Hart, who decided 
belatedly to make another run (Cook, 2007, 26; 
Simon, 1989).  
 In 1988 everyone had learned to appreci-
ate the importance of Iowa and the lessons of 
Jimmy Carter’s 1976 nomination strategy, and 
as Elaine Kamarck has written,  by then the can-
didates had learned the importance of the cal-
endar and the scheduling of the early contests, 
or that “sequence is strategy” (Kamarck, 2009, 
chapter 2).   Several candidates put major effort 
into Iowa especially Gephardt and Simon. Si-
mon and Gephardt were both traditional liberals 
with a strong record of support from organized 
labor, and both could claim to be neighbors to 
the state of Iowa. Both Simon and Gephardt put 
all their efforts and money into scoring a victory 
in that crucial first caucus and becoming the 
alternative to Dukakis.   
           On February 8th, Gephardt won a very 
narrow victory in the Iowa caucuses, much to 
the disappointment of Simon and his supporters. 
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According to the traditional strategy Gephardt’s 
Iowa victory was supposed to provide the req-
uisite momentum for a win in the New Hamp-
shire Primary; however, Dukakis was geared up 
and waiting in New Hampshire.  He was from 
neighboring Massachusetts, and a big proportion 
of the population of New Hampshire is served 
by the Boston media market. On February 16th 
Dukakis won New Hampshire with 36 percent 
of the popular vote case, with Gephardt coming 
in second at 20 percent and Simon third at 17 
percent (Polsby and Wildavsky, 2008, 107).The 
race was definitely on for the next big event, the 
second mega primary dubbed “Super Tuesday” 
on March 8th when 16 states, with a significant 
portion of them in the South, held primaries. 
The primaries expert, Rhodes Cook, writing for 
Congressional Quarterly, described the results of 
Super Tuesday, 1988, in the following succinct 
summary:
The huge Super Tuesday vote across Dixie 
in early March was a wash.    Dukakis won 
the two big states on the fringes, Texas and 
Florida.  Jesse Jackson swept five states 
from the Deep South to Virginia.  Sen. Al 
Gore of Tennessee won five states across 
the middle of the South from North Caro-
lina to Oklahoma.  And Gephardt won his 
home state of Missouri.  The Democratic 
race got even more convoluted the follow-
ing week when Sen. Paul Simon won the 
primary in his home state of Illinois (Cook, 
2007, 26).  
As the Cook quote depicts, the race was in dis-
array at that point; however, it was soon clari-
fied by a series of timely victories by the origi-
nal front-runner, Dukakis. The primaries came 
quickly during the rest of March and into April, 
and Dukakis rolled up a string of impressive 
victories that included Connecticut, Wisconsin, 
New York, and Pennsylvania.  Dukakis had the 
deepest campaign organization, raised the most 
money, and had the most impressive array of 
party and political leader endorsements.  
 All of these are elements necessary to 
fashioning a successful nominations campaign 
(Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller, 2009).  These 
advantages enabled him to persist while others 
struggled and then dropped out or were win-
nowed out by the lack of money, a losing record, 
and diminishing prospects for victory.  As the 
season progressed, Dukakis’ victory margin in 
most primaries increased and he appeared to 
have unstoppable momentum (Ragsdale, 1998, 
58).  It took all of March and most of April for 
the race to be sorted out and for the winner to 
emerge, but Dukakis was clearly in control of 
the most delegates.    
 As the out party the Democrats held their 
convention first on July 18-21 in Atlanta, Geor-
gia.  The Dukakis forces seemed to be in firm 
control, but Jackson held on, and he challenged 
Dukakis up until the opening of the convention 
and never conceded to Dukakis.  Although it 
was clear that Dukakis had the votes, Jackson’s 
supporters put his name in for the nomination 
and set the stage for a roll call vote.  A challenge 
to a roll call vote on the first ballot is always a 
bad sign for the frontrunner, and it proved to be 
the same for Dukakis.   Ultimately, Dukakis re-
ceived 2,876 first ballot votes in the convention 
as compared to 1,219 for Jackson (Ragsdale, 
1998, 85).  
 Although it was obvious that Jackson 
was not going to win his party’s nomination, he 
did manage to continue to be a presence in the 
race, attract media attention, and most impor-
tantly, was seen as negotiating with and wring-
ing concessions from Dukakis.  Dukakis faced 
the same problem on how to manage Jackson’s 
demands as Walter Mondale did in 1984.  One 
of the concessions was to lower the Proportional 
Representation (P. R.) minimum threshold for 
attaining delegate votes from 20 percent and set 
it at 15 percent of the popular vote in the states’ 
primaries, a concession which made it harder 
for the front-runner to close the deal and gave 
a premium to those candidates who ran second 
and even third in the Democratic primaries (C. 
Q.,  2001, 27). 
 It was a rules change not widely noted at 
the time; however, it was the use of P. R. which 
helped propel Senator Barack Obama to the 
delegate vote lead, and ultimate nomination, in 
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the contentious 2008 Democratic contest.  After 
considerable negotiation with Jackson, the Du-
kakis camp was able to compromise with him, 
or to finesse his issues, and the Democrats got 
credit ultimately for holding a relatively har-
monious and successful convention.  The fall 
campaign was shaping up to be fairly competi-
tive. Dukakis came out of the national conven-
tion with a comfortable lead in the polls over the 
presumptive Republican front-runner, George 
H. W. Bush; however, that lead had evaporated 
by Labor Day because of mistakes made by 
Dukakis and an aggressive and politically savvy 
campaign run by Bush.    
The Republicans in 1988
            At first Bush had difficulty winning 
in the crucial early primaries and thus attain-
ing what in 1980 he had called “The Big Mo”, 
or momentum.  He actually ran third in Iowa 
behind Kansas Senator, Bob Dole, and Marion 
G. “Pat” Robertson, the founder of the “500 
Club,” a major evangelical television program.  
Dole won with 37 percent of the vote followed 
by Robertson who received 25 percent and then 
Bush ran a disappointing third with 19 percent 
(Polsby and Wildavsky, 2008, 107).  Robertson 
effectively mobilized the strong contingent of 
religious right voters who make up an important 
constituency in the Iowa caucuses.  Dole was 
from a neighboring farm state, Kansas, and he 
related well with the Iowa agricultural interests, 
and this advantage propelled him to victory in 
Iowa (Winebrenner and Goldford, 2010, 172-
173). 
 Eight days later Bush made a comeback 
in the first primary, New Hampshire, where he 
beat Dole handily by 38 percent to 28 percent 
with Robertson running fifth and receiving only 
9.4 percent (Ragsdale, 1998, 57). Bush had the 
coveted momentum after New Hampshire, and 
he quickly won the South Carolina Primary and 
a series of Super Tuesday events mostly in the 
South.  Bush had the South sewed up, and by 
then he was unstoppable.  Dole dropped out 
on March 29th soon after he lost the Illinois 
Primary on the third Tuesday in March. Pat 
Robertson dropped out on April 6th and he was 
the last remaining challenger to Bush (Mayer, 
2000, 34).   The winnowing process had the race 
down to only one candidate still standing for the 
Republicans by the first week in April.  This was 
typical for that time, but it would be late by 21st 
Century standards. Bush went on to win all but 
one of the Republican primaries that year (South 
Dakota) and to be unchallenged in the national 
convention.  By achieving something of a party 
consensus fairly early, and well before Dukakis 
disposed of Jackson, the Republicans put them-
selves in a good position to hold a harmonious 
convention and to make the party combat ready 
for November. Winning the nomination early 
is almost always better than winning it later, 
although 2008 proved to be an exception to that 
rule. 
 The Republican National Convention 
was held on August 15 to 18 at the Superdome 
in New Orleans (Cook, 2001, 150-151). George 
H. W. Bush was nominated unanimously on the 
first ballot in the Republican national conven-
tion (Ragsdale, 1998, 85).  Bush was Reagan’s 
Vice President for eight years, a period which 
he used gainfully to make hundreds of visits to 
state and local Republican Party events and to 
garner the friendship and support of thousands 
of Republican activists. Bush was also a former 
Chair of the Republican National Committee, 
the only case in modern history when a national 
party chair went on to become president.  Wear-
ing both of those mantles, Bush was the favorite 
of the party organizational establishment in 
1988. While he was never warmly embraced by 
the conservative core of the party, by 1988 he 
had largely rehabilitated himself in their eyes 
and they appreciated his dutiful service in the 
Reagan White House for two terms. The race 
was not a total loss for Dole, however.  He had 
been Ford’s Vice President running mate in 
1976, and was also a former national party chair 
in the 1970s.  Dole started building up his own 
party activist IOU’s which he cashed success-
fully in the 1996 nominations race. 
             The Republicans almost always nominate 
someone who has run before, perhaps multiple 
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times, and the Reagan/Bush/Dole examples from 
1968 through 1996 illustrate that pattern.  There 
is not a single case of an “outsider” winning the 
Republican nomination in that era. Bush’s only 
controversy in 1988 was over the surprise nomi-
nation of Dan Quayle, a conservative young 
Senator from Indiana, to be his running mate.  
Quayle was largely unknown outside Indiana 
and Washington, D. C. and he seemed to bring 
thin credentials to the job of being one step away 
from the presidency.  
 If one had to rate the conventions on 
a preparation for the fall and party harmony 
scale, the nod would have to go to the Repub-
licans.  The Quayle candidacy was more of a 
negative for those outside the hall and did not 
create much dissonance within the ranks of the 
Republican insiders who were at the conven-
tion. Quayle was a strong conservative and the 
conservatives inside the hall rallied to his side.   
While Dukakis managed his disputes with Jack-
son relatively smoothly, the sight of Jackson still 
contending for media attention and for domi-
nance of the message at the beginning of the 
Democratic convention was a lingering problem 
for Dukakis, especially in the white South where 
Jackson was extremely unpopular.  Even though 
the Bush team had been behind Dukakis in the 
polls going into the Republican convention, 
soon after the convention was over Bush took 
the lead in the polls and never trailed Dukakis 
again.  
            Bush, of course, went on to score a fairly 
comfortable victory over Dukakis in the popu-
lar and the electoral vote, although Dukakis 
improved considerably over the performance 
of Carter in 1980 and Mondale in 1984.  Bush 
received 53 percent of the popular vote and 
Dukakis 46 percent.  On the strength of that 
popular vote margin Bush attained 426 Electoral 
College votes compared to 111 for Dukakis 
(Ragsdale, 1998, 103).  In the color coded con-
ventions of red for the Republicans and blue for 
the Democrats, the 1988 map showed the roots 
of what has come to be a very familiar pattern. 
Dukakis won only ten states while Bush won 
40; however, there is much continuity between 
the Dukakis states and the core of the Democrat-
ic Party’s strength two decades later.  Dukakis 
took Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin and the District of 
Columbia (Archer, et. al, 2008, 51; C. Q., 2002, 
224). West Virginia has subsequently become 
more Republican, and Iowa was a swing state 
in 2000 through 2012; however, all the oth-
ers have become more reliably Democratic in 
presidential voting.  In 1988 the Democrats lost 
their third consecutive national election, each 
by a wide margin, and they continued a deeply 
divisive and dispirited period of soul-searching 
over the future of the Democratic Party.  Many 
were asking insistently whether the Democrats 
could ever put together a winning presidential 
coalition again.  The answer came four years 
later in the form of a candidate from the unlikely 
hometown of Hope, Arkansas.   
1992
The Republicans in 1992
         The story of the 1992 Republican nomina-
tions race is a simple one.  George H. W. Bush 
was the incumbent president, and incumbent 
Republican presidents are rarely challenged, and 
never challenged successfully, in the nomina-
tions race.  Reagan came the closest to success 
in 1976 in his challenge to Ford; however, his 
exception is the case which has proved the rule 
subsequently. There was little reason to believe 
that Bush was vulnerable in the Republican pri-
maries, and no major Republican figure stepped 
forward.  Former Reagan speech writer, and 
current cable television talk show personality, 
Patrick J. (“Pat”) Buchanan, decided to chal-
lenge Bush’s re-nomination from the far right.  
Buchanan represented a sort of unreconstructed 
nativism and super nationalism which was 
popular on the talk show circuit, and that view 
had some support among Republican primary 
voters. He spoke for those who felt alienated 
and disenfranchised in the Republican Party and 
who were feeling the stress of a faltering econo-
my which frequently was blamed on immigrants 
a fear which Buchanan fed off of.   
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Buchanan got off to a promising start when he 
got a respectable 37 percent of the New Hamp-
shire primary vote, compared to the president’s 
53 percent, and there was some cause for con-
cern among Bush’s supporters at that point since 
Buchanan did much better than most observers 
expected.  For the first time there was empirical 
evidence, based on real voters, that Bush might 
be more vulnerable than had been believed.   
However, after that initial surprise, Buchanan 
was never able to mount a real threat 
to the Bush re-nomination effort although he 
did inflict a serious wound on Bush’s re-election 
prospects at the national convention (Cook, 
2007, 29).  
            The Republicans gathered in Bush’s 
hometown of Houston, Texas, on August 17-
20, 1992.  The convention was planned to be a 
happy occasion with an uncontroversial re-nom-
ination of the Bush-Quayle team and a celebra-
tion of the Gulf War victory and the party’s 
prospects for a second Bush Administration.  Pat 
Buchanan withdrew on opening day as a part 
of a deal to give him the spotlight that night for 
a prime-time address to the nation.  The Bush 
forces could not have known that Buchanan 
would use the occasion to declare that the nation 
was in a “culture war” between conservative 
and liberal forces, and that the liberal forces 
represented the road to ruin for the nation.  The 
fierce nature of Buchanan’s charges against his 
foes and the re-affirming response they received 
from a significant part of his audience in the Re-
publican National Convention hall that evening 
in Houston proved to be the dominant story of 
the day coming out of the convention, and it left 
a lasting impression in the minds of many voters 
who were getting ready to make a commitment 
for the fall campaign.  
            There is no question but what the ap-
peal of Buchanan’s message was to his fellow 
cultural warriors on the right and that he gave 
them the message they wanted to hear.  It was 
not necessarily the message for the larger televi-
sion audience that the Bush campaign wanted 
to project.  In Byron Shafer’s terms, the “Bifur-
cated” nature of the audience was either lost on 
Buchanan, or he simply did not care to appeal to 
the wider convention audience at home watch-
ing television (Shafer, 1988).  While Bush was 
not challenged very effectively in the re-nom-
inations race by Buchanan, this was another 
instance where the damage outside the hall was 
greater than the off-setting gains made among 
the party’s core inside the hall.  Bush ultimately 
received 2116 first-ballot votes compared to 
only 18 for Pat Buchanan and 26 for a variety of 
others (Ragsdale, 1998, 87)  
            Bush apparently did not recognize the 
danger at the time, but his decision to turn the 
convention stage and microphone over to Bu-
chanan at the convention in Houston became a 
first step in his fall election loss. Whatever red 
meat stimulus Buchanan may have provided for 
some of the Republican base, it turned into a 
public relations disaster for the Bush campaign 
since it looked to many more mainstream voters 
like the Republican Party had come to be domi-
nated by right wing extremists, a perception 
which the Democrats were happy to reinforce in 
their campaign.  The platform the Republicans 
adopted also was aimed directly at appealing 
to the party’s conservative base but it was not 
designed to appeal to a general election audi-
ence.  The authoritative Congressional Quarterly 
described it as follows:
There was little moderation evident in the 
party platform adopted for George Bush’s 
second   term.  The GOP approved a hard 
line approach opposing abortion rights and 
any attempt to increase taxes.  On the social 
issues front, there were planks favoring 
school choice, school prayer, and family 
unity (C. Q., 2002, 154).
       The same could undoubtedly be claimed 
about the general cant in the liberal direction 
for most recent Democratic Party platforms.  
Indeed, both parties do all they can to encour-
age the perception that the other party has been 
captured by extremists, but their own platforms 
are often very doctrinaire.
 The parties and their candidate some-
times reinforce and feed the perception that they 
are controlled by extremists by their actions and
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the stances taken in the primary and caucus sea-
son and in the national conventions. Pat 
 Buchanan then reinforced the perception that 
the Republicans were beholden mostly to the so-
cial conservatives in their party.  The Democrats 
exploited this message effectively.   
 Both parties seek to “frame” the nar-
rative in such a way as to present themselves 
as the reasonable and rational alternative con-
stantly ready to do battle with the crazy extrem-
ists who are far out of the mainstream and who 
have captured the other party. Occasionally, as 
with the Democrats in 1972 in Miami and with 
the Republicans in 1992 in Houston, the party’s 
officials and the candidates and the campaigns 
running under their banners cooperate with 
and enhance this perception.  Barry Goldwa-
ter’s 1964 acceptance speech advocating that 
the party should offer “A Choice not an Echo” 
has become party policy and practice for both 
Republicans and Democrats in the ensuing four 
decades.  However, the parties are loath to admit 
publically that their platforms and policies are 
doctrinaire and that they must have the sup-
port of their core supporters, and a high level of 
turnout among them, to win in November.  The 
tension between the fringes and the middle is al-
ways there in both parties and how they resolve 
it helps define their probabilities for success in 
the general election.  
The Democrats in 1992
 The Democratic Party’s struggle to find 
a nominee almost undid it in the early stages of 
the 1992 race; however, before it was over the 
nominations campaign worked to the nominee’s 
advantage and allowed the party to identify and 
test the candidate who could go on to victory in 
the fall campaign. The early season contest also 
allowed Bill Clinton, the ultimate victor, to get 
all the known skeletons out of his closet and to 
try to face up to them and to exorcise the ma-
jor bad news before the fall campaign.  In that 
sense, Clinton and the Democrats were strength-
ened by the strenuous nominations process and 
the challenges he faced and ultimately overcame 
in the primaries.  The top three candidates were 
Clinton, the governor of Arkansas, former Mas-
sachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas, and former 
California Governor Jerry Brown.  Clinton 
was clearly the middle or moderate candidate; 
Brown continued to anchor the left; while Tson-
gas was a hard to classify combination of both 
perspectives.  
            None of the top three candidates chal-
lenged in the Iowa caucuses in 1992.  They left 
Iowa to favorite son Senator Tom Harkin, who 
had raised the biggest early money war chest 
and who won easily in the initial Iowa Caucus, 
but that turned out to be the high point of his 
campaign.  The days of the true favorite son 
candidacy being viable were over because the 
new rules demand competition and victories 
in the primaries and a nationalized campaign. 
Then the focus shifted to New Hampshire which 
was hotly contested.  Tsongas came in first, and 
Clinton finished second.  Since Clinton had just 
endured a week of very negative publicity which 
came in wake of breaking stories about his 
marital problems and his Vietnam War era draft 
status, he was deemed to have done “better than 
expected” in New Hampshire.   Clinton adeptly 
fed this story line by calling himself “the come-
back kid.”  Clinton did not get the most votes 
out of New Hampshire; however, he did get the 
best story line and the attendant momentum.  He 
used this momentum to gain ground in the polls 
and to raise new money. That is the advantage of 
early victories and Clinton exploited that advan-
tage skillfully.  
 This combination all came together in 
the “Super Tuesday” primary, which was still 
mostly a southern primary held on March 21, 
1992.  Clinton won the entire South on that cru-
cial day.  He then used that momentum to sling-
shot into Illinois and Michigan on the third 
Tuesday in March.  Clinton used his Illinois and 
Michigan victories to argue that he was not just 
a regional candidate and that he could appeal to 
the large Midwestern industrial and farm states. 
When he won those Clinton was on his way. 
(Cook, 2007, 28).  Clinton’s primary and caucus 
season victories provided a very solid founda-
tion for him to claim the Democratic
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nomination. He went into the Democratic 
convention clearly in control.   He then used a 
successful convention to unite the party and to 
serve as the springboard to the victorious fall 
campaign (Cook, 2002, 28).  This is the ideal 
strategy for winning the general election. 
 The Democratic National Convention 
was held in New York City on July 13-16 (Cook, 
2001, 22).  It was expected to be a fairly tame 
convention since Tsongas had dropped out in 
March and Brown had no real chance of stop-
ping Clinton.  Clinton was regarded to be more 
moderate than Brown or Jesse Jackson and yet 
he received a great deal of liberal support as 
well.  Clinton had been aggressive in appointing 
women and African-Americans to key positions 
as Governor of Arkansas, which is not easy for 
most southern governors to do.  He had culti-
vated leaders in the civil rights and the women’s 
movements, and he enjoyed high profile support 
in both communities. His wife, Hillary, was also 
active in a number of women’s and civil rights 
causes.   
 Clinton had already announced his 
choice of Senator Al Gore of Tennessee to be 
his running mate before the convention started, 
and that decision proved to be a popular one.  
The 1992 convention was carefully stage-man-
aged and scripted to present the new genera-
tion leadership narrative that the Clinton team 
wanted to project.  They certainly understood 
that the external audience was watching and that 
the fall campaign’s images and themes were 
being established.  They also wanted to charge 
up the party faithful who had come to New York 
to nominate someone they hoped would end 
twelve consecutive years of Republican rule in 
the White House.  
 Clinton won 3,372 first ballot delegate 
votes in the national convention compared to 
596 for Jerry Brown, 209 for Paul Tsongas and 
111 for Jesse Jackson (Ragsdale, 1998, 87).  
This was decidedly Clinton’s convention.  Clin-
ton’s support and his camp’s control over the 
convention allowed them to dominate the mes-
sage and to frame the image of the Clinton-Gore 
ticket.  They wanted to project the message that 
a new generation of young leaders, who were 
moderate and pragmatic policy wonks, had tak-
en control of the party.  The platform that was 
offered in New York was mostly moderate and 
leaned decidedly toward the policy preferences 
of the Democratic Leadership Council (C. Q., 
2000, 151-152).  Clinton had to deal with chal-
lenges on the left posed by both Jerry Brown’s 
delegates and Jesse Jackson, but they were able 
to do this largely outside the view of the tele-
vision cameras.  The convention itself turned 
out to be remarkably free of internal strife and 
acrimony as far as the public could see, and 
the Clinton–Gore ticket got the best story they 
could have out of convention week. 
            Clinton and Gore enjoyed a healthy 
bounce in the polls out of the national conven-
tion and their road trip taken at the end of the 
convention.  While the polls remained close 
throughout, the Clinton and Gore campaign 
never relinquished the lead for long during the 
fall campaign.  Because both camps were taking 
federal matching dollars, the Democrats were 
able to match the Republicans in campaign 
expenditures during the general election.  Clin-
ton also managed to get credit for doing as well 
or better than Bush in the debates which further 
boosted his campaign. 
            Ultimately Clinton took 43 percent of 
the popular votes compared to 37.4 percent for 
Bush.  Most of the rest was won by Ross Perot 
who won an unprecedented 19 percent of the 
popular vote in 1992 (Ragsdale, 1998, 102-103). 
However, Clinton’s plurality of the votes was 
spread evenly enough to allow him to win a 
dominant 370 to 168 Electoral College victory 
over Bush, and Perot did not carry a single state 
in spite of his impressive popular vote total.  
Clinton won all the states that had gone for Du-
kakis in 1988, and he added to it enough, most 
notably in the West, Midwest, and the North-
east, to take a comfortable Electoral College 
victory (Archer, et. al, 2006, 53).  
 Clinton and Gore, two moderate  
southerners, were ultimately able to win only 
four southern states, out of the eleven states of 
the old confederacy, including their home states 
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of Arkansas and Tennessee plus Louisiana and 
Georgia.  The rest of the South stayed firmly 
planted in the Republican Party’s column.  
The African-American vote, which is very 
substantial in several southern states, and which 
is over ninety percent Democratic is not nearly 
enough to overcome the overwhelming Repub-
lican advantage among the majority of white 
southerners.  
 The Bush victories in Texas and Florida 
were especially important components of his to-
tal Electoral College vote and were the two big-
gest states he won.  Clinton won the entire tier 
of states immediately to the west and adjacent 
to the Mississippi River.  Bush won the entire 
next tier west from Texas on the south to North 
Dakota on the Canadian border and he extended 
his reach through the plains and mountain west 
states with the exception of Colorado, Montana 
and New Mexico (all of which have become 
swing states in the 21st century).  The Demo-
crats won all the states immediately to the east 
and adjacent to the Mississippi River except for 
the state of Mississippi which Bush carried.  The 
Democrats continued to have big problems with 
the white South, and especially the Deep South, 
and the Republicans continued to enjoy a  
major advantage there.  The Clinton-Gore  
victory in 1992 proved that the Democrats could 
win without much of the South although it 
would be difficult.  This pattern was repeated in 
1996.  
            The now famous “cultural wars” thesis 
was just emerging in 1992, probably labeled and 
fed first by Pat Buchanan’s speech at the Repub-
lican convention in Houston.  The manifestation 
of the cultural wars and the polarized politi-
cal nation that accompanies this thesis is most 
graphically displayed in the red versus blue pat-
terns of the Electoral College superimposed on 
the national map showing the 1992 presidential 
results.  The results are now very familiar, and 
most of the suspense in recent presidential elec-
tions stems from the competitiveness of several 
swing states, like Florida, Ohio, Colorado, Iowa, 
and New Mexico.
 There is much continuity now evident in 
the color coded maps depicting the results from 
1992 through 2012 (Archer, et. al, 2006, 52-55).  
This has been a series of close and competitive 
presidential elections and the nation has been 
closely divided in red and blue states at least up 
to 2008 when Obama won the Electoral College 
handily mostly by taking nine states that George 
W. Bush had won in 2004.  However, the conti-
nuity between George H. W. Bush’s red states in 
1992 and George W. Bush’s red states in 2000 
and 2004 is striking. The same is true for the 
continuity of blue states for Bill Clinton in 1992 
and 1996 and for Barack Obama in 2008 and 
2012. By far the best predictor of how a state 
will vote in the presidential election is how they 
voted in the last election and only the handful 
of swing states provide for suspense and change 
at the aggregate level. The demographic groups 
and specific states which have been in the camp 
of one or the other of the two major parties have 
been largely stable and the swing states get 
most of the attention because there are so few of 
them.  This stability also carries over into group 
level support and individual voter behavior 
where the continuity across elections it has been 
very high for the past several cycles.  
  
1996
The Democrats in 1996
 The nominations season in 1996 was 
pretty much the reverse of 1992 from the per-
spective of the two major parties.   Bill Clinton 
was the incumbent president finishing out his 
first term and focused intently on achieving a 
second term.  Early on this was thought to be 
something of a challenge after the mid-term 
elections of 1994 produced a New Gingrich led 
Republican take-over of the congress on the 
strength of a 54 seat Republican victory in the 
House that year. It was the first time the Repub-
licans had controlled the House since 1952-54 
in Eisenhower’s first term.   The Republicans 
also took control of the Senate on the swing of 
a net of 10 seats in their favor and this was the 
first time they had controlled the Senate since 
the 1982-86 Regan era interregnum (Stanley and 
Niemi, 2007-2008, 54). 
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 Some Republicans saw this transfer of 
power as the first phase of an inevitable Repub-
lican realignment on the strength of what they 
hoped would be a solid Republican presidential 
victory in 1996.  However, in the ensuing two 
years, under the leadership of the Speaker of the 
House Gingrich the Republicans, especially the 
members of the House, embarked on an ambi-
tious new legislative program. It included apro-
cedural revamping of the House rules which 
established a much more centralized power 
structure in the party leadership, especially the 
Speaker’s office (Elperin, 2006; Pika and Mal-
tese, 2002, chapter 5).  They also advanced the 
substantive issues on the Republican agenda as 
represented in the Contract with America which 
Gingrich had authored and then attempted to 
promulgate in the wake of the 2004 victories 
(Gingrich, 1994). This represented a list of leg-
islative objectives that conservatives had long 
wanted to see enacted into law. 
 While most of the important planks of 
the contract advanced through the House with 
strong and disciplined Republican support, sev-
eral items also stalled out in the Senate where 
Bob Dole, the Republican leader, had other pri-
orities.  If the proposals passed both legislative 
bodies, they still faced the need for a signature 
from Bill Clinton who refused to sign several 
items.  Then after a series of dramatic face-off 
fights over the budget ensued in November and 
December of 1995 and January of 1996 the 
partisan conflict actually forced a shut-down 
of the federal government i.e. the closure of 
some offices for a few days in what were called 
“non-essential services” areas.  Unfortunately 
for the Republicans, they and Speaker Gingrich 
received the brunt of the public’s blame for the 
shut-down and the attendant inconveniences 
to the public, and Clinton fed that perception. 
(This first shut-down then became the backdrop 
and the often cited precedent for the next one in 
October of 2013).  Bill Clinton who was derided 
as “irrelevant” after the 1994 elections was sud-
denly back in control of the executive branch 
and very much in control of the bully pulpit of 
the White House and he used it to his great ad-
vantage in getting ready for 1996 when he was 
virtually unchallenged for his party’s nomina-
tion. 
 Clinton and his advisers had long memo-
ries, and they knew what the intra-party fight 
with Kennedy had done to Jimmy Carter’s re-
election quest in 1976.  They were determined 
not to have a repeat performance in 1996, and 
they were successful in clearing the Democratic 
field for President Clinton’s re-election cam-
paign that year.  On August 26-29 the Demo-
crats held a very harmonious national conven-
tion in Chicago, and the contrast with the 1968 
battle in Grant Park and the disaster that was 
the last Democratic National Convention held 
in Chicago was studied and could not have been 
more marked (Nelson, 2011).  The Democratic 
Convention took as its theme, “The Bridge to 
the 21st Century”, which was all about showcas-
ing Clinton’s accomplishments in the first term 
and getting ready for the fall campaign. During 
his first term Clinton had been somewhat hard 
to classify on ideological grounds.  He took 
some stances that were decidedly liberal and 
which were widely condemned by his conserva-
tive critics. 
 However, on other matters, like the 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
 (NAFTA) of 1993 and the Welfare Reform Act 
of 1996 Clinton had refused to follow the liberal 
play book.  On the Welfare Reform Act Clinton 
dealt with Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole and the 
conservatives in Congress to write a welfare re-
form agenda that was revolutionary for its time 
and most of it critics came from the left side of 
the spectrum.  Likewise on trade legislation, 
particularly the NAFTA bill, he defied the labor 
unions and used help from the Republicans to 
pass legislation that he deemed crucial to his 
economic development agenda.  His campaign 
presented him as pragmatic and moderate in 
the 1996 election, and the Democratic platform 
mostly reflected Clinton’s stance which was 
eclectic, but more moderate than doctrinaire lib-
eral (C. Q.  2001, 159-160).  This was a strong 
position from which to fight the fall campaign, 
and he had no effective challenger for the  
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nomination.
The Republicans in 1996
 Bob Dole was not as fortunate in the 
nomination process as Clinton although he  
ultimately prevailed handily. Dole was the 
Republican Majority Leader in the U. S. Senate, 
and a former Vice-Presidential nominee, and a 
former chair of the RNC, and well positioned to
to win the Republican nomination.  In addition, 
he had run on his own briefly in 1988 before 
bowing out in favor of George H. W. Bush. Re-
publicans favor those candidates who have run 
before and who have been good partisan soldiers 
in supporting the ultimate nominee. Dole fitted 
all those criteria and started as the front-runner.  
           Dole faltered a bit in the opening rounds.  
He won Iowa, but by a narrow and disappoint-
ing margin given that he had won Iowa hand-
ily in 1988 (Winebrenner and Goldford, 2010, 
238-239). Dole got 26.3 percent of the caucus 
vote compared to 23.6 percent which went to 
Buchanan in second place; however, Buchanan 
got most of the publicity because of his “better 
than expected” performance (ibid.).   Dole then 
lost New Hampshire to Pat Buchanan, and Bu-
chanan immediately gained significant ground in 
the national polls while Dole lost ground (Buell, 
2000, 105).  This result, like the Democratic 
Primary results in 1984 when Hart beat Mon-
dale in New Hampshire, illustrated graphically 
how much damage a loss in New Hampshire can 
do to a front-runner and how much it can benefit 
a challenger, if perhaps only temporarily.   Dole 
then quickly lost Delaware and Arizona to Steve 
Forbes, and his front-runner status appeared to 
be in some trouble.    Then the tide turned when 
the South Carolina Primary on March 2nd and 
the Super Tuesday races on March 5th provided 
Dole with the victories and the momentum 
he needed to make his nomination inevitable 
(Cook, 2007, p. 31).  Dole went on to crucial 
victories in the west, including California, and 
by the end of March he had effectively clinched 
the Republican nomination.
 The Republicans held their national 
convention in San Diego, California on August 
12-15.  This choice helped showcase them as the 
party of the sun-belt which they had become. 
The Dole forces were not short on the ability 
to learn from past mistakes.  They remembered 
the negative reaction to the Houston platform 
speeches from 1992 and by then the divisive-
ness of the Democratic National Conventions 
of 1968, 1972 and 1980 had become legend.  
People in both parties understood that there was 
a premium to be placed on conducting a spec-
tacular show for the television audience rather 
than a spectacle for the famous media personali-
ties to cover.  
           Dole and his campaign managed the San 
Diego convention very well and prime time 
was spent bashing Clinton and praising Robert 
Dole, Jack Kemp, and Ronald Reagan.  There 
had been a behind the scenes struggle over the 
plank endorsing an amendment to the U. S. 
Constitution to ban abortions; however, the Dole 
forces managed to keep this conflict out of the 
limelight.  The platform was very conservative, 
as Republican platforms uniformly had become; 
however; Dole kept the more moderate factions 
on board by giving them high profile speak-
ing slots in prime time.  Former Army General 
Colin Powell, for example, delivered his speech 
in prime time and gave a ringing declaration for 
diversity, affirmative action, and abortion rights, 
positions that were shared by few delegates in 
the convention hall that evening and that were 
rejected in the party platform (C. Q., 2001, 157-
58).
           In fact this has become something of 
a ritual for both parties.  That is, they both 
adopt very conservative or liberal platforms 
to please the party base while at the same 
time prominently programming against type 
by scheduling moderates and even former mem-
bers of the other party to speak from the plat-
form in prime time.  This, too, is a fine example 
of the two very different audiences for which 
the national conventions perform and the differ-
ent functions they serve (Shafer, 1988).  
 Nevertheless the Republican Party was 
only superficially unified coming out of the con-
vention and as the following summary from 
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Congressional Quarterly indicates, they were 
facing some internal divisions which are still 
relevant today:  “No matter how well Dole and 
the Republicans papered over differences at the 
convention, the party remained split between its 
traditional base of fiscal conservatives and its 
new base of social-issue activists who wanted 
to see their positions turned into policy” (C. 
Q. 2001, 158). The same could be said of the 
Republican National Convention which met in 
Tampa, Florida in late August 2012. 
          The basics of the general election contest 
had already been set in place by the events of 
the past four years, and the fall campaigns rein-
forced and confirmed the trends which were all 
pointing in the direction of a Clinton re-election. 
Dole’s campaign was never able to reach a take-
off point and never able to overtake Clinton in 
the polls.  In the national convention Dole tried 
to rally the party for an electoral victory against 
Bill Clinton in the fall; however, that victory 
proved to beyond the grasp of the best efforts 
of the Republican Party and Bob Dole.  Clinton 
won a formidable 379 to 159 electoral college 
victory over Dole although his popular vote 
margin fell a fraction below the 50 percent mark 
because of the presence of Ross Perot in the 
race again in 1996 (Ragsdale, 1998, 103). The 
familiar color coded map of the election results 
showed remarkable continuity with the 1992 re-
sults.  Only five states changed colors with Clin-
ton’s victories in Arizona and Florida more than 
compensating for his losses to Dole in Montana, 
Colorado, and Georgia, states which Clinton had 
carried in 1992.  The Electoral College arithme-
tic worked to Clinton’s advantage as he picked 
up a net of nine more votes compared to his 
1992 total while Dole dropped nine compared to 
Bush in 1992.  
           Party and political polarization contin-
ued in American politics and in presidential and 
congressional relations after 1996.  Indeed, if 
anything, party polarization and the culture wars 
grew more intense as the Republicans aggres-
sively went after Bill Clinton because of his 
affair with Monica Lewinsky and his attempt to 
cover it up. This fight resulted in the impeach-
ment vote in the House in 1998 the first since 
Andrew Johnson was impeached by the radical 
element of the Republican Party in the House in 
1865.  The fault lines on Clinton’s impeachment 
in the House and subsequent failure to be re-
moved from office by the Senate divided the na-
tion starkly along partisan and ideological lines 
in Clinton’s second term.  The mass public was 
similarly polarized in their views of whether 
Clinton should have been removed from office 
although a majority was opposed. This was one 
of the most intensely polarized eras in American 
politics as the Clinton years came to a close and 
the nation got ready for a new millennium and 
a new president in 2000. Polarization continued 
and became deeper in the first decade of the 21st 
Century.  
2000
The Republicans in 2000
 George W. Bush was the grandson of a 
United States Senator from Connecticut and the 
son of the 41st President of the United States.  
In 2000 he was serving his second term as  
Governor of Texas and was very popular in his 
state. While technically he had not run before, 
he had been very active in his father’s cam-
paigns, and he had been a Republican insider for 
years.  
 He had all the earmarks of a success-
ful Republican candidate, and he was initially 
the favorite of most of the Republican Party’s 
mainline or establishment figures.  The Repub-
lican Governors, and many members of the 
House and Senate Republican majority in the 
Congress, for instance, endorsed him early.  In 
addition, he had already proved to be adept at 
fundraising among traditional Republican sup-
porters in his two runs for the Texas governor’s 
office, and he improved on his earlier record by 
raising almost $100 million for his presiden-
tial campaign during the primary season. Bush 
rejected federal campaign matching funds for 
the 2000 primary season so he was free to raise 
and spend as much as he could manage to round 
up during that nominations phase.  Bush was the 
first front-runner and major candidate of either 
37
CHAPTER 3 - THE PAST IS THE PROLOGUE
party to reject the federal match, and this started 
the downward spiral of that campaign finance 
era which had been dominated since 1976 by 
federal financing and federal limits on campaign 
expenditures.  The spiral continued in 2004 and 
reached its apex in 2008 and 2012 when the 
limits effectively became moot and the whole 
public campaign finance regime collapsed. 
 In the 2000 primary season Bush’s 
campaign fundraising was a record by three fold 
over any earlier fundraising total for a nomina-
tion.  Bush’s camp tried to scare away potential 
challengers and to project an air of inevitability 
about his pending nomination.  He won an early 
victory in Iowa on January 24th, by defeat-
ing Steve Forbes and Alan Keyes.  However, 
someone forgot to give the script to John Mc-
Cain, a sometimes maverick Republican Senator 
from Arizona. McCain was not a favorite of the 
religious right, a block which is strong in Iowa, 
and he had a record of opposition to the ethanol 
subsidy to corn growers which was not a popu-
lar position in Iowa, and he probably decided he 
could not compete with Bush there.   
 McCain sat out Iowa to concentrate on 
New Hampshire which came just a week later.  
This proved to be a good strategic move, and 
McCain beat Bush by 18 percent in the New 
Hampshire Primary on February 1st (Cook, 
2007, 33; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode, 2003, 
26-27).  Here was another case where a vic-
tory in the New Hampshire Primary allowed a 
challenger to upset a front-runner and stop their 
momentum.  The battle was joined, and the 
Bush forces and the McCain forces were locked 
in a mortal political struggle for almost a month 
afterward.  A good deal of bad blood emanated 
from that contested month and tensions between 
McCain and Bush simmered for quite a long 
time.   
 Bush won a crucial victory in South 
Carolina on February 19th   -a southern state 
and the home of many dyed in the wool Repub-
lican core voters and especially the religious 
right or “values voters.”  McCain won Michigan 
the same week; however, his victory in Michi-
gan depended on it being an open primary and 
on McCain’s appeal to independents and cross 
over voters. McCain’s campaign argued that 
this appeal demonstrated that he would be the 
stronger candidate in the general election, but 
the Republican Party leadership echelons had 
already made a choice for Bush, and most of the 
party “Establishment” supported him.   Bush 
then took commanding control of the nomina-
tions race by a string of victories on March 7th 
when he won most of the large states, including 
California, New York, Ohio, and Georgia.  After 
that, the handwriting was on the wall, and Mc-
Cain dropped his challenge on March 9th. This 
was one of the earliest ever dates for a contested 
nomination race to be finished (Pika and Mal-
tese, 2002, 47).  This early settlement date and 
the size of Bush’s victory augured well for his 
chances in the 2000 general election.  
 The themes of party harmony and a 
focus on getting battle ready for November 
were prominently on display during the Re-
publican National Convention. On July 31 to 
August 3 the Republicans gathered in Phila-
delphia to conduct the business of the party, 
to celebrate Bush’s primary victories, and to 
get ready for November.  They did not want to 
have any deeply divisive floor fights and inter-
nal disagreements on public display, and they 
accomplished this objective admirably.  The 
Bush campaign managed the convention ef-
fectively and they kept the internal conflicts out 
of the public eye.   A group of more moderate 
Republicans, for example, wanted to revisit the 
abortion plank and to remove the endorsement 
of a constitutional amendment against abortion.  
Bush’s forces defeated this movement without 
a major fight (C. Q., 2001, 162).  The Republi-
can platform remained essentially a conserva-
tive document; however, it softened somewhat 
some of the more notably hard line conservative 
positions of earlier Republican platforms.  More 
importantly, the speakers from the podium again 
featured people like Colin Powell who gave the 
convention a more moderate public face. The 
fire-brands from the right, like Pat Buchannan, 
were relegated to afternoon speaking slots or 
shut out of podium appearances at all. By now 
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this had become a pattern where the party 
platform endorsed pure conservative positions 
to appeal to the party activists and the base 
but the platform guests gave a moderate cast 
to the convention itself in preparation for the 
fall campaign.  The roll call vote for president 
was unanimous for Bush.  The Republicans left 
Philadelphia, jubilant, united and determined to 
recapture the White House in November.  
The Democrats in 2000
           Al Gore was the early favorite to win the 
Democratic nomination in 2000.  He had been 
Vice President for Bill Clinton for eight years, 
and Clinton had taken him seriously and includ-
ed Gore in most of the major initiatives of his 
administration.  In addition, Gore had run for 
president himself in 1988, and he had a broad 
network of supporters and the endorsement of 
many notables in the Democratic Party.  How-
ever, it was an open seat and there were people 
in the Democratic Party who did not want a 
continuation of the Clinton-Gore era.  Clinton’s 
personal life and drama had been an embarrass-
ment to many Democrats, and there were others, 
especially on the liberal side of the party, who 
had genuine policy differences with him and 
Gore.  Early on, former Senator Bill Bradley of 
New Jersey announced his candidacy, and those 
who were opposed to Clinton and Gore quickly 
coalesced around Bradley. Bradley proved that 
he could raise money, and he basically matched 
Gore’s early fundraising ability. 
           On January 24th Gore started out well by 
winning Iowa handily by a 2 to 1 margin over 
Bradley.  Then on February 1st the first in the 
nation New Hampshire Primary was held.  It 
turned into a very close race which Gore won by 
a very narrow 3,000 vote margin (Cook, 2007, 
32).  Even though it was close, New Hampshire 
was a loss from which Bradley never recov-
ered and it was the beginning of the end for his 
candidacy.  
           The most important date in the 2000 
nominations race was March 7th when eleven 
states held primaries.  Gore won all of those on 
that date including the big states of California, 
New York, Ohio, Connecticut, and Georgia.  
Bradley dropped out on March 9th (Abramson, 
et. al, 2002, 26-27).  Gore went on to win a total 
of 38 state primaries and 76 percent of the total 
Democratic primary vote cast in 2000 (Cook, 
2007, 32; Abramson, 2002, 28-29).  The rela-
tively easy and early victory Gore posted should 
have helped him to get ready for the general 
election, but he did not ever seem to hit on an 
overarching campaign strategy and campaign 
theme that would sustain him into the general 
election.  
 The Democratic National Convention 
convened in Los Angles August 14 through 17, 
2000.  It should have been a happy and harmo-
nious convention which got their party and their 
candidate ready for the fall fight.  The Clinton-
Gore years were arguably two terms marked by 
peace and prosperity. The federal budget had 
been in the black for three consecutive fiscal 
years- the first time that had happened in thirty 
years (and it has not happened since).  The 
debates in 2000 were over how to handle the 
budget surplus. Generally the Democrats wanted 
to use them to shore up Social Security and to 
pay other accumulated bills and the Republicans 
wanted an immediate tax reduction.  By his-
toric standards this was a pleasant debate to be 
holding.  The record of the Clinton years should 
have made Gore’s job of fashioning a message 
relatively easy; however, it did not turn out that 
way.  
           On the night of his nomination, Gore 
was welcomed by enthusiastic national conven-
tion  delegates and before his speech began he 
placed a passionate, and to many it seemed, a 
prolonged and ostentatious kiss on his wife, 
Tipper Gore.  Again, this was read by the media 
as a rebuke to the famously troubled marriage 
of Bill and Hillary Clinton.  Like Bush before 
him, Gore received unanimous support from the 
delegates on the first roll call vote for president 
thus indicating the level of internal party sup-
port he had achieved (C. Q., 2001, p. 164). He 
and his campaign left the Staples Center with 
the party united and a successful convention 
behind them. 
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After Labor Day the early trial heat polls 
showed a very close race shaping up for the fall 
(Abramson, et al, 2002, 33). During the nomina-
tions contest Bush led most of the polls, and he 
got a convention bounce out of his Philadelphia 
convention.  Gore, too, got a positive conven-
tion bounce in the polls and for a short span he 
led Bush in some of the polls.  This lead did 
not last past the first debate which Gore was 
widely perceived to have lost to Bush because 
of his frequent audible sighs and his off camera 
behavior and those mannerisms, rather than 
the substance of the questions and the answers. 
No matter what the answers were and the 
policy differences the debates uncovered, it 
was personality and image which triumphed 
in the coverage of the debates as it always 
does.  Gore reinforced his negative image from 
the first debate with his tactics during the third 
debate which he was rated to have lost because 
of his aggressive and overbearing manner.  
 Gore never really recovered from his 
performance in the first and third debates, and 
more importantly from the spin that the media 
and the Republicans successfully put on the out-
comes of the debates.  Gore’s image continued 
to be one of a wooden and somewhat artificial 
campaigner and the Bush campaign success-
fully put the issue of Gore’s trustworthiness and 
truthfulness on the public agenda. In addition, 
Gore never figured out what to do with Clinton 
and how to employ Clinton’s formidable cam-
paigning skills, and Gore failed to really take 
advantage of the peace and prosperity theme 
which should have been his to exploit.  
  The final results are a prominent feature 
of our recent history.  Gore did win the popu-
lar vote, by over 500,000 votes, but he lost the 
Electoral College through the combined actions 
of the officials of the State of Florida, where 
Bush’s brother, Jeb Bush, was Governor, and 
through a decision of the United States Supreme 
Court where a very controversial 5 to 4 ruling 
ultimately stopped the Florida vote recount on 
the 34th day, thus leaving Bush with a popu-
lar vote margin of 537 votes out of more than 
6 million cast. With Florida given to Bush, he 
took a narrow 271 to 266 Electoral College 
vote compared to a 48.7 percent to 47.9 percent 
popular vote victory for Gore (Archer, et al, 
2006, 54).  If Gore had won any one of West 
Virginia, New Hampshire, Arkansas or his home 
state of Tennessee, all states that he and Clinton 
had carried in 1992 and 1996, he would have 
been elected president by the Electoral College 
quite apart from what happened to Florida.  He 
was unable to do so and the nation continued to 
be deeply divided over the election and its con-
troversial outcome, and the South became even 
more pivotal in creating a Republican electoral 
majority.  
 The Supreme Court voted largely on 
partisan and ideological grounds when five 
Republicans voted for the Bush appeal over 
two Democrats and two of the more moderate 
Republicans who voted for the Gore position in 
the case which famously settled the presidential 
election of 2000 (Bush v. Gore, 2000).  In fact, 
this case as much as any single act is emblem-
atic of the first two decades of the 21st Century 
and just how much conflict and partisan and 
ideological polarization has come to mark our 
politics, especially our presidential and congres-
sional elections, but also including the Supreme 
Court.  The ruling was hailed by Republicans 
and condemned by Democrats.  It further exac-
erbated and solidified the partisan polarization 
which had already marked public opinion.  
 It was only the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 that ultimately made the Flor-
ida case and the Supreme Court’s settling of it 
seem moot and the specific controversy largely 
faded from the public discourse in the wake of 
the terrorists’ attack, but the deep partisan polar-
ization continues and has deepened since then. 
 The parties and their candidates 
build on this polarization and they count on 
it especially to mobilize and energize their 
core supporters and to raise the money they 
need in the election.  Their allies in the mass 
media provide a megaphone which magnifies 
and extends that partisan message out across the 
nation.  The 24 hour cable news cycle, and the 
leading television and talk-radio personalities
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who are clearly and proudly associated with 
either a conservative or liberal position help to 
carry that negative message, and that sense of 
polarized rhetoric to large audiences among the 
mass public. It is not hard to identify where the 
candidates are supposed to stand on the ideo-
logical continuum and who is on which side.
        Party identification and ideological com-
mitments are the lenses through which all of our 
politics are filtered. For millions of voters there 
is little question as to who wears the black hats 
and who wears the white hats.  Much of Ameri-
can politics today takes the form of a morality 
play, but the very definition of which is the more 
moral position is hotly contested and deeply di-
visive.  This dialectical division into competing 
partisan and ideological camps was much in evi-
dence during the Clinton era, and the polariza-
tion became even more intense during the Bush 
era (Jacobson, 2004).  It then reached a new 
boiling point in the Obama era leading thought-
ful critics to question whether our basic separa-
tion of powers system could even perform its 
basic functions like adopting a budget routinely 
and paying the nation’s bills both of which were 
questions which precipitated the governmental 
shut-down of October 2013 and several threat-
ened shut downs subsequently.   
2004
The Republicans in 2004
 George W. Bush proved to be the most 
partisan president in the modern era (Jacobson, 
2007).  In this partisanship he followed his role 
model, Ronald Reagan, in paying close atten-
tion to the requirements of building a strong 
Republican Party and aggressively campaigning 
for members of congress who would be sympa-
thetic to his causes (Jacobson, 2004, Skinner, 
2008-2009).  His unstinting travel and fundrais-
ing for Republican candidates was a nation-wide 
crusade in 2002, and it paid handsome divi-
dends when the Republicans defied the usual 
pattern of mid-term election losses for the party 
in the White House.  In fact, the GOP picked up 
1 Senate and 8 House seats in the 2002 elections 
for Congress largely in the wake of the terror-
ists attacks of September 11, 2001, and Bush’s 
skillful handling of the aftermath (Stanley and 
Niemi, 2006, 50).  
 Bush was a formidable candidate within 
the Republican Party in 2004, and not surpris-
ingly, no creditable candidate rose to challenge 
him.  Many scholars have argued that Bush 
was the most polarizing of modern presidents 
up until then (Jacobson, 2007; Skinner, 2008-
2009). Regardless of how much the Democrats 
disparaged him, and they largely were very 
united in their dislike of Bush, he was extraor-
dinarily popular among his Republican peers 
and especially among the party’s base or core 
of conservative voters. They provided strong 
and unstinting support for Bush, and the conser-
vative media outlets such as Fox News, Rush 
Limbaugh and the Wall Street Journal provided 
constant protection for him and his positions 
and a never ending barrage of criticism directed 
at his detractors. This was a period when patrio-
tism and who was a patriot and who was soft 
on terrorism were the major topics of national 
debate in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and that 
debate tended to work for Bush and against the 
Democrats. Public opinion had not yet turned 
significantly negative on the war in Iraq al-
though support for it was not as solid as it had 
been at the time of the initial invasion.   All of 
this put Bush in good shape for the 2004 general 
election although the united opposition of the 
Democrats ensured that the race would likely 
be a competitive one in the fall and polarization 
would continue.
The Democrats in 2004
 The issue for the Democrats was who 
would be the best candidate to follow into battle 
in the fall.  They desperately wanted to win, 
and they wanted to choose the candidate who 
would have the best chance to do so in the fall 
campaign.  At first the answer seemed to be 
Howard Dean.  He was the former Governor of 
Vermont and as the only Governor in the field. 
Dean could claim to be the only candidate with 
significant executive experience.  Dean was also 
an outspoken opponent of the war in Iraq and 
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especially of the Bush Administration’s rationale 
for the invasion of Iraq.  Early opposition to the 
war in Iraq was becoming an important metric 
for the more liberal activists although it did not 
become a litmus test until 2008. Dean was also 
popular with young people and he was adept 
at raising money on the Internet which at that 
time was a new campaign fundraising tool. He 
was especially effective in attracting millions of 
small donors over the internet and was a pioneer 
in this campaign technique.   However, many 
Democratic leaders doubted his electability and 
were hesitant to get on board with Dean, and the 
party seemed to be searching for an alternative 
as the warm up year of 2003 came to a close.  
            The Iowa caucuses served as the spring-
board for a successful candidate and to begin 
to sort out the alternatives as it has done in 
several other cases.  John Kerry, Senator from 
Massachusetts, and decorated war hero from 
the Vietnam era, experienced much difficulty in 
getting his campaign together and mounting a 
coherent effort during the fall of 2003.  Indeed 
one would have to say that based on the pub-
lic opinion polls, Dean won and Kerry lost the 
invisible primary season up through the end of 
December of 2003.  However, by the opening 
act on January 19th, 2004 Kerry’s campaign 
was ready, and he won Iowa handily over John 
Edwards who came in second and Howard Dean 
who finished a disappointing third (Cook, 2007, 
34).  Many Democrats thought they needed a 
candidate who could be inoculated against the 
“soft on terrorism” and “anti-war” label that 
inevitably would be thrown at any Democrat 
during the fall campaign, and with his decorated 
Vietnam War combat experience Kerry seemed 
to fill that need quite admirably. When he won 
in Iowa Kerry began to emerge from the pack, 
and he began to gain some traction and positive 
press. Then utilizing the momentum developed 
in Iowa, Kerry went on to a solid victory by 12 
points over Dean in New Hampshire on January 
27, 2004.  Dean was from next door Vermont, 
and if he could not win in New England, most 
thought his race was over. Dean dropped out on 
February 17th.  
 Kerry won an overwhelming victory 
in the “mega-Tuesday” primary on March 2, 
2004, and at that time he became the prohibitive 
favorite to win it all. Edwards, his last remain-
ing serious competitor, withdrew the next day. 
On the evening of March 2nd, President George 
W. Bush called Senator Kerry from the White 
House and congratulated him on his victory.  
Starting the next day the race for the fall prize 
was on immediately when the Bush campaign 
aired a flight of commercials geared for the 
general election.  The nominations issue had 
been effectively settled for both parties the first 
week in March, which was the earliest it had 
ever been settled in the modern nominations era 
under the new rules.  The “frontloading” of the 
presidential nominations calendar had reached a 
new zenith.  Kerry won 33 of the 36 Democratic 
primaries in 2004 thus putting him in good 
shape for making a close contest of it for the fall 
term.  He did make it a competitive contest, and 
a harmonious national convention helped him to 
accomplish that objective.  
The Democratic Convention of 2004
          The Democrats met in their national 
convention in Boston, July 26 to 29.  Boston 
was chosen well before Kerry was known to 
be the nominee, but it promised to be an excel-
lent choice to showcase the Kerry campaign.  It 
was Kerry’s hometown and his political base of 
Massachusetts was one of the most liberal states 
in the union.  Kerry was a traditional liberal on 
domestic issues and his liberal voting record 
was one that the average delegate to the Demo-
cratic National Convention that year would find 
comforting.  The Boston convention could only 
be deemed a success for the Kerry campaign.  
He named John Edwards to be his running mate. 
Edwards had been arguably Kerry’s strongest 
competitor in the primaries, and he had a popu-
list appeal and an attractive newcomer image. 
Another newcomer to the national stage was the 
keynote speaker, Barack Obama, a young Afri-
can-American who was the Democratic Party’s 
nominee for the vacant Senate seat in Illinois.  
Obama was at that time a state senator, 
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and this was the first big time national expo-
sure he received.  Obama made the most of it, 
and he would be heard from again soon.  The 
platform the Democrats adopted included a 
litany of standard Democratic programs and 
appeals.  The convention was harmonious 
throughout the week, and it ended on a high 
note with Kerry’s acceptance speech.  While 
Kerry was perhaps the strongest candidate in 
the Democratic Party’s field in 2004, neither the 
primary season nor the convention experience 
could really change the fact that he was not the 
most effective campaigner the Democrats had 
ever offered.  Kerry appeared to be wooden and 
aloof and largely unaffected by the problems 
and aspirations of ordinary people. Kerry was a 
patrician in a party that had always championed 
the common person.  This demeanor did not 
stop him from winning the primaries; however, 
those early campaign experiences did not loosen 
him up and present him with the kinds of learn-
ing opportunities that a longer and more com-
petitive season might have offered.  In effect, 
the fact that the primaries ended on March 3rd, 
the earliest date in recent history, was seen at 
the time to be an advantage for the Democrats; 
however, the quick end to the competition did 
not offer the Kerry camp the opportunity to 
condition their candidate and to vet some of his 
weaknesses to nearly the same extent that the 
long and competitive nominations season did 
with Barack Obama just four years later. 
The Republican Convention of 2004
 George W. Bush was not expected to 
draw any real opposition in his quest for the Re-
publican nomination and that proved to be the 
case.  This advantage then allowed him to get 
an early start on the campaign for the fall. The 
Republicans being the incumbent party went 
second and held a late convention on August 30 
to September 2 in New York City the site of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The Re-
publicans wanted to take maximum advantage 
of that symbolism and to remind the nation re-
peatedly of the leadership Bush had provided in 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  It was a theme 
that worked effectively for them in the mid-
term elections of 2002, and they could expect to 
exploit it again.  They fulfilled that expectation. 
The Republican National Convention that year 
showcased a long list of Republican luminaries 
all of whom came to praise George W. Bush es-
pecially for his war on terrorism and to urge the 
nation to return him to office. The convention 
stage was replete with diversity and the speakers 
allowed into prime time were mostly moderate, 
symbolic and uncontroversial.  The Republi-
can platform, however, again featured a litany 
of conservative positions which also reflected 
the policy positions taken by George W. Bush 
during his first administration.  The convention 
ended on a high note of party harmony and the 
Bush campaign was battle tested with veterans 
who were eager to take on John Kerry for the 
fall.  
The General Election of 2004
 The Kerry campaign got the standard 
bump in the polls coming out of the convention 
and from then on the polls appeared to signal a 
very competitive race, which turned out to be a 
good prediction.  The Bush campaign and the 
interest groups which support the Republican 
Party had their own strategic plans, and they 
turned the fall campaign into a referendum on 
Bush’s leadership in the war on terrorism and 
into a referendum on various “values” issues 
like gay marriage in ways that dominated the 
media driven agenda.  Bush proved to be an 
even more competitive and effective campaign-
er than the Kerry people could have anticipated.  
In addition, Bush had all the advantages that 
being the incumbent and controlling both the 
executive and the legislative branches afforded 
the incumbent.  Bush and his strategist Karl 
Rove centered their strategy on the Republican 
base and turning it out in unprecedented num-
bers while also making some appeals to the 
Independents.   They accomplished this mission 
and when they won the key state of Ohio by a 
comfortable margin, the race was over. This 
was the first time a presidential campaign 
was so overtly concentrated on the major
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objective of mobilizing and winning an over-
whelming percentage of the party’s base and 
where appeals to all other audiences were sec-
ondary to this objective.  The Bush-Rove plan 
worked admirably and became a standard 
strategice choice for later campaigns.
 Bush went on to win the popular vote 
by a close and competitive 51 to 48 percent 
popular vote margin.  This translated into a 
286 to 251 Electoral College margin.  Bush 
won all the states he had won in 2000 except 
for New Hampshire which went from Repub-
lican to Democratic and he added Iowa and 
New Mexico to his totals.  Outside those three 
changes, one from red to blue and the other two 
from blue to red, the colors of all the other states 
remained the same between 2000 and 2004 
(See: C. Q, Archer, et al, 2006, 54-55 for maps).  
This continuity in the Electoral College map il-
lustrated just how stable, predictable and polar-
ized American presidential politics had become.  
The red state versus blue state dichotomy had 
become a familiar one and the continuity in ag-
gregate voting results from election to election 
was impressive (Gelman, 2008). The only ques-
tion was whether a relative handful of marginal 
states could be peeled off from their traditional 
position and added to the other party’s column.  
Barack Obama’s unexpected victory in 2008 
indicated that the answer was “yes” in the case 
of nine states he carried in 2008 that had voted 
for Bush over Kerry in 2004; however, that 
election was four years in the future.  Shifting 
from the aggregate vote level to the individual 
level of analysis, one of political science’s most 
respected analysts, Gerald Pomper, summarized 
the 2004 general election results in the follow-
ing terms.  
“Always the best indicator of electoral 
behavior, party loyalty was especially firm 
in 2004.  Kerry won 89 percent of Demo-
crats; Bush won even more, 93 percent, of 
Republicans; and the two candidates split 
the votes of independent almost exactly in 
half” (Pomper, 2005, 50).
        One could hardly ask for a better descrip-
tion of the major explanation for most recent 
presidential elections.  This is the commonly ex-
pected “normal vote” of the 21st century, and it 
is heavily driven by partisanship for those who 
identify with the two parties, and even for many 
independents the assessment of the two par-
ties is an important component of their voting 
behavior.  As Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 
have observed, partisanship has become a 
fundamental part of their social identity for 
millions of voters (2002).   That partisan divi-
siveness and red state versus blue state polariza-
tion continued with only some modest variation 
in the 2008 elections.  However, the change 
which did occur that year was virtually all in a 
direction which favored the Democrats.
2008
 The nominations contest in 2008 pro-
vided an unusual opportunity since it was a 
completely open seat contest.  There were no 
sitting presidents or vice presidents running on 
either party’s side.  It was a rare opportunity for 
a new generation and a new cohort of leaders to 
step forward and there was much interest in the 
nominations contest for both parties.  Ultimately 
there were eight official candidates for the 
Democrats and at one time as many as eleven 
announced candidates for the Republicans, or a 
total of nineteen, a modern record at that time.
(Baltz and Johnson, 2009, 227) 
The Republicans in 2008
 According to the early polls, the initial 
front-runners for the Republicans were Rudolph 
Giuliani, former Mayor of New York City, John 
McCain, Senator from Arizona, and Mitt Rom-
ney, former Governor of Massachusetts.  These 
three, in varying combinations, led the polls in 
the first half of 2007and were considered to be 
the first tier of the Republican candidates.  This 
first tier status is important because the Repub-
lican Party has a long history of nominating a 
front-runner candidate, and usually one who is 
not only widely known but who has also run 
for president or vice president before. The only 
exceptions to that rule since 1952 when the Re-
publicans went with war hero, Dwight 
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Eisenhower, are Barry Goldwater in 1964 and 
George W. Bush in 2000 and each had their own 
strong base of support among stalwart Repub-
licans in those years. By that prior experience 
measure, McCain would have the advantage 
based on his race against Bush in 2000.   The 
Republican nominations process has simply 
not been friendly to “outsider” or “darkhorse” 
candidates, and the Republicans prefer a known 
quantity and someone who the party can co-
alesce around as early as possible.  In spite of 
McCain’s presumptive early advantage, he was 
heavily challenged by Giuliani and Romney, 
and later by Mike Huckabee, a former Governor 
of Arkansas.   
 Romney was the least well known of the 
original three front-runners, and he had to buy 
considerable television time to try to close the 
name identification gap.  His substantial per-
sonal fortune meant that he could afford to buy 
the media time and the staff expertise necessary 
to be competitive. The Iowa Caucuses were held 
on the third day of January, 2008, the earliest it 
had ever been scheduled, and it drew massive 
media attention.  The Romney campaign was 
jolted when Huckabee ran first with 34 percent 
of the vote to Romney’s 25 percent despite the 
millions of dollars that Romney had spent and 
the relatively Spartan campaign that Huckabee 
could afford in Iowa. McCain ran fourth edged 
out for third by Fred Thompson.   
 What Huckabee had going for him was 
that he was an evangelical Christian, and a 
former Southern Baptist pastor. He mobilized 
an Iowa coalition of evangelical church people, 
home school advocates, and other conservative 
Christian groups, to attend the Iowa caucuses 
on his behalf.  It takes committed and fervent 
supporters to win a caucus, especially in Iowa 
where the caucus has been developed to an art 
form and a civic ritual. The participants have 
to be willing to spend a cold winter’s evening 
attending the caucuses and supporting their 
candidate.  This takes much more discipline 
and dedication than the simple act of voting in 
a primary requires.  The caucuses reward those 
candidates who have dedicated supporters who 
are motivated by strongly held ideological and 
issues based positions. After Huckabee won the 
Iowa Caucuses, he became a significant factor 
in the Republican nominations contest until he 
finally dropped out in favor of McCain long af-
ter McCain had become the prohibitive favorite.  
He then became a leading Fox News personality 
and later announced that he was running for the 
2016 nomination.  
           McCain started his competitive challenge 
with the New Hampshire Primary where he 
invested a lot of time and money.  This invest-
ment paid off on January 8th, only five days 
after Iowa, when McCain came in first with 37 
percent of the vote.  Romney came in a fairly 
close second with 31 percent, and Huckabee 
third with 11 percent.  McCain won South Caro-
lina on January 19th, a victory which must have 
been satisfying to him since South Carolina had 
effectively killed his campaign against Bush 
in 2000.   Then with a large last moment assist 
from popular Governor Charlie Crist, McCain 
won Florida on January 29th.  
       Winning South Carolina and then Florida 
became the tipping point for McCain.  It al-
lowed him to argue that momentum was on his 
side going forward into the “mega Tuesday” pri-
mary on February 5th, when a total of 24 states 
held some kind of caucus or primary.  This was 
a prize worth mounting an all-out battle for, 
and the remaining candidates expended a lot of 
money and energy on trying to get the win and 
the advantages of a positive spin out of that day 
which some termed a “de facto national  
primary.”   
 By the time Mega-Tuesday’s results 
were digested, it was clear that McCain was 
the man to beat, and that the alternatives still 
standing were Mike Huckabee and Ron Paul 
who continued to get a solid core of around 10 
percent from his Libertarian base.  In fact, Mitt 
Romney dropped out shortly after the Mega-
Tuesday primary.  From then on it was only a 
matter of time before McCain’s superior sup-
port among the party faithful and party notables 
coupled with his renewed campaign war chest 
would prevail which he ultimately did.  
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His victory on February 5th was one of the  
earliest for a contested primary season, and it 
put him in a very good position to marshal his 
resources and supporters for whomever the 
Democrats would choose to be their standard-
bearer in the fall campaign.  That proved to be 
the most contentious and most interesting chap-
ter in the story of the long campaign of 2008.
  
The Democrats in 2008
 On the Democratic side Senator Hillary 
Clinton of New York was the early front-runner. 
Clinton was the former first lady of the land and 
had just handily won re-election for a second 
term in the 2006 New York Senate race.  She 
was a very accomplished political leader in her 
own right, and she had both the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with being the wife 
of the former president.  Many people liked 
Bill Clinton, and this was especially the case 
among Democratic Party activists who are so 
crucial to winning a presidential nomination. 
Many activists and ordinary voters alike looked 
backward to his administration as eight years of 
relative peace and prosperity from which Clin-
ton retired with very high job approval ratings.  
Others loathed both Bill Clinton and Hillary 
Clinton and were prepared to vote for anyone 
but Clinton in either the primaries or the general 
election.  Nevertheless, Hillary Clinton had the 
advantages that name identification, a proven 
ability to raise money, and a national network of 
loyal friends, committed political activists, and 
interest group support could bring to the nomi-
nations contest.  
 Clinton led almost every poll in the 
2007 run up to the 2008 race and she had all the 
advantages of the front-runner, but she and her 
husband also carried a lot of baggage. They had 
become an important part of the party and ideo-
logical polarization that was by then so endemic 
to American politics. Clinton’s negative per-
sonal ratings among ordinary voters were very 
high, a condition which had been true ever since 
she left the White House in 2001.  These strate-
gic considerations created many doubts among 
some Democratic activists.  Above everything 
else, the Democrats wanted a winner for 2008, 
and that nagging doubt about Clinton’s elect-
ability was a persistent liability for the senator.  
In spite of that disadvantage, Clinton’s assets 
were so formidable that she entered the race as 
the odds on favorite to gain the nomination, and 
the polls showed her with a substantial lead that 
continued through most of 2007.  
 No other candidate, perhaps besides 
Hillary Clinton, created the excitement and 
interest of that generated by Senator Barack 
Obama of Illinois.  Obama was a young former 
state senator first elected to the United States 
Senate in 2004.  He initially came to national 
attention with a well delivered and well received 
Keynote Address to the Democratic National 
Convention in Boston in 2004.  Obama generat-
ed a great deal of interest as a fresh face, and he 
impressed many as a moderate, pragmatic and 
sane voice of reason in a deeply polarized era.  
He was also an early critic of the decision to in-
vade Iraq, and in March of 2003 he had made a 
highly publicized speech in downtown Chicago 
at an anti-war rally where he said that he was 
not opposed to all wars, “just dumb wars” and 
he declared that Iraq would be a dumb war.  
           This speech became an important cre-
dential which gave him real creditability with 
those opposed to the Bush Administration’s 
decision to go to war in Iraq. Those vehemently 
anti-war factions were especially concentrated 
in the Democratic primary electorate.   The fact 
that he was also African-American and that he 
had a compelling personal biography added 
to his appeal.  Obama used the vehicle of his 
second book, The Audacity of Hope, to mount 
a national book tour in the late fall and early 
winter weeks of 2006 to test the waters (Obama, 
2006).  His trips to Iowa and New Hampshire, 
sites of the earliest primaries and caucuses, set 
off extreme interest in his candidacy.  When he 
admitted in an interview with newsman Tim 
Russert after the November 2006 mid-term elec-
tions that he was indeed thinking of running, 
media interest gained momentum exponentially.  
Obama truly was developing into a political 
phenomenon, and it appeared that his time in the 
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national spotlight had come in spite of the fact 
that he had served only two years in the U.S. 
Senate and after ten years in the Illinois State 
Senate and had a limited political record over-
all.  
 Many people saw in Obama a candidate 
who instilled hope and reason into the political 
dialogue, and those were appealing qualities in a 
deeply divisive era.  People also saw in Obama 
a fresh new face in politics and one who repre-
sented many who had felt cut-off and alienated 
from the political process.  Young people and 
many African-Americans, in particular, seemed 
to be energized and excited by his candidacy.  
Obama had a particularly strong base of sup-
port among those who get their news from the 
Internet, and his campaign mounted an unusu-
ally sophisticated approach to mobilizing every 
facet of the new technology. Obama took How-
ard Dean’s model from 2004 and built on it and 
expanded it to an unprecedented new campaign 
model.  This strategy paid ample dividends as 
he was able to raise extra-ordinary amounts of 
money on the Internet, and to use it to hook up 
activists with the campaign and with political 
events in their area.  
 This was the take-off stage for social 
networking via the social media, and Obama’s 
campaign made especially effective use of 
this developing social and technological phe-
nomenon. Obama’s web site consistently far 
outstripped the number of hits logged by his 
nearest competitors.  No candidate had ever 
used the Internet with the imagination and ef-
fectiveness shown by the Obama camp.  Upon 
the announcement of his tentative interest in 
the nomination, Obama immediately shot up to 
second place in the trail heat polls.  He was at 
twenty percent in most polls by the end of De-
cember of 2006, although he still trailed Hillary 
Clinton who stood at just under forty percent 
(Gallup, December 2006).  The fact that Obama 
quickly began to draw attention and criticism 
from Republican and conservative commenta-
tors, as well as from other competitors in the 
Democratic race, proved that he had become a 
serious contender for both the nomination and 
the general election.  Senator Obama and Sena-
tor Clinton were the clear frontrunners in the 
Democratic race. This was an unusual field, 
with a history-making line up being offered by 
the Democratic Party. 
The Democratic Caucus and Primary Season 
Results in 2008
      2008 became a volatile, unpredictable, and 
interesting year for the Democrats. The first sign 
that this would be an unusually volatile year 
came when the results of the Iowa Caucuses 
were revealed.  On January 3, 2008, only two 
days after the New Year was heralded, and the 
earliest official start date ever, Obama won the 
first in the nation contest with an impressive 38 
percent of the precinct level caucus voters sup-
porting him. Edwards came in second with 30 
percent, followed closely by Clinton at 29 per-
cent (Jackson, 2008). In addition turnout surged 
to 239,000 in the Iowa caucuses almost twice 
the 2004 level (Patterson, 2009, 44-63; Ceaser, 
Bush, and Pitney, 2009, 114).   The other five 
official candidates trailed badly- all in the single 
digits.  The Iowa results immediately estab-
lished the top tier of the Democratic candidates 
with Obama and Clinton clearly at the top, John 
Edwards trying to gain some traction and the 
rest relegated to the second tier.  Senators Joe 
Biden and Chris Dodd both dropped out imme-
diately after Iowa.    
 The results in Iowa also put the national 
spotlight on the Obama campaign, and on the 
prospect that a young African-American Sena-
tor might become the Democratic nominee and 
even the president of the United States.  Obama 
achieved almost instant national recognition and 
fame, and his candidacy spurred great expecta-
tions about his future and the subsequent shape 
of the race.  The Iowa victory also created great 
excitement among many constituencies which 
had not been mobilized traditionally, especially 
among many young people.  African Americans 
also quickly took note of the Obama victory in 
Iowa, a state with a very small black population, 
and they seemed to start believing for the first 
time that one from their community could 
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actually have a chance to become president.  
 In retrospect, Iowa would clearly have 
to be viewed as the early and one of the most 
crucial, tipping points of the nominations cam-
paign.  However, the very optimistic expecta-
tions raised among the Obama supporters were 
immediately put into question less than a week 
later when on January 9, 2008 Hillary Clinton 
came in first in the New Hampshire Primary.  
Clinton received 39 percent of the votes; Obama 
followed closely with 37 percent, and Edwards 
came in a distant third with 17 percent.  The 
pressure increased on Edwards.  If he was going 
to be a factor, he had to start winning some pri-
maries, and he was ultimately not able to do so. 
Obama’s momentum was slowed by his second 
place finish in New Hampshire, and the “Clinton 
as the favorite” theme re-appeared instantly. The 
Democratic contest soon settled down to a two 
person race which became a marathon rather 
than a sprint and it was a race which did not end 
until four months later (Jackson, 2008; Balz and 
Johnson, 2009).
           The two candidates traded blows and 
victories and defeats back and forth until early 
June.  At first neither seemed capable of actu-
ally pulling away from the other and becoming 
the prohibitive favorite.  It is very possible that 
the Democratic Party’s rules was partially the 
cause of this stalemate.  The Democrats’ earlier 
adoption of Proportional Representation meant 
that the second place candidate got delegates as-
signed in proportion to the aggregate vote in any 
state primary. Obama especially was constantly 
able to win delegates even with second place 
finishes and to survive losses that might have 
been fatal to a similar candidate under winner-
take-all rules.  The caucuses, too, aided Obama 
as his campaign had figured them into their 
strategic equation and they consistently picked 
up victories and delegates in caucus states the 
Clinton camp had ignored.  It was remarkable 
that the newcomer and his campaign seemed to 
understand and play the rules more expertly than 
the veteran candidate who had been involved in 
far more national campaigns for the presidency.  
The Obama versus Clinton fight was not finally 
settled definitively until the last state contests 
were held on June 3rd which was extremely late 
by modern campaign standards.    
 As the race wore on the delegate vote 
totals started to loom bigger and bigger in the 
calculations about who would ultimately pre-
vail.  On May 8th,  a victory in the North Caro-
lina primary and a close second in the Indiana 
primaries allowed Obama to pick up more 
delegates under the Democrats’ proportional 
representation rules and those two contests 
proved Obama had achieved the momentum he 
needed for the last stage.  He and his supporters 
started talking about the math of the delegate 
count and how much the logic of their lead in 
the committed delegate count favored Obama.  
They also started to pick up the endorsement of 
more and more of the super-delegates, a group 
which initially favored Clinton (Kamarck, 2009, 
160-165; Mayer, 2009, 101-103).  
 From May 8th on, the public count 
among the super-delegates came to favor 
Obama, and the initial advantage for Clinton 
among those delegates had disappeared. In a 
classic case of the argument between the “In-
structed Delegate” concept of representation and 
the “Trustee” role, the Obama camp argued that 
the super-delegates should respect the will of 
the people who had voted in the primaries and 
caucuses and Clinton argued that they should 
exercise their own independent judgment and 
vote for the candidate who would run better in 
the general election. Interestingly, this is the 
same arguments made in 1980 when Kennedy 
argued that the delegates should be free to vote 
their consciences and for the stronger candidate 
for the general election and Carter argued that 
they should be bound by the candidate commit-
ments they had made at the time of the primaries 
and caucuses in their states (Southwell, 2012, 
267-283).   Thus the rules continued to have 
a different impact depending on the strategic 
choices and the interests of the candidates inter-
preting them. 
 In mid to late May several more super-
delegates announced their support for Obama, 
and the magic number of 2118 committed
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delegates seemed to be in his reach. This was 
the first time since Walter Mondale’s nomina-
tion in 1984 when the super-delegates made a 
crucial difference in who got the nomination. 
During the day of June 3rd the Associated Press 
count of committed delegates showed Obama 
with the required majority.  It was finally all 
over unofficially at that point. The long race for 
the Democratic nomination had come to a close 
and the party was still internally divided over 
the results.  
 It was up to Obama, and then Clinton, to 
start to pick up the pieces and to pull a fractious 
party together for the formidable challenge pre-
sented by Senator John McCain in the general 
election. It was also up to Obama and Clinton, 
and all who had worked so hard on their behalf, 
to ensure that the very divisive nominations 
seasons of 1968, 1972 and 1980 would not be 
repeated in a raucous and dysfunctional national 
convention which then led to a general election 
loss in the fall.  Both teams were apparently 
keenly aware of those precedents and of the 
costs of a divided convention. No Democrat 
wanted a repeat performance from the Carter vs. 
Kennedy convention imbroglio Even if the Clin-
tons and Obama could declare a truce, it was not 
clear that their supporters would follow suit.  As 
it turned out, both sides made compromises and 
took strategic steps to ensure that their national 
convention would be a success.  It is not inevi-
table that the past has to be prologue as these 
party leaders demonstrated in 2008.      
                             
The Democratic National Convention of 2008
 The Democratic National Convention 
held August 25-28 in Denver, Colorado was 
planned to be an extravaganza for the nomi-
nation of Barack Obama. The challenge for 
Obama and the Democrats was to unite the 
party.  That is always an important order of 
business for the convention, but it was even 
more compelling for Obama because of the long 
and hard fought intra-party battle with Clinton 
and the late date at which it had been settled. 
It was initially unclear just what role Clinton 
would be given although she was subsequently 
assigned a major slot in prime time to deliver 
her speech. It is always difficult to know how to 
handle a vanquished rival and especially how to 
handle former presidents during the convention, 
and the unique status of both Clintons within the 
Democratic Party made this question even more 
difficult.  
 For all the headaches and problems, 
however, the Obama forces went about their 
plans for a national convention that would unite 
the party and inspire the country if at all pos-
sible.  They were keenly aware of their need to 
use the national convention as the springboard 
to a successful campaign in the fall. Both Bill 
Clinton and Hillary Clinton were given prime 
time opportunities to speak and both gave ex-
emplary testimonials to the need for party unity 
and for the election of Obama to the presidency.  
Those speeches, along with a dramatic appear-
ance by an ailing Senator Edward Kennedy, and 
a call to arms by the only remaining scion of 
the Kennedy dynasty helped to set the tone for a 
harmonious convention.
 In this the major challenge for Obama 
was to win the support of the Clinton delegates. 
After much courting by the Obama camp, Clin-
ton announced that she was satisfied with the 
convention arrangements and with the nomina-
tion of Joe Biden for Vice President, and she 
urged her supporters to get on board. It was not 
clear that they would heed her call until the roll 
call vote on the presidential nomination since 
her name was still before the convention as a 
potential nominee, and the possibility of a vast 
convention floor demonstration on her behalf 
was very real.   Even though the Clinton camp 
had insisted on a roll call vote on the first ballot, 
after the roll call of the states got underway, 
Senator Clinton, speaking from the New York 
delegation post, made a motion that Obama be 
nominated by acclamation which was quickly 
accepted.  From that point on, it became in-
creasingly likely that the Democrats would unite 
behind Obama and leave Denver with the ap-
pearance and the reality of a successful conven-
tion.  Before that, the issue was still very much 
in doubt.    
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 Virtually all of the proceedings of the 
national convention indicated that the Obama-
Biden ticket and the Democratic platform 
constituted a mostly liberal alternative being 
offered to the American people. The Democratic 
Party platform reflected the predominant liberal-
ism which had been the hallmark of most recent 
Democratic platforms. The platforms, the tenor 
of the conventions, and the rhetoric from the 
stage in both parties showed that there were real 
choices to be made in the general election and 
that the nation was going to be presented with 
very substantive policy differences between 
the two candidates and their parties in terms of 
where the United States was going in the 21st 
Century and how they proposed to get us there. 
The Republican National Convention of 2008 
 As the party controlling the White 
House, the Republicans went second with their 
national convention.  It was an unusually late 
convention scheduled for September 1 - 4 in 
Minneapolis: St. Paul, Minnesota. It started out 
as John McCain’s convention. McCain reveled 
in the term “maverick” which was the adjective 
he applied to himself often and which the media 
had applied to him consistently since his 2000 
primary challenge to Bush.  He touted himself 
as being above party considerations and some 
of his votes on high profile issues emphasized 
the penchant to take some policy stances outside 
Republican orthodoxy.  From a larger view, Mc-
Cain had a fairly conventional conservative vot-
ing record over his long career, but he did break 
with the party and criticize it occasionally as for 
example on campaign finance reform, immigra-
tion legislation and the elimination of earmarks 
from appropriations bills.  He was also a fierce 
critic of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
and the Defense Department’s execution of the 
war in Iraq, although he was also a vigorous 
supporter of the initial decision to invade Iraq.  
Over the course of the campaign, he also be-
came President Bush’s strongest ally in support 
of the “surge”, i.e. the significant increase in the 
number of American troops deployed in Iraq.  
This independent quality did not endear him to 
all Republicans; however, it did play well with 
the media and with some independents.  
 Although in the course of seeking the 
2008 nomination McCain had largely become a 
dependable conservative, by the time the con-
vention opened, McCain had still not settled 
some of his outstanding conflicts with the 
most conservative elements of the Republican 
Party’s base.  However, on August 29 McCain 
announced what became the bombshell of the 
Republican convention.  He had chosen Sarah 
Palin, the young first-term governor of Alaska 
to be his running mate.  This was a surprise 
announcement since Palin had only been in the 
office two years and was virtually unknown to a 
national audience. She had not been on the short 
list of any of the most knowledgeable  
handicappers.  
 The choice did have the desired effect 
on the convention.  The Republican faithful 
inside the hall were galvanized by the Palin 
choice, and the social conservatives who had 
not been especially enthusiastic about McCain 
were quick to sing Palin’s praises.  She was 
pro-life, attended an evangelical church, and 
was said to be deeply religious.  She had cut 
taxes as Governor of Alaska (except for taxes on 
the oil companies) and was adamantly in favor 
of drilling for more oil in the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge (ANWAR).   From then on, it 
was the McCain-Palin convention and ticket.  A 
convention which had threatened to be boring at 
the outset was now excited and mobilized by the 
Palin choice and very much on board with the 
man who had made it.  McCain had refurbished 
his credentials as a maverick, a term which Palin 
happily applied to herself as well.
 The Republicans left Minneapolis with 
their ideological base energized and enthused by 
the choice of Palin, and the party establishment 
largely reassured by their selection of McCain 
although some were uncertain about Palin.  
Overall it was a successful convention although 
there were early strains between the McCain 
camp and the Palin camp which would become 
evident quickly and which would publically 
hamper the fall campaign.  A national campaign 
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simply cannot countenance public rumors of 
dissent and discord between the presidential and 
vice-presidential forces and be successful in the 
end.  Those stories of divisiveness between the 
McCain and Palin campaigns started early in 
2008 and certainly hindered their efforts to  
present a unified front in the general election. 
The General Election of 2008
  The national conventions were the offi-
cial kick-off of the fall campaign and both were 
held very late by ordinary standards.  The fall 
issues had largely emerged during the primary 
season although no one could anticipate just 
how much the economy would come to domi-
nate the fall.  The debates for the fall campaign 
and the themes for the television commercials 
were beginning to take definite form and the 
media were busily framing the two campaigns 
(Jamieson and Waldman, 2003).  It was much 
later than usual when the Democratic nomina-
tion was finally settled and when the national 
conventions were held; however, the race for 
the fall had already taken shape as a heated and 
contentious one as could be expected in a nation 
which had been so deeply and so closely polar-
ized for the past three decades.  It is this run-up 
to the national conventions and the events of 
the nominations season which helps define and 
position the two parties in the minds of the only 
national audience which counts, the voters in 
the general election in November.  
 Ultimately, of course, it did turn out to 
be a deeply divisive race where the partisan 
divisions could not have been much more obvi-
ous. Immediately after the Republican National 
Convention the polls showed the race to be 
essentially a toss-up and the Republican Party’s 
social conservatives were ready to work hard 
because of Palin’s presence on the ticket.  This 
neck and neck horserace continued until the 
financial melt-down of the national economy in 
mid-September appeared to present a clear and 
present danger to the nation’s economic secu-
rity and the whole world financial system was 
threatened.  
 In a highly charged atmosphere the two 
parties’ leaders assembled around a table in 
the cabinet room of the White House under the 
leadership of George W. Bush and Henry Paul-
son, the Secretary of the Treasury.  They es-
sentially accepted an emergency bail-out of the 
banks and other financial institutions which the 
Bush Administration had put together hurriedly.  
During the run-up to that meeting McCain can-
celed his public campaign to fly back to Wash-
ington, while Obama continued to campaign 
and prepare for the up-coming debate.  In the 
last two days before the Washington economic 
summit, it appeared that McCain was on the 
outside looking in and that Bush was actually 
getting more support for his plan from Obama 
than from McCain.  Obama clearly won the 
perception war and appeared much cooler and in 
better command of the facts and their strategic 
implications than McCain did.  This was the 
pivotal moment in the fall campaign and Obama 
seized it while McCain fumbled. From then on 
Obama led the polls and never faltered in his 
drive toward November 4th   (Balz and Johnson, 
2009, 351).
 Obama went on to a convincing vic-
tory, taking 53% of the popular vote to 47% for 
McCain.  Obama won an even larger electoral 
vote victory, 375 to 163 over McCain (Balz and 
Johnson, 2009, 372).  Obama won nine states 
that Bush had carried in 2004, for a net gain of 
112 Electoral College votes there alone (Ceaser, 
Busch, and Pitney, 2009, 156). McCain did 
not win a single state that Kerry had carried in 
2004.  It was the first time since Jimmy Carter’s 
election in 1976 that the Democratic candidate 
had attained more than half of the popular vote.  
Obama improved on Kerry’s performance in 
every state except for four southern and border 
states (Tennessee, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and 
Arkansas) (Balz and Johnson,2009, 372).  The 
political analyst, Charlie Cook, estimated that 
McCain won the South by 7 points, despite the 
heavy African-American population of many of 
the southern states (Ibid, 371).  Obama simply 
got decimated in much of the white South with 
the exception of the three southern states he 
won, and in those states he did not carry a
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majority of the white voters.  Republicans car-
ried a total of 22 states, most of the South, a 
part of the Appalachian mountain chain that 
Obama had problems with in the primaries and 
the Mountain West.    Outside the South it was 
a sweeping Democratic victory according to 
Cook’s estimate that Obama won the rest of the 
nation by 14 points (Ibid.).  McCain won 91 
percent of the Republican voters and Obama 
won 90 percent of the Democratic vote (Ceaser, 
Busch, and Pitney, 2009, 158). This continued 
the trend of campaigns placing their first pre-
mium on mobilizing and winning their party 
base by a nine to one margin or better.
 Obama won an overwhelming victory 
among the youngest cohort of voters and he 
won in every age group except for the senior 
citizens.  Reversing recent trends, the Demo-
cratic candidate lost the elderly, i.e. the cohort 
over 65 years of age. The fact that Obama won 
the popular vote by a handy margin is presaged 
by the finding that Obama won 66 percent of 
the Independents (Stanley and Niemi, 2009, 
115).  In essence, most of the party identifiers 
voted for their own party’s candidate while the 
Independents split but leaned significantly in the 
direction of the party which captured the White 
House.  This was the template for most recent 
presidential elections.  It was another chapter in 
the modern saga of the ideological and partisan 
polarization which has marked American poli-
tics late in the 20th Century and during the first 
decade of the 21st Century.  That polarization 
continues and is more marked today than ever 
before. 
2012  
The Democrats in 2012 
 In preparation for the drive toward a 
second term President Obama and his campaign 
planners were keenly aware of recent history 
and the advantages to entering their re-election 
race without the distraction of a difficult pri-
mary fight.  They worked hard to ensure that no 
Democrat of any stature would challenge him, 
and they succeeded in that objective.  Ultimately 
Obama had no serious opposition in achieving 
his second nomination which was a far cry from 
his internecine struggle with Hillary Clinton in 
2008.  The Obama campaign’s strategic models 
were the 2004 Bush re-election campaign and 
the 1996 Clinton campaign and they learned 
from both playbooks.  Obama was able to use 
the primary season to marshal his resources and 
to make the kinds of strategic plans that would 
use the winter of 2011 and the spring and sum-
mer of 2012 to focus entirely on the Republican 
challenge of the fall of 2012 no matter who the 
Republican nominee turned out to be.  The an-
swer to that question about the Republicans was 
only revealed after a raucous primary season 
played out.  
The Republicans in 2012
 There were numerous Republican chal-
lengers eager to take on Obama who they con-
sidered to be vulnerable, and the polls showed 
that a Republican could be quite competitive.  
The economy had been slow to heal from the 
deepest recession since the Great Depression.  
The number of people employed had moved 
from negative to positive territory soon af-
ter Obama took office; however, the monthly 
number of new jobs created by the economy 
had only grown slowly and in many months it 
had barely kept pace with an expanding labor 
pool.  Consequently, the unemployment rate had 
started at ten percent, and then declined slowly 
but remained stubbornly above eight percent un-
til the very close of the election season.  Many 
commentators and Republicans alike consis-
tently pointed out that no recent president had 
ever been re-elected with an unemployment rate 
above seven percent.  The monthly jobs report 
became the single most important indicator of 
Obama’s re-election chances although there 
were numerous other complaints about his stew-
ardship of the presidency.
 As is usually the case with the party 
outside the White House, and especially if the 
incumbent looks beatable, the Republican nomi-
nations race attracted a large and very mixed 
field of candidates.  These included former Mas-
sachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, former U. S. 
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Senator Rick Santorum, former Speaker of the 
U. S. House, Newt Gingrich, businessman Her-
man Cain, Representative Ron Paul of Texas,  
Governor Rick Perry of Texas, former Governor 
John Huntsman of Utah, Representative Michele 
Bachmann of Minnesota, and former Governor 
Tim Pawlenty of Minnesota. At one time or the 
other several of these candidates held the top 
spot in the polls based on a temporary victory in 
one state.
 At the outset Romney appeared to be 
the front-runner. He had run before in 2008 
and it has become an electoral axiom that the 
Republicans do not nominate outsiders.  The 
only other candidate who had run before 2012 
was Ron Paul, and most observers thought that 
he would have great difficulty in expanding 
beyond his avidly Libertarian base.  Romney 
also had by far the most money and the deep-
est and most experienced organization. He was 
personally very wealthy and he had many super 
rich friends and supporters.  Money can buy a 
candidate an experienced staff, media exposure, 
and the freedom to focus on other things besides 
the grinding demands of fundraising that wear 
down most candidates.  Romney had all of these 
advantages as well as his experience of having 
run already in 2008.   Based on all these fac-
tors, Romney was considered by the pundits and 
the media to be the early front-runner, but he 
encountered many problems in maintaining that 
status.
 The Republican race was hard-fought 
and deeply divisive.  The early contests pro-
vided more confusion than clarity to the race.  
The Iowa Caucuses, held two days after New 
Year’s Day of 2012, their earliest ever, were first 
announced to have been won by Romney by a 
margin of only a handful of votes.  That victory 
was widely publicized and gave Romney an 
early boost.  More than two weeks later it was 
determined that Santorum had actually won by 
thirty four votes, but by then the spotlight had 
moved on. Based on erroneous counts by Iowa 
party officials, Romney had benefitted from the 
typical first in the nation Iowa momentum boost, 
and Santorum had lost a great opportunity.
One week later Romney won the New Hamp-
shire Primary with 39 percent of the vote com-
pared to 23 percent for Paul; 17 percent for 
Huntsman; 9 percent for Gingrich; 9 percent 
for Santorum, and less than 1 percent for Perry.  
This victory was generally expected; however, 
coupled with the announced victory in Iowa, 
it gave Romney an early claim on the magical 
momentum which all candidates seek (Stanley 
and Niemi, 2013, 63).  Getting credit for win-
ning both Iowa and New Hampshire afforded 
Romney a good start and a claim on early 
momentum.  
 Then the contest moved on to South 
Carolina on February 21st which Gingrich won; 
Romney came in a somewhat distant second; 
Santorum third, and Paul fourth.  This victory 
gave a temporary boost to the former Speaker 
and he immediately shot to the top of the na-
tional polls, but that did not last long.  South 
Carolina and later Georgia were the only two 
primaries Gingrich was ultimately able to win.  
Next came Florida on January 31st.  Florida is 
always important because of its size, its status as 
a battleground state, and its position early in the 
calendar.  Romney won Florida; Gingrich came 
in second; Santorum came in third, and Paul fin-
ished fourth.  This win certainly seemed to help 
put Romney back on track, and he took Nevada 
the next week.
 Then the scene shifted and Rick San-
torum’s campaign caught fire.  On February 
7th Santorum won the Colorado Caucus with 
40 percent of the vote, compared to 35 percent 
for Romney; 13 percent for Gingrich; and 12 
percent for Paul.  Santorum also won the Min-
nesota Caucus easily outdistancing Paul, Rom-
ney and Gingrich who came in second, third, 
and fourth respectively.  Santorum also won the 
non-binding Missouri Primary that day with 55 
percent of the vote.  This was not good news 
for the front-runner, and it was not a good way 
to bolster the argument that Romney was the 
inevitable winner.  
 On February 28th Romney took Arizona 
and Michigan as expected, but he got less credit 
for those two victories because of Arizona’s 
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large Mormon population and because Michigan 
was Romney’s native state.    Romney then won 
a quick succession of states, including Wash-
ington on March 3rd and Idaho, Massachusetts, 
Vermont, Virginia and Ohio on March 6th.  San-
torum’s campaign also gained some new mo-
mentum from the results that day as he contin-
ued to do well in the conservative southern and 
border states of Oklahoma and Tennessee. 
However, Romney also won Virginia handily 
where Gingrich and Santorum were not even on 
the ballot.  The Santorum and Gingrich cam-
paigns, because of a lack of funds and staff and 
perhaps also as a strategic failure in planning, 
did not manage to get together enough petition 
signatures to get on the ballot in Virginia.  The 
point has been made repeatedly that strategic 
prior planning is required to play the nomina-
tions game successfully, and the campaign with 
the resources to survive some early setbacks 
and the ability and resources to mount a second 
and third wave attack is a decided advantage in 
the long run. The campaigns with much thinner 
resources are much more vulnerable to having 
to drop out after sporadic defeats. The abysmal 
results for Gingrich and Santorum in Virginia 
emphasize that basic point.  
 Santorum went on to win in Mississippi 
and Alabama adding credibility to his claim 
of being the “true conservative” in the field.  
Romney was the clear frontrunner but he had 
proved to be a somewhat weak frontrunner who 
could not quite close the deal.  On March 20th 
Romney won Illinois handily.  While Santorum 
actually won more counties in Illinois (N =74), 
Romney won in the more populated counties (N 
= 28) (Jackson, 2012, 8).  This victory in a large 
and diverse Midwestern state helped to bolster 
Romney’s claim to be the more electable can-
didate for November.  Romney then won a big 
victory when he took the District of Columbia 
and Wisconsin on April 3rd.  Santorum and the 
media agreed that his home-state Pennsylvania 
primary on April 24th had become a must win 
for him.  However, Santorum took a look at his 
depleted bank account and the polls, which saw 
him in a close race in Pennsylvania and decided 
to drop out on April 10th. 
 In fact, Santorum would not have been 
able to get this far under the former rules of 
campaign finance where candidates who took 
the federal subsidy funding had to continue to 
win primaries in order to continue to receive 
funds.  Santorum, like Gingrich was for a while 
an exception to that rule because each found a 
“fat cat”, i.e. a super-rich benefactor who gave 
their campaigns millions and tens of millions 
of dollars to subsidize their races regardless of 
temporary defeats.  In Santorum’s case it was a 
business man and investments manager named 
Foster Friess and in Gingrich’s case it was a 
Los Vegas gambling casino mogul, Sheldon 
Adelson, who provided their bankroll at least 
for a while. Adelson gave Gingrich $20 million 
dollars during the primary season and then gave 
another $30 million to Mitt Romney after Gin-
grich dropped out.  That independent source of 
private funds allowed both Santorum and Gin-
grich to stay in the race longer than usually was 
the case for candidates who could only win one 
or two primaries (Gingrich) or a few primaries 
(Santorum) in the 2012 race.  Nevertheless it 
proved to be inadequate for the long run.  A rich 
benefactor can sustain a campaign for a time 
and help them to survive temporary defeats, 
but there is still the imperative to win crucial 
primaries and develop broad and deep fund-
ing sources to sustain a campaign with hard 
money over the long haul.  In addition, there 
are certain categories of direct expenses, for ex-
ample, staff and travel expenses, and advertising 
written and placed by the campaign itself  that 
can only be paid for with hard money and those 
expenses demand a broader base of fundraising 
than the deep pockets of one or two fat cats.  So, 
the 2012 campaign began to define the limits of 
the indirect expenditures and those limits were 
evident again in 2016. 
 After Santorum dropped out, Romney 
effectively became the Republican nominee al-
though Ron Paul continued the race and refused 
to drop out, and the delegate count did not offi-
cially show Romney to be over the top until May 
29th  when he won Texas (Jackson, 2012). It was
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late in the day by modern standards, and Rom-
ney had been damaged by the primary battle.  
He had also spent tens of millions of dollars that 
he would have preferred to be aimed at President 
Obama. Romney had also been attacked vigor-
ously by Rick Santorum, Rick Perry and Newt 
Gingrich who identified some of his liabilities 
and launched extremely critical ads and personal 
attacks (during the long debate season) against 
him.  Romney’s experience in 2012 showed the 
real problems that a hotly contested presidential 
primary season with lots of candidate debates 
can cause for a candidate, and especially to a 
challenger.  The polls showed that Romney was 
consistently trailing Obama narrowly, but also 
that the race was competitive.  It would take an 
uplifting national convention and an excellent 
fall campaign to close the gap.
The Republican National Convention of 2012
 The Republican convention was held in 
Tampa, Florida, on August 27 through 30.  They 
started by having to cancel the first night’s of-
ficial proceedings because of a hurricane which 
was threatening Tampa.  This was reminiscent 
of the same problem which caused the same re-
sult in John McCain’s convention of four years 
earlier.  Both cancellations also reminded the 
nation and the media of how concerned the Re-
publicans were to avoid calling renewed atten-
tion to the memory of Hurricane Katrina which 
hit New Orleans on August 29, 2005, and the 
Bush Administration’s fumbled response to it.  
Cancellation of the first night backed up some 
of the better speakers, such as Ann Romney, to 
later in the week when they did not get optimum 
speaking slots.  
 Then a dispute over the rules broke out 
on Tuesday afternoon and some of Ron Paul’s 
Libertarian supporters demanded to be heard 
and loudly condemned actions taken by the 
Convention Chair. They created much noise 
and conflict on the convention floor which the 
media, predictably, transmitted to the national 
audience. There is nothing like internal party 
conflict to attract the media’s coverage and if 
it happens on or near the convention floor, it 
instantly becomes national news.  All of that 
might have been transcended if the convention 
had closed on a high note and one emphasiz-
ing party harmony; however, the last night was 
devoted not only to Mitt Romney’s acceptance 
speech, but also to an appearance by Hollywood 
star, Clint Eastwood.  His debate with an empty 
chair, ostensibly intended to represent President 
Obama, got the lion’s share of the publicity the 
next day, and the national response was one 
of puzzlement and occasional derision.  Rom-
ney’s generally well presented and positively 
reviewed acceptance speech got second billing 
to Eastwood’s strange performance.  If con-
ventions are supposed to heal factional strife 
and make the party combat ready for the fall 
campaign, as well as presenting the best face 
possible to the mass public, one would have to 
rate the GOP 2012 convention as having funda-
mentally failed to perform those most important 
functions. It did not provide the uplifting start 
to the general election campaign that Romney 
would have wanted.  
The Democratic National Convention of 2012
 The Democrats opened less than a week 
later on September 2nd in Charlotte, North 
Carolina.  They had the same objectives as the 
Republicans, i.e. put on a good show for the 
television audience and blog world, minimize 
conflict, heal any remaining factional strife, and 
get the party fired up and ready to campaign for 
President Obama.  By any standard measure 
the Democrats accomplished these objectives 
in Charlotte.  They were materially assisted 
by a gracious and appealing speech by First 
Lady Michelle Obama on Tuesday night and an 
extraordinary speech by former President Bill 
Clinton on Wednesday night.   Clinton made the 
case for Obama in a way that even Obama could 
not quite match and his ability to take complex 
policies and make them understandable and 
relevant to a mass audience was on full display.  
Obama’s speech the next night called on the 
party’s shared values and constituted a ring-
ing declaration for mostly liberal causes.  The 
Democrats appeared to leave Charlotte 
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“fired up and ready to go” to adopt a phrase 
Obama used repeatedly during the fall.  
The General Election of 2012
 Each party got a small but significant 
initial bump in the polls out of their conven-
tions, but neither one lasted more than a week.  
Then the polls settled back to where they had 
been for months, i.e. with a small but consistent 
lead for Obama.  The polls, and the size or even 
the existence of this lead became an issue itself 
in the late stages of the campaign.  Those on the 
right insisted that Romney was at least tied and 
in some cases leading in their polls and some 
of the less partisan polls, like Gallup, showed a 
close race occasionally led by Romney by a nar-
row margin. 
 The question of how to model the mass 
electorate and especially how to locate and 
question the undecided voters and those most 
likely to vote became hotly contested.  Those 
who were poll “aggregators” like most nota-
bly Nate Silver insisted that Obama’s lead was 
not large but that it was significant and that it 
remained stable.   In an ominous portent for 
things to come for Romney, when the Septem-
ber unemployment data were released at the end 
of the first week of October, the rate had fallen 
to 7.9 percent, the lowest it had been since the 
start of the Great Recession.  Obama insisted 
that this was empirical validation for his “stay 
the course” appeal.  Romney insisted that it was 
only a further indicator of just how tepid the 
economic recovery had been and some of his 
supporters claimed that the data had been ma-
nipulated by the Obama campaign.  The argu-
ment continued.  
 It turned out that the poll aggregators 
were right.  Obama won the popular vote by a 
51 to 47 percent margin and this represented 
an almost five million national vote victory.  
He became the first Democrat since Franklin 
Roosevelt to win two consecutive popular vote 
majorities.  His Electoral College victory was 
much more impressive with a 332 to 206 vote 
margin.  Neither margin was as substantial as 
his 2008 victory. Obama carried 26 total states 
compared to 24 for Romney versus 28 to 22 
states for Obama over McCain in 2008. Thus 
Obama lost a net of two states when 2012 is 
compared to 2008.   More importantly, Obama 
carried eight of the ten “battleground” states, 
losing only North Carolina and Indiana from 
his 2008 totals.  This means that 48 of the 50 
total states voted the same way in both 2008 
and 2012.  This result illustrates just how stable 
and just how polarized the nation remained at 
the aggregate vote level (Jacobson in Nelson, 
2014, 145-172).  The extent of polarization is 
also indicated at the individual voter level by the 
fact that 93 percent of the Republicans voted for 
Romney and 92 percent of the Democrats voted 
for Obama (Stanley and Niemi, 2013-2014, 
117).  This continued the extraordinarily high 
indicators of the partisan polarization which had 
marked all the recent presidential elections. 
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 For those who follow the Responsible 
Parties theory, the 2012 elections might have 
been thought to perform the function of provid-
ing a mandate to govern for President Obama 
and the Democrats (White and Mileur, 1992).  
In the one truly national election we have, 
Obama had “gone to the country” and won.  The 
Democrats maintained their control over the 
U. S. Senate, but lost the House by a 33 vote 
margin.  Even in losing the House, however, 
they had garnered more than a million popular 
majority of the total votes cast in House races.  
It was only the vagaries of how the votes are 
allocated and distributed and especially how the 
districts had been drawn by more states with a 
Republican majority in control of unified state 
governments that produced this gerrymandered 
outcome.  
 Thus, we began a new era of divided 
government at the national level.   Party and 
ideological polarization continued and the leg-
islative gridlock and partisan wars intensified, if 
anything, in 2013 through the 2015 preamble to 
the 2016 national elections.  All of the ensuring 
partisan bickering in Washington provided the 
backdrop for the run up to the 2016 presidential 
nominations and election season.  It was an era 
when the political leaders fought almost inces-
santly and had trouble getting anything much 
done and the voters professed repeatedly to the 
pollsters and the media their disappointment 
and disgust with their government, but tens of 
millions of Americans through their individual 
votes ensured the aggregate outcome they ap-
parently disliked and distrusted.  
 The 2012 elections produced divided 
government again and the divisions in the fed-
eral government reflected and exacerbated the 
continuing partisan and ideological divisions in 
the country.  Then the 2014 mid-term elections 
produced a partisan wave for the Republicans 
which changed the U. S. Senate from a Demo-
cratic majority to a Republican majority giving 
complete control of Congress to the Republicans 
and producing an even more deeply divided 
government. The polls showed that job approval 
for Congress was at historic lows in the eyes of 
the American people.  The question was whether 
these negative evaluations of Congress would 
improve under complete Republican control 
but the early results indicated that they did not 
change much.  
 Most of Obama’s second term policy 
agenda was stymied and the chances of his pre-
vailing on most legislative votes were small and 
none. Obama’s job approval ratings would be an 
important factor setting the context for the 2016 
campaign and for most of 2015 these hovered in 
the mid to high forties and occasionally broke 
fifty percent. These job approval numbers were 
not a disaster for the Democrats’ hopes for 2016, 
but they were not great either.  They essentially 
meant either side could win.   The economy 
turned in very positive job creation numbers, 
with almost every month in 2015 showed that 
the new jobs created were consistently above 
the 200,000 mark, and the total numbers of jobs 
created since the Great Recession reached and 
then exceeded the number lost producing very 
positive net jobs gained totals. The stock market 
was twice the level that existed when Obama 
took office, and the consumer confidence in-
dex grew. Those objective numbers should 
help the Democrats, but many people were still 
unemployed or under employed and many also 
believed the nation was still in a recession. In 
politics it is the perceptions which count. 
 The Republicans in the Congress were 
intent on fashioning an image and a strategic 
narrative for the upcoming 2016 national elec-
tions by stressing the negatives claiming that 
the nation was weak abroad and struggling 
economically at home. The Democrats were 
just as intent of achieving the same objective by 
stressing the positives in the Obama record. The 
media swung back and forth in their coverage
CHAPTER 4
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and interpretations of both narratives- highlight-
ing the positives one day and stressing the nega-
tives the next.  All of this conflict intensified the 
already deep divisions in the government and 
in the nation. This mixed picture became the 
backdrop for the beginning of the 2016 race and 
the official start of the primary season.  
 The American people had consistently 
voted for divided government and the at-
tendant polarization but they were not par-
ticularly happy with the results.  The “right 
track; wrong track” poll questions consistently 
produced a whopping majority for the wrong 
track although that has been the case for a long 
time.  Our political culture apparently now 
includes the recognition that Americans are a 
dyspeptic and critical people when it comes 
to overall evaluations of their government no 
matter who is in control. This has become a key 
component of the American political culture. 
This insures that “the angry electorate” marked 
by a large contingent who tell the pollsters that 
they want to throw all incumbents out and vote 
for newcomers will continue to be a staple of 
every election.  This phenomenon may account 
for the fact that three of the top candidates in 
the Republican contest for 2016 are people who 
have never held office before and who ran with 
pride with their “outsider” labels.  
 So what do all these historical examples 
teach us?  Well, first the all-important base of 
the two parties has shifted significantly along 
the ideological axis.  The Republicans have 
become the markedly conservative option and 
are probably now the most purely conservative 
the party has ever been in its history (Mann and 
Ornstein, 2012; White, 2016).  This is particu-
larly the case among the political activists and 
campaign funders who are so crucial to gaining 
the necessary victories in the primaries and the 
caucuses.  There are now groups on the right in 
the Republican Party who effectively hold veto 
powers over the nominations and if a candi-
date is not acceptable to them, they will not be 
successful in winning the nomination.  The old 
Eastern elite establishment of moderate and lib-
eral Republicans has disappeared to be replaced 
by hard core conservatives, mostly from the 
South and West.  
 Essentially the same picture holds true 
in reverse in the Democratic Party. Their core is 
on the left or liberal end of the continuum, and 
they have shifted markedly along the ideologi-
cal axis in that direction since the beginning of 
the reform era in the early 1970s.  In fact, the 
reform era was initiated and led by the Demo-
cratic Party activists of that time who wanted 
the party to displace the former party bosses and 
replace them with grassroots activists much like 
themselves.  These activists came from the civil 
rights, anti-war and women’s movements and 
they entered party service in order to advance 
those causes.  Today a candidate who does not 
accept the broad consensus of liberal values 
which animated those groups will not have 
much of a chance in seeking the Democratic 
Party presidential nomination.  The old conser-
vative wing of the party, primarily centered in 
the South, has almost completely been thrown 
out in favor of conservatives who are now Re-
publicans. 
 That being said, however, the Democrats 
are still the more diverse of the two parties.  
This diversity includes the demographic groups 
they represent, the socio-economic classes they 
include in their base, and even a certain level of 
ideological and issue based disagreement that is 
at least tolerated.  There are significantly more 
moderates still identified with the Democratic 
Party than among the Republicans where the 
term conservative has achieved almost univer-
sal approbation and adoption among the party’s 
base and party leaders alike (Jackson, 2015).
 The candidates understand all too 
well that they have to appeal to the party’s 
activist base in order to win the caucuses and 
primaries.  This means that they usually have 
to tack to the right if they are Republicans 
or to the left if they are Democrats. As the 
nominations season goes on the candidates often 
become more and more shrill and more and 
more pure in their attempts to appeal, and even 
pander, to those they must please in order to win 
the next primary or caucus. They may have been
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somewhat moderate in at least some of their po-
sitions in the past or they may have a moderate 
record in prior offices held; however, such be-
liefs become expendable in the constant drive to 
win over the ideological and issue driven party 
loyalists and activists who disproportionately 
populate the precincts that turn out most reli-
ably in the primaries and caucuses.  They also 
have to please the major campaign financiers 
who tend to be funders with a cause and not just 
disinterested champions of good government 
and the common good.  
 For example, early in the spring of 2015, 
Hillary Clinton moved much more clearly into 
the liberal ranks on such issues as same-sex 
marriage, civil rights, and income inequality 
under perceived pressure first from what was 
initially the Elizabeth Warren constituency and 
then became the Bernard Sanders consistency. 
She also started taking much more hard-hitting 
and well defined policy positions in order to 
make her liberal bona fides clear. For example 
her earlier studied reluctance to take a stance on 
the Keystone pipeline proposal evaporated into 
a ringing declaration of her opposition, a posi-
tion well calculated to appeal to the environ-
mental activists in the party base. Jeb Bush and 
Marco Rubio abandoned their earlier support 
for a moderate immigration reform plan, which 
included a path to citizenship, in order to placate 
the Tea Party constituency in the Republican 
base who denounced all such plans as “am-
nesty”. In 2012, Mitt Romney announced early 
on that he was an “extreme conservative” even 
though his record as governor of Massachusetts 
was more moderate than anything else and he 
had even initiated and signed into law a health 
care plan that became the model for the national 
Affordable Care Act in the Obama Administra-
tion.  
 No modern Democratic candidate has 
been pro-life and no Republican candidate has 
been pro-choice since the two parties realigned 
on this controversial issue and started putting 
their signature positions into the party platform 
in 1980.  Early in their presidencies Bill Clinton 
and Barack Obama equivocated on the matter 
of same sex marriage until they both adopted 
the Democrats’ litmus test position somewhat 
later; however, Hillary Clinton got out front on 
the issue at the early stages of her campaign in 
2015. The time for equivocation had passed.  
All the Republicans were opposed although 
they varied somewhat in just how vociferous 
they were in their condemnation of the Supreme 
Court’s landmark ruling in June of 2015 hold-
ing that state recognition of same sex marriages 
was required by the U. S. Constitution.  All of 
this scrambling to the ideological extremes and 
even pandering to the right or left is driven by 
the nature of the new nomination system and the 
fundamental imperatives of a much more ideo-
logical and issues oriented party system. The 
base for both parties is much more ideological 
and those who are the most involved in politics 
as activists are also the most ideological and is-
sues oriented voters.   
 All of this nomination season policy 
position taking is highly relevant to the way the 
winner will govern.  Candidates who run on the 
signature values and issues positions of their 
parties are very unlikely to abandon them when 
they attain the White House.  The platforms 
they run on in the general elections are mark-
edly different from each other and promise quite 
different visions of what American government 
and society will look like if they are elected.  
The most important positions literally become 
matters of war and peace and life or death for 
millions of people both at home and in the for-
eign countries that are profoundly impacted by 
the policies of an American administration.
 The platforms of the two major par-
ties are certainly not binding on those elected 
in any legalistic sense; however, they are 
important political statements of the funda-
mental issue and ideological commitments of 
the two national parties, and they are impor-
tant indicators of where the president will try 
to take the party and the country when he or 
she is elected. The candidates make promises 
and commitments when they are running and 
they take campaign funds from interest groups 
and individuals who have a policy agenda.  
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Those who are elected are unlikely to just 
abandon those promises, friends, supporters 
and sources of campaign funds once they are in 
power. Indeed they are almost always commit-
ted to trying to transform those earlier campaign 
promises into public policy.   
 The same situation exists in the U. S. 
Congress.  The Congress is now more polar-
ized ideologically than it has ever been in 
American history.  The redistricting process is 
firmly under the control of the parties in most 
states.  Where one party is dominant in a state 
they draw congressional and legislative district 
lines that are designed to protect their party to 
the maximum extent possible.  This means a 
maximum number of districts where there is 
one party control and achieving the nomina-
tion is tantamount to achieving election victory.  
Thus, the only way an incumbent is likely to be 
defeated from such a district is to draw a strong 
opponent in a party primary.  Such an opponent 
is likely to come from the more ideological 
right wing if the incumbent is a Republican and 
from the left wing if the incumbent is a Demo-
crat.   
 Thus, party gerrymandering which 
is rampant in many states is a very strong 
driver of party polarization and the rewards 
for sticking to the party line are much more 
compelling than the rewards for “working 
across the aisle” in a bi-partisan fashion.  
The policy making process in Washington has 
been sacrificed to the electoral interests and the 
gerrymandered district line drawing of the two 
parties.  Getting elected and following the signa-
ture issue positions of the party base has become 
more important than any pursuit of the com-
mon good or the public interest.  Compromise 
is taken as the sign of weakness and insufficient 
commitment to ideological dogma and the 
Congress is often gridlocked over the most basic 
issues and the ability to govern suffers.  
 The level of party unity and party line 
voting in the Congress has never been higher.  
The 2010 and 2014 mid-term elections effec-
tively wiped out those who mis-identified with 
the other party.  That is, the moderate to conser-
vative Democrats were almost totally thrown 
out or retired, especially in the South, and they 
were replaced with conservative Republicans.  
On the other side, the old line liberal to moder-
ate Republicans have all been replaced by much 
more conservative Republicans.  The party in 
the government is now almost entirely conserva-
tive on the Republican side and almost entirely 
liberal on the Democratic side.  The “Blue Dog 
Caucus” which once represented the moderate 
Democrats, mostly from the South and West, 
faded away after the 2010 and 2014 mid-term 
elections decimated their ranks. 
 This polarization also extends to the 
party in the electorate.  Following elite level 
leadership, the two parties have moved a long 
way toward realignment at the mass voter level 
as well.  The liberals are almost all Democrats 
and the conservatives are almost all Republicans 
and there are far fewer misaligned partisans now 
than at any time in our history.  Only the mod-
erates remain somewhat confused with some 
going each direction and many calling them-
selves independents.  The ideological voters do 
the expected and vote for their own party both 
for president and Congress.  The level of party 
voting at the mass level has never been higher 
and the level of cross-over or split-ticket 
voting has never been lower than in recent 
presidential elections. This all starts in and 
is reinforced by the presidential primaries and 
caucuses.  What is true at the presidential level 
is also true at the congressional level although 
the trend is tempered and dampened somewhat 
by voting for the incumbent. 
 This is the typical picture of party 
and ideological polarization.  It is also rein-
forced by geographic, class based, racial and 
gender polarization. The earlier cross-cutting 
cleavages of the American polity and society 
have now aligned themselves to be much more 
conterminous with party loyalty and the existing 
issue cleavages in the polity. The cross-cutting 
cleavages which formerly led to cross-pressured 
voting now is much more comfortably en-
sconced in the belief that everyone I care about 
thinks very much like me and shares my views
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and beliefs.  Partisanship has become an integral 
part of one’s social identity, just as important 
as religion or race, as scholars such as Green, 
Palmquist, and Schickler argue (2002). Voters 
are reinforced in these comfortable beliefs by 
the now partisan and polarized media, especially 
cable television and talk radio which is sought 
out by those who believe whatever that particu-
lar media outlet is advocating and reinforcing 
every day and with every newscast.  The Inter-
net, social media and blogs are made to order 
for those who seek a community of shared inter-
ests and true believer certainty.  If one sticks to 
one’s Facebook Friends and Twitter community 
each day to gain news and perspectives on poli-
tics, never a discouraging word will be heard.
 This familiar picture of the polarized 
electorate led by a polarized political elite 
and reinforced by a polarized media and mo-
bilized interest groups has significant impli-
cations for the operation of the government.  
Because of the separation of powers and checks 
and balances system deeply embedded in the 
structure of American government, it takes co-
alitions and compromise to make much happen 
and particularly to fashion new and innovative 
policy departures.  The president proposes and 
the Congress disposes in the legislative process.  
It takes building a winning majority in order to 
pass a bill.  It requires give-and-take and com-
promise in order to build winning coalitions.  
It requires even more give and take and com-
promise if the government is divided with the 
congress, or even one body of the Congress, un-
der the control of one party and the presidency 
under control of the other.  Divided government 
has been the norm far more often than unified 
government since the reforms were instituted.
 This means that the compromise and 
the give-and-take that are required for the 
democratic process to work in a separation 
of powers system have become more and 
more difficult to achieve.  The large issues like 
adopting a budget and determining the size of 
the defense establishment and dealing with do-
mestic challenges like the health care needs of 
the millions of uninsured, or the legal status of 
millions of illegal immigrants, the need to con-
stantly build and upgrade the nation’s infrastruc-
ture, or what to do about climate change, clean 
air and water rules, and the right to life versus 
freedom of choice positions, or any semblance 
of limitations on guns, all strike fierce debates 
and party-line votes, and legislative gridlock is 
the norm when dealing with anything contro-
versial.  Just keeping the government open and 
not facing another shut down threat over such 
mundane procedural issues as voting to raise the 
debt ceiling, which absolutely has to be done to 
preserve the full faith and credit of the American 
government, is a frequently faced and totally 
manufactured crisis in recent years. 
 It is a crisis which apparently became 
the tipping point leading to the resignation of 
former Speaker of the House, John Boehner. 
A dysfunctional Congress has become the new 
normal in Washington, and the polls indicate 
that the judgment of the American people on 
the job the congress has been doing for the past 
several years is devastatingly negative.   
 This malfunctioning of the system 
has a major impact on the executive branch 
as well.  The president becomes a lame duck 
after two years of his first term and two years 
of the beginning of the second term, if he can 
achieve a second term.  The battle to be the 
president’s successor starts earlier and earlier 
and the partisan gamesmanship leading up to 
the next national elections starts as soon as 
the new Congress is seated. The president has 
certain prerogatives, especially in the foreign 
and defense fields and he can still lead in those 
areas although even there the president is 
increasingly challenged by the other party in 
congress. President Obama’s attempt to join six 
major world powers in the negotiation of a plan 
to control Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions is 
just one of the most important and most conflict 
ridden examples of such partisan opposition in 
the Congress developing around the position of 
trying to scuttle the agreement, or even make it 
impossible to achieve, as Senator Tom Cotton of 
Arkansas and forty six of his Senate colleagues 
did even before the agreement was signed. 
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This is only the most recent example of con-
gressional assertion of its powers to contain 
and control the president’s power over foreign 
policy although it ultimately failed. 
 On the domestic side it is infinitely 
harder for the president to work his will and 
lead Congress in his preferred policy direction.  
The Congress has multiple powers that can be 
used to counter and stymie the president, with 
the power of the purse as the most important 
and most easily used example.  They also have 
the power of continuous oversight of the execu-
tive branch and it can be used as a potent politi-
cal weapon against the president’s policies and 
administrators.  Obama’s two-year battle for the 
Affordable Care Act actually ended in legisla-
tive victory in 2010.  However, its implementa-
tion was constantly challenged in the Congress 
and before the courts for the next five or six 
years.  At this writing the legal fate of the ACA 
has seemingly been settled as to its basic con-
stitutionality by an apparently definitive victory 
handed down by the U. S. Supreme Court at the 
end of June, 2015.  Its political fate awaits the 
outcome of the presidential and congressional 
elections of 2016 since most of the Republican 
presidential candidates claim they would move 
to repeal or seriously modify the ACA on the 
first day of their new administrations.  The fate 
of the president’s immigration policies and en-
vironmental regulations await a similar fate with 
the next Congress and administration.  
 This policy gridlock is the product of 
the separation of powers system James  
Madison and his colleagues constructed as 
the basic edifice of the American Constitu-
tion.  The basic structure was one which re-
quired coalition building and compromise to 
make it work in the founders’ day. It also re-
quired the development of modern political par-
ties which the founders got busy building even 
as some of them at the same time denounced 
the bane of excessive partisanship.   This basic 
constitutional structure is one which requires 
the same skills today. However, today it is very 
difficult to find the formula for compromise and 
the path to successful coalition building in order 
for the major and deeply conflicted issues of the 
modern world to be managed under the aegis of 
an Eighteenth Century government structure. 
Starting in the 1790s, the parties were the nerves 
and sinew which bound the body politic togeth-
er and allowed a disjointed system to function.  
The political parties were always the key to 
making that separation of powers and checks 
and powers system workable.  The parties orga-
nized their forces to advance their causes, and 
the cause of their president if they controlled 
the White House.  But, they also usually recog-
nized that the opposition had rights and maybe 
occasionally had good ideas which should be 
included in the basic policy. 
 With the kind of polarization we have 
today, which is clearly driven and exacerbated 
by the presidential nominations and election 
system, and then reinforced by the separate con-
gressional elections, partisan gerrymandering, 
and the pernicious influence of big money and 
ideologically driven media, it is very difficult to 
make basic policy and to address the fundamen-
tal problems facing American society and the 
world’s needs.  
 We can do better.  Indeed we must do 
better if our 18th Century constitutional form of 
government is going to be capable of addressing 
the nation’s complex modern problems and find 
a way to survive the deep conflicts and unyield-
ing political allegiances which often threaten to 
paralyze it and prevent American government 
from rising to the demands of a 21st Century 
world. 
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Appendix A
   
Presidential Nominations Primer: The Rules of the Game
1.   The successful candidate must run in and win a series of state based primaries and caucuses in 
       order to be nominated
2.   One of the early front-runners usually wins the nomination.
3.   The Republicans traditionally nominate candidates who have run for president at least once 
       previously.  The Democrats occasionally nominate an “outsider”.
4.    The party activists in both parties have become the major influence in deciding who the  
       nominees will be.  
5.    The candidate who raises the most money will usually win.  
6.   Sequencing is critical to the development of a successful candidate strategy.
7.   Campaign infrastructure and human resources are critical.  
8.   The preprimary presidential debates are a new obstacle and opportunity and have become
      an increasingly important part of the winnowing process.  
9.   Winning early contests and winning often is essential to establishing momentum and 
      staying alive in the race.  
10.  The candidate who relies heavily or almost exclusively on an initial one state victory 
      strategy will almost certainly lose.  
11.  The party which holds the most harmonious national convention will go on to victory 
      in November.  
12.  Winning the party base, that is a large majority at the ninety percent or above level, 
       is necessary for a victory in the fall.  
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                                    Appendix B   
Schedule of Primaries and Caucuses for 2016
Date     State  Contest Type
February
Monday, February 1   Iowa   Caucus
Tuesday, February 9   New Hampshire Primary
Saturday, February 20   Nevada (D)             Caucus
     South Carolina (R) Primary
Tuesday, February 23   Nevada (R)  Caucus
Saturday, February 27   South Carolina (D) Primary
March
Tuesday, March 1 **  Alabama  Primary
(Super Tuesday)
     Alaska (R)  Primary
     Arkansas  Primary
    
     Colorado  Caucus
     
     Georgia  Primary
     Massachusetts  Primary
     Minnesota  Caucus
     North Carolina Primary
     
     Oklahoma  Primary
     Tennessee  Primary
     Texas   Primary 
     Vermont  Primary
     Virginia  Primary
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Date    State   Contest Type
Saturday, March 5  Kansas    Caucus
    Kentucky (R)  Caucus
    Louisiana  Primary
    Nebraska (D)  Caucus
    Maine    Caucus
Tuesday, March 8  Hawaii (R)  Caucus
    Idaho (R)  Caucus
    Mississippi  Primary
    Michigan  Primary
    
Sunday, March 13  Puerto Rico   Primary
Tuesday, March 15  Ohio   Primary
    Florida   Primary
    Illinois   Primary
    Missouri  Primary
Tuesday, March 22  Arizona  Primary
    Utah   Primary
Saturday, March 26  Alaska (D)  Caucus
                                                Hawaii (D)  Caucus
    Washington (D) Caucus
April  
Tuesday, April 5  Wisconsin  Primary
Tuesday, April 19  New York  Primary
Tuesday, April 26  Connecticut  Primary
                                                Delaware  Primary
                                                Maryland  Primary
    Pennsylvania  Primary
    Rhode Island  Primary
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                                 Appendix B cont.    
Schedule of Primaries and Caucuses for 2016
May
Tuesday, May 3   Indiana  Primary
Tuesday, May 10   Nebraska (R)  Primary
     West Virginia  Primary
Tuesday, May 17   Kentucky (D)  Primary
     Oregon  Primary  
  
June
Sunday, June 5   Puerto Rico (D) Primary
Tuesday, June 7   California  Primary
     Montana  Primary
     New Jersey  Primary
     New Mexico  Primary
  
     South Dakota  Primary
Tuesday, June 14   D. C.   Primary
States Not Settled
     North Dakota
     Utah
     Colorado
     Idaho
     Maine 
     Washington
     Wyoming
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** Date RNC rules allow states to shift from Proportional Representation to Winner-Take-All  
primaries.  
Sources:  http://www.uspresidentialelectionnews.com/2016-presidential-primary-schedule-calen-
dar/
http://www.politics1.com/calendar.htm  Accessed:  September 16 and 17, 2015.  
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